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ABSTRACT 
At the beginning of the fifth century the Athenian strategia 
constituted, together with the polemarch, the chief military executive 
institution of the newly established democracy. It soon outgrew 
its purely military function and became the single most important 
magistracy of the state at the heart of fifth-century Athenian 
politics and government. Possession of the strategia was the only 
way to political promincace and power, at least until the demagogues 
found an alternative path. All the most important and influential 
politicians of the fifth century from Themistocles to Alcibiades, 
including Aristeides Cimon, Pericles, Nicias and Clean, only became 
or remained the leaders of Athens as generals. It is not surprising 
therefore that the strategia has been the subject of close attention 
by modern scholars. Our knowledge of the character of the Athenian 
democracy is certainly not complete without an understanding of the 
workings of its major executive institution. However, modem 
scholarship has failed to resolve many of the problems concerned with 
the strategia and has produced a wealth of argument without any general 
measure of agreement, rather than any basic conclusions. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to submit some of these 
problems to a reexamination. Many of them, admittedly, have come 
under the scrutiny of Charles W. Fomara, and his recent work ("The 
Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404", Historia Einzelschriften, 
Heft 16, 1971) is the most valuable recent contribution to the 
subject. I agree with much of Fornara t s analysis but concerning 
1 . 
2. 
many important considerations I am unable to accept his conclusions. 
In what follows I argue that the reform of 501/0 established the 
electoral procedure whereby the generals were elected by the whole 
Demos. At the beginning of the fifth century each general was 
elected from a different tribe, one general being chosen from each of 
Cleisthenes t ten tribes, but an electoral reform of about 480 or one 
or two years earlier removed the requirement providing for tribal 
representation. Henceforward the generals were elected g 
) 	c / 
rather than Kacr T ir 4V S VCs. . The Athenians cannot be said to 
have departed from the practice of electing ten generals annually at 
the :tilXctirEs'ial erra.-ricZV but the removal of the tribal-represent-
ation restriction also removed the obstacle to an increase in the 
number of generals beyond ten. In some years of the fifth century 
there is a numerical increase in the strength of the board. The 
Athenians elected extra generals as circumstances dictated. Finally, 
the principle of collegiality was strictly maintained in practice 
throughout the fifth century except for one minor aberration in 
407/06. A strict differentiation can be drawn between the political 
prestige and influence pertaining to an individual and the official 
authority which he possessed as a general. 
PART 
CHAPTER 
Ath Pa 22.2 and the Reform of 501/0. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn with safety and 
without fear of challenge about Aristotle's statement ?,-recTa-roin 
arparriyais npoUvro KaTa ckvAds., e 	,s6vAijs _EV% 'Trig SE 
1  (1.7c:falls c.-rpuTtas )yd' 	1 n..	6 7 roA 	 i g papxos 	s simply that one result of 
Cleisthenes' constitution was the creation of ten' strategoi one from 
each tribe. It is not possible to summarize further nny widely 
accepted viewpoint as to what the reform was or what it was not. In 
short,no general agreement has been reached in answering questions 
which arise from this sentence. Was the strategia a continuation of 
a pre-Cleisthenic military institution which of necessity adjusted to 
Cleisthenes tribal reorganization, or was it more than a simple 
mechanical adjustment and rather an innovation which broke sharply 
with the past? Secondly, what was the relationship between the 
strategoi and the polemarch and in which of the two elected positions 
did real authority reside? ' For example, was the polemarch effectively 
the commander-in-chief and the generals merely tribal commanders or 
were the strategoi the military executive of the state as well as 
tribal leaders, the polemarch retaining only some of his traditional 
powers rather than effective command? Thirdly, who elected the 
strategoi, the tribes voting individually or the ecclesia voting on 
all candidates, and what was the procedure whereby candidates were 
'chosen and then elected to office? 
3. 
Before an attempt is Made to examine each of these questions 1 
4, 
in turn, it is perhaps necessary to briefly consider the chronolog.- 
ical difficulties in Ath Pa 22.2. In the sentence immediately 
before the one about the strategoi Aristotle says Trp&r.ov pay 0 UV 
E'TEl IT 	11.676. I-QUI-71V 772 V KaTdaTa 	 4X0VTOS'i-fl POLAii 
TOrg T7EV.7aKOCT:.01j TOV OpKov .1-rotrio-av 	pZrc Kai ii7v 4113,45ovetv: 
If the dating point provided by Karcorra_criv is identified with 
Cleisthenes' legislative activity in the year of Isagoras' archonship, 
508/7, 2 then the archcaship of Hermocreon belongs to 504/3. 3 However, 
this conflicts with the assertion of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that 
4 Acestorides was archon in 504/3 and with Aristotle's succeeding 
chronological indication that ETEI 	T4011M, stAillgic(ry, 5 that is,- 
after they began to elect the strategoi, the battle of Marathonand 
the archonship of Phaenippus occurred. The battle of Marathon took 
place in the archon year of 490/89, and working back 12 years from 
this date, it is impossible to place the archonship of Hermocreca in 
504/3. Accordingly, most scholars have dated the archonship of 
Hermocteon to 501/0, by either supposing that the ordinal is corrupt 
k / 6 and emending irEpirniy to araoL12, or by accepting some corruption in 
the text, namely that the lectrefc,rreLets refers to the ostracism law 
of 22.1, which may have been the last of Cleisthenes' reforms and 
dated as late as 505/4. 7 If Sumner's objection to the first possi - 
) bility be accepted that changing nynlip to OYa0L49 is not at all an 
easy emendation, and in fact untenable, 8 and if Hignett's objection 
to the second possibility be accepted that the author of the Ath Pa 
would have told us if the ostracism law was passed in 505/4 rather 
than in 508/7, then clearly the answer lies elsewhere.' 
Aristotle separates his mention of the inauguration of the 
5. 
bouleutic oath in the archonship of Hermocreon, and the establishment 
11. 
of the strategia, by the word trrExra... The problem is partially 
solved if Aristotle meant this word to cover an interval of those 
years between the new oath and the first election of the generals, thus 
dating the archonship of Hermocreon to 504/3 and the election of the 
strategoi to 501/0. 9 
	
At least the internal puzzles of the Ath Pol 
are thus straightened out, but the conflict with Dionysius remains. 
Fornara i s solution, 10  that Hermocreon may have been the archon of 
506/5, 505/4 or 503/2 returns us to the former difficult situation 
by accepting an emendation of 179.1rr1ii. . At this stage, perhaps the 
safest and most honest viewpoint is one of neutrality. I believe with 
Badian that it is more realistic to remain undecided and to adopt a 
position which does the least violence to the Ath Pal.  
and Hermocreon both have good claims to the archonship of 504/3, 
Aristotle's use of the word en-E,irce, suggesting that the bouleutic oath 
was introduced before the generals were first elected and therefore 
tentatively in 504/3. The reform affecting the strategia can be more 
definitely assigned to 501/0. 
Suffice it to say that if the chronological difficulties of 
Ath Pal 22.2 are solved without postulating some corruption in the 
text, the archonship of Hermocreon did not fall in the same year as 
the reform of the strategia, and this reform most probably occurred, 
as Aristotle informs us in the twelfth year before Marathon, which 
is 501/0. 12 
What was the extent and nature of the reform of 501/0? 
Wade—Gery has suggested that the reform "created" the strategoi 13 
and Fornara has argued that the strategia was a totally new magistracy 
6. 
which revolutionized the army. 14  The question arising from this, 
of course, is what was the pre-Cleisthenic military organization of 
Athens? 	Ath Poi 4.2, the so-called constitution of Draco, suggests 
that the institution of the strategia existed in pre-Cleisthenic 
Athens and that generals were elected (nroovro) to office even at 
the time of Draco. Most scholars, however, regard this section of 
the Ath Poi as unhistorical, 15 but as Hammond has noted, it is part 
of the Ath Pol. 16 There are two other indications in the Ath Pot that 
the strategia was a pre-Cleisthenic institution. At 22.3 
ITEl(ferpcuroS 	arLairoS KCLI Sir a:T o u.)1/ ir% s ‘ ruleavVcS tare/. 3ri1 1 and at 
17.2 Aristotle comments on a command (crixtrirgiV ) of Peisistratus 
in the war against Megara. The natural meaning of Ath Pot 22.2 is 
certainly not that a new office was now established but that one 
general was now elected from each of Cleistnenes ten tribes. 17 It 
would indeed seem a little perverse to argue that Aristotle's phrase-
ology was conditioned by his own belief in the existence of pre-
01eisthenic strategoi. - Any •evidence is better than none, and even 
though there is lack of positive proof for the existence of strategoi . • 
before. 501, surely such lack of information cannot be used to support • 
the conclusion that Aristotle must mean the innovation was "the 
institution of the office of strategosu. 18 
Apart from Aristotle, other sources provide several examples 
of pre-Cleisthenic strategoi. Herodotus mentions the strategia of 
Peisistratus against Megara, stating Ev 	rrres rItaraINE.as Vopsvi 
19 rri.ri ri , and Androtion mentions Peisistratus as strategos becoming 
tyrant. 20 	Plutarch notes that according to the Delphic record 
)A Alcmaeon was fterivcziwv err:I-Tres in the Sacred War. 21 Wilamowitz 
7. 
has assumed from these examples that strategoi commanded the army 
of Athens in military operations before the time of Cleisthenes. 22 
It is the usual view that the pre-Cleisthenic army, subdivided into 
the four tribal groups, must have required its leadership to be 
divided in the same way, and that these leaders occupied an elective 
position. 23 However, it is not the usual view that sixth-century 
strategoi (whether called strategoi or something else) were any more 
than tribal commanders. It is generally concluded from Herodotus 
1.59.4 that Peisistratus was polemarch in the war against Megara. 24  
Herodotus certainly used the word to describe the commanders of a 
state's forces or of a coalition's forces. 25 The meaning of the 
word tstraspsos in the Ath Pal is also that of an officer leading the 
26 army, as Hammond has pointed out. 	The problem is simply this. 
There is no evidence linking pre-Cleisthenic “strategoi” with the 
military organization of the pre-Cleisthenic tribes. Did Aristotle 
mean that Peisistratus as ustrategos „27 was one of the duly elected 
generals described in Ath Pal 4.2, and if so, can he be considered 
as the commander of one of the four tribal contingents? Similarly, 
was Plutarch's Alcmaeon a tribal commander? These questions do not 
admit of certain answers. 
It cannot be demonstrated beyond this that the strategia 
was a pre-Cleisthenic magistracy, or as Hammond asserts that before 
the beginning of the sixth century the responsibility for the safety 
of the state was in the hands of the polemarch and an unknown number 
of strategoi the former being responsible for the defence of Attica, 
and the lAtter commanding forces sent on expeditions outside Attica. 28 
References to sixth-century strategoi in sources other than in the 
Ath Pal may indeed be anachronisms, and it is not unlikely that 
Afistotle used these sources for his information about Peisistratus. 
It is hard to know what else Herodotus could have called Peisistratus, 
apart from errevivcis, unless he had known he was polemarch. He 
uses the normal Greek word for leader of an army, the word he consist-
ently assigns to commanders of military forces. Furthermore, as 
Fornara notes, 29 it is understandable that Alcmaeon and Peisistratus 
would have been referred to in conventional terms even if more precise 
information was available about their specific roles. 
Accordingly, some scholars have resisted the temptation to 
use the scattered references to pre-Cleisthenic strategoi as evidence 
for the existence of a regular elected magistracy which was a fore-
runner to the fifth-century strategia. Hauvette has suggested that 
such strategoi were appointed only when there were special military 
30 needs, and they were therefore not regularly elected. 	However, 
returning to a point previously mentioned, it is generally agreed, 
and I believe .rightly, that the pre-Cleisthenic . military system must 
have been based on the SoIonian . tribes. Whether these tribal comman-
ders were called .strategoi or not is -unknown. ,SchWahn thinks that 
"strategoi" replaced the (1)0XcpcisAdis. of . the aristocratic state 
as commanders of the S.olonian tribes. 31 Herodotus,, in speaking of 
Cleisthenes' tribal reform states 	Sbcce re VI 	4uit4p- x-ovy". avri 
32 
• TECTCT ipcov 	.;roincre , Mcaxa ica roin 	Bliptous Kar6req.ce 	h ray givAtis • 
Myres has concluded from this that Herodotus was using ctuA4rXcus 
in a non-technical sense, and in fact meant the ten strategoi. 33 If 
Myres is right then the pre-Cleisthenic tribes were commanded by 
"strategoi" and the reform of 501/0 did not create them as Wade-Gery 
9 . 
has postulated. I do not believe that we can categorically, assert, 
as Hignett does, 34  that the statement of Herodotus is false. It 
may very well be that the importance of the 4t fAcirXos does not 
justify Herodotust attention upon them here, if the meaning of the 
word is the same as at Ath Pol 61.5 where a.‘1)Actia)(0,c Is cks - 
rob,' geriro/AEVo ,/ Tub/ ITTITCWV . 	However, the chances are equally as 
good that Herodotus meant "tribal commanders" rather than "cavalry 
commanders". If so, here is evidence that the four Solonian tribes 
J A were commanded by cpuxecrXol , and if not but perhaps less likely, the 
term may be a survival from the days when cavalry was the essence of 
the Athenian army. Herodotus may have used the word in the technical 
sense and indeed the passage is one in which we would expect him to do 
so. He may simply have used the old technical term on the understand-
ing that everybody knew the Cleistheni ,: comaanders were called 
, 691arilsol or failed to mention that the old fuAufAC1 were now called 
6rra-I- T(0i . I do not think such an argument to be any more or less 
plausible than the others here considered, except that Herodotust 
statements should not be dismissed as lightly as in the instance cited. 
Suffice it to say that it is still a matter for conjecture whether 
Herodotus used the word opuAktrcus in a technical or non-technical 
sense, as is the assertion that we should replace the word with 
another, preferably  crtrO:ri You& . 
If we may assume, purely on the basis that no importance 
was attached to iactpXos in the fifth century which would warrant 
attention being paid to them by Herodotus, and irrespective of whether 
the term be considered non-technical or not, that the historian is 
describing the reform of 501/0, then here (5.69.2) is evidence of 
10. 
pre-Cleisthenic military organization based on the old SoIonian 
tribes, and the reform of 501/0 was in some sense a continuation 
vbf the past. In other words, whatever Herodotus meant by 
, cleuxar xotis , we have at least some indication from the statement that 
these officers were increased from four to ten, that some mechanical 
adjustments were made in the military organization of the state to 
conform with Cleisthenes' new tribal system; and on the assumption 
that the reference is to the reform of 501/0, the ten tribal strategoi 
were at least cousins to the tribal leaders of the old SoIonian 
state. 35 It is not possible to accept Wade-Gery's solution that 
Cleisthenes created the strategoi any more than it is possible to 
accept Hammond's view that the strategoi existed as standing officers 
in pre-Cleisthenic Athens. 
The question concerning the nature of the reform of At:7v Poi 
22.2 still remains. The view of Wi1amowitz 36 that the ten strategoi 
were first elected from their respective tribes in 501/0 has in its 
favour the fact that the natural meaning of Ath Poi 22.2 fits this 
interpretation exactly. Hammond and Badian appear to be in substant-
ial agreement with Wilamowitz, both believing that it was only in 
501/0 that the Cleisthenic tribes were first connected with the 
military system • 37 Most modern scholars have ranged themselves in 
almost complete opposition to this viewpoint. The usual view is that 
the reorganization of the system of military command cannot have been 
deferred for a period of time as long as six years after Cleisthenes 
tribal reform, and that the natural meaning of Ath Poi 22.2 cannot 
therefore be accepted. 38 Essentially, proponents of this opinion 
consider it imperative that once the old tribal system was abolished 
11. 
the military organization superimposed on the old structure ceased 
to exist automatically. Accordingly, ten generals must have come 
into existence at the same time as the tribal reorganization because 
it is not plausible that the state either remained without tribal 
leaders between 507 to 501, or that the new tribal system persisted 
with the old military organization presumably based on the old tribal 
structure and the polemarch. Busolt's solution, formulated in recogn-
ition of the supposition that the military organization must have 
adjusted itself to the new tribal structure well before 501, is that 
Ath Pol 22.2 is speaking of an alteration in the method of election 
of the strategoi. His proposal, that between 507 to 501 each of the 
ten generals was chosen by the members of his own tribe and that in 
501/0 this duty was removed from the individual tribes and became 
the province of the Demos as a whole, has become the ruling theory 
to explain the nature of the innovation of Ath Pol 22.2. 39 
Busolt's hypothesis suffers from two severe limitations. 
Firstly, there is no evidence whatever to indicate that Cleisthenes' 
tribal reforms must have included the provision that ten tribal 
strategoi be instituted at the same time, that is in the year after 
508/7 when the reforms became effective. 	If the 4vhc..rXol of 
Herodotus are the strategoi of Ath Pot 22.2, then of course, Cleis-
thenes may have adjusted the military organization of Athens t 
conform with his tribal reforms as early as 508/7. The passage in 
Herodotus linking the creation of the new tribes and dames with the 
increase in number of the ■fuAo.?)(01 does suggest he thought the 
re forms o:;curred concurrently, but the inference is not inevitable. 
If Herodotus knew the reforms were separated by several years clearly 
12 . 
it was not important to him. It is not impossible that Cleisthenes 
was behind the reform of 501/0, and if correct it is reasonable enough 
that Herodotus should connect this with the tribal reform without 
making mention of the time gap. If he was not aware of the time gap 
it is not an unreasonable supposition that he linked the reforms 
together and attributed them all to Cleisthenes. Even if. Herodotus 
!leant strategoi, Busolt's solution is by no means conclusive. 
Furthermore, if ten strategoi were created by Cleisthenes in 508/7, 
the assumption that they were elected by the individual tribes until 
501/0 is completely without support. It is indeed eminently reason- 
able to suppose, as has been previously noted that the pre-Cleisthenic 
military organization of Athens was based on the four tribes and 
that the fifth-century strategia was derivative, to an extent unknown, 
from the previous military organization. The similarities however, 
remain unknown. Busolt's argument, which considers it reasonable 
to conclude that Cleisthenes must have instituted ten strategoi in 
508/7, is surely based on the assumption that the pre-Cleisthenic 
military organization was similar to the fifth-century strategia to 
an extent which is unwarranted from the evidence available. This 
solution would be plausible only if it was fairly evident that four 
tribal strategoi were elected by their tribes in pre-Cleisthenic 
Athens. 
Secondly, the author of the Ath Poi does not imply at 22.2 
that he meant to indicate the reform consisted of a change in the 
body which elected the strategoi. I believe with Fornara that if 
the essence of the reform was a change in the method of electing the 
40 generals, Aristotle would have been more explicit. 	Hignett41 also 
13. 
has doubts on the same grounds, inferring that hebelieves Ath Poi 
22.2 to mean that there was a change in the body from which the 
strategoi were chosen. Hignett appears undecided about the reform 
because he makes no attempt to reconcile his doubts on Busolt's inter-
pretation of Ath Pol 22.2 with his previous sentence that before 
501/0 "each of the generals was perhaps chosen by the members of his 
own tribe". 42 
	
In short, Busolt's.hypothesis is not easily compatible 
with the wording of Ath Pol 22.2, and whereas Hignett considers that 
Busolt's interpretation cannot be excluded on this ground alone, the 
combination of this limitation with the other outlined above perhaps 
constitutes a more serious obstacle to the theory. 
Fornara has accepted the orthodox viewpoint that the military 
organization of Athens cannot have waited till 501/0 before it was 
brought into line with Cleisthenes' reforms, but in seeking to over-
come the weaknesses in Busolt's theory he has postulated an alter-
native hypothesis to explain the meaning of Ath Pol 22.2, an inter-
pretation which is immediately attractive because it is more compat-
ible with the sentence of Aristotle. Fornara suggests that the 
emphatic word in the sentence may be 4ravro, that the real meaning 
of the reform is in the possible implication in the passage that 
before 501/0the people did not in fact elect generals. 43 Apart 
from the reasonable possibility that Aristotle maybe implying the 
reform was of this nature, Fornara notes two other considerations in 
support of his interpretation. Firstly, the intent of Ath Pol 22 
is to point to the progressive democratization of the state that 
followed after Cleisthenes' tribal reform and which culminated in 
the application of the law about ostracism to Hipparchus in 488/7; 
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the popular election of strategoi would be exactly the type of 
democratic innovation Aristotle is talking about. 
Secondly, the remark about the polemarch becomes highly 
relevant, rather than somewhat superflUous, because an effect of the 
reform was to diminish the power and authority of that office, although 
45 not to the point of depriving the polemarch of hegemony. 	The 
emphasis of the reform on this interpretation was to democratize the 
army by making the leadership of the tribes an elective office for the 
first time, but not to break the polemarch, although this was an 
inevitable aspect of it. Fornara suggests that the statement by 
Herodotus about the increase in numbers of the 449Xcl may be evi-
dence for the military organization between 507 etilid 501, but emphas-
izes that this is not necessary to his hypothesis, 46 and that whatever 
the military arrangement in those years, the reform of 501/0 was not 
a mechanical :adjustment but a radical innovation which brought the 
/ army into line with the Cleisthenic ITtAtTE10, in the broadest sense. 
Fornara concludes that ifAravTo means that prior to 501/0 the 
generals were not elected, it follows that Aristotle did not bother 
to inform us of the nature of the electorate; in combination with 
the considerations, firstly, that it would have been the purpose of 
the reformers to strengthen the cohesiveness of the tribes, and 
secondly, that the polemarch was still commander-in-chief, and the 
strategoi just tribal leaders, it is thus likely that in 501/0 the 
generals were elected by their respective tribes and not by the people 
as a whole. 47 
This interpretation certainly eliminates some of the weak- 
nesses of Busolt's reconstruction. There are however some difficulties 
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with Fornara's hypothesis which should not be overlooked. Hammond's 
viewpoint, 48 which is in fact in direct opposition to virtually 
all of Fornara's conclusions, may, it is proposed, serve as a vehicle 
to expose the limitations of the latter. Many of Hammond's opinions 
have already been noted, and many, on the basis of the arguments 
presented earlier in this chapter, have been considered unacceptable, 
including his conclusion that the strategia was a sixth-century 
institution similar to that of the fifth century. Be that as it may, 
Hammond categorically asserts that the innovation which Ath Poi 22.2 
intends to convey does not lie in the use of election. He considers 
it absurd to suppose that military commanders had been appointed 
before 501 by any other method, and that the principle laid &Ain by 
Ath Pa l 43.1, that Xeirorcvo rj‘t 	trr‘os 	trazto/turcfgais, is Just as 
applicable to the sixth century as to the fifth century and fourth 
century. 49 'According to Hammond the possibility does not exist 
c ^ that the word arouvro is an indication that before 501/0 the 
generals were not elected. The complete opposition of Fornara's view 
that we are not entitled to make fifth-century practice an invariable 
basis for inference about procedures of the previous century, espec-
ially when we are dealing with an apparent innovation, toy . 
Hammond's insistence that military commanders must have been elected 
in the pre-Cleisthenic state, is more indicative of our ignorance of 
the sixth-century military organization of Athens than anything else. 
On this point Hammond and Fornara nullify each other. The question 
of whether military commanders of the highest level, apart from the 
polemarch, were elected before 501/0, cannot be said to admit of any 
answer. 
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However, another statement by Hammond which does seem 
valid is his aggressive assertion that Ath Pot 22.2 does not allow 
the interpretation which Fornara postulates, that each individual 
tribe, rather than the Demos as a whole, was the body which elected 
the strategoi. Herein lies the main difficulty of Fornara's hypo-
thesis. The natural meaning of Aristotle's phrase ToCis frfarirci;s 
c 	 ) c 	 ^ u npouvra Kara, 4 vhas, C§ ucco'reis: ctuXbis &A/a is "they (the people) 
elected the generals on a tribal basis at one from each tribe". To 
c be sure Aristotle does not explicitly name the subject of mouVro . 
This is in no way unusual. The rest of the Ath Pal is written in 
exactly this style. In all places where it can be reasonably implied 
that the noun 	tiekkiicta. could have been used by the author, this 
does not occur. His normal mode of expression is the use of the third 
c 31 
person plural, and more rarely the use of the nouns pi A(.414.Alioi and 
c A 
o )11..kos . 	Obviously he did not find it necessary to be more 
explicit. Everybody knew what he meant. The generalized style, 
typical of the whole treatise, does of course make it difficult to 
reach absolute conclusions, but surely it makes it all the more imper-
ative to adhere to the natural meaning of the Greek. Bearing this 
in mind, if we look at the phrase in question within the context of 
the immediately preceding and immediately following sentences, the 
balance, I suggest, weighs in favour of the ecclesia (more specifically, 
C "the people" or "the Athenians") as the subject of arouvrO. 
22.2-3is as follows: 	77 pciyrov 1.1 E!! -0151-1 	7T4L7T1V 1 ttE -ra 
‘-raunp, 1:7p, tic1.1-u, aracnv c 	 EplioKpcorros- apxorTos Ti) flov\n Tois 
TrevTa .Koatocc Tu1 L<pkov Eo1,710-av ov ETC scat vol, 0,LLVUOV011/. 
'EVE:TCL TOVE' CTTOCZ7riyOUg n povvro Ktrra chtrAas. 	 ;c vo., 
Ath Pal 
17. 
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1' 	 • acCf is a-rpwrcets jyq iv 711., o -.7oAlkwpxos. ETEL8g 11e7a 
TO. VTOL SW E" KdTCO VL K4aall'ES: - 1:7)11- 	—NI 	(Lin' 	E7 77Z (11 :2! VITT. 7T-0)). 
. 	 . 	 • 	 _ 	_ 
I crpxopTos.,. otaAt7rjr-ro; 	•3150 . 	riiv 	Oappoiivros- i(377 TO 
TO TE -IxfAelavTo 74.) VC;f1.(p. T Cr7p a K I 	1:711 • • • 
There is no ambiguity as to the subject of the verbs etTotertw 
and ZKncrav -ro 	Aristotle is referring in very general terms to 
the ecclesia. 	The two relevant passages can be translated as 
follows: 	"First of all, in the fifth year after these enactments, 
in the archonship of Hermocreon they (the people) instituted the oath 
for the Council of 500 which they still swear at the present time". 
"In the twelfth year after this, in the archonship of Phaenippus, 
they had won the battle at Marathon, and two years having passed 
after the victory, the people being now in high confidence, they (the 
people) used for the first time the law concerning ostracism". This 
does not definitely prove that the subject of ipoavro is the same. .. v 
However, the onus of proof rests with those scholars who believe other-
wise. In other words, are we to consider that Aristotle would have 
used such a general statement if he thought each tribe individually 
elected its own strategoi? 	At Ath Pol 63.1 Aristotle states that 
the archons and the Clerk of the Thesmothetai were responsible for 
the appointment of jurors - Ta 	s ,LKCIOTI;flta KATIp0OCT CV 
r,ote 0' cipxoli.-rEs. Kara OvAa's-, 	ypaity.a-retis 	°ea* 	 SeKa'717,- . 
May we not expect the same sort of precision at Ath Pol 22.2? 
Aristotle could quite simply have written CrrE.irck. roos errrareiYeus 
" 	 ■ 	k / 
trOOVTO 0.1 4UXCII /atria. CpACLS 	• • • 	If each tribe was the elect- 
ing body, it would not only be careless for the author to use the 
third person plural, LrcO vTO,  between fro reisba and 4rierckvrO, 
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without noting the change of subject, but would also mean he aband-
oned, in this instance, the characteristic precision which is 
evident, for example, at 63.1. 50 This, coupled with Herodotus 
c 	t 6.104.2, which names the general Miltiades as cur EGE.I uric' rou 
in 490, is sufficient indication that the ecclesia, and not 
each tribe individually, was responsible for the election of generals. 
If Aristotle merely wished to inform us that starting in 501/0 ten 
generals representing all tribes were elected by the ecclesia, the 
subsequent reference to the polemarch becomes even more relevant 
than under Fornara's reconstruction. 	Fornara is probably right that 
Aristotle mentioned the polemarch because he knew that an effect of 
the reform was to diminish the per and authority of that office, 
but if Aristotle is telling us that the generals were now elected 
for the first time but by their respective tribes, his reference.- 
to the polemarch is no more than a reflex a statement of the obvious, 
for such a method of election implies that the strategoi were to be 
subordinate to the polemarch anyway, even if henceforth they assumed 
some control of decision-making at his expense. Therefore, apart 
from the fact that Fornara's interpretation of Ath Pol 22.2 has the 
weakness of not conforming with the natural and obvious meaning of 
the, passage, as has been demonstrated, his attempt to argue that the 
phrase dealing with the polemarch becomes highly relevant within the 
framework of his hypothesis is also not without difficulties. 
the other hand, if Hammond's interpretation of Ath PoZ 22.2 be 
c 
accepted, that trouvro is a reference to the electing body, the 
ecclesia, the purpose of the remark about the polemarch may indeed 
by exactly that which Foraara has suggested. This may be an explicit 
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reminder that the polemarch, one of the nine archons who were still 
the chief executive officials of the state, did not lose hegemony 
of Athenian forces as a consequence of the reform which entrusted 
the election of generals to the whole citizen body. In other words, 
may not the meaning of the whole passage be that even though the 
strategoi were now elected by the ecclesia and therefore by implication 
became important executive officials, the polemarch who was also 
directly elected by the ecclesia, still retained hegemony of the army? 
Aristotle has just noted that the strategoi were elected by the 
Demos. He has thought it necessary to explicitly clarify the position 
of the polemarch at the time this reform took place. In short, such 
a fundamental relevance cannot be associated with Aristotle's phrase 
unless the natural meaning of Ath Poi 22.2 be accepted as the correct 
interpretation. 
Scholars who assume that the military organization of 
Athens cannot have waited •until 501/0 before it was brought into line . 
with Cleisthenes' new tribal system • and who try to explain that the 
real nature of the •reform has been obscured by the wording of Ath Pol. 
22.2, are faced with the further difficulty of needing either to 
explain the polemarch's position in the .army and in relation to the 
strategoi between 508 . to 501, or to assume that Aristotle did not 
intend the last section of the sentence to be any more than an after-
thought.. However it is by no means inconceivable that there was an • 
interval of seven years before the strategoi were instituted. • It 
was not until 504/3 that Cleisthenes' boule was finally constituted. 51 
In addition, during the years immediately after 508/7 Athens was 
involved in protecting herself from attacks on three sides. The 
20. 
Pelopannesians penetrated as far into Attica as Eleusis in 506 and 
Chalcis was engaged in ravaging the northern areas of Attica at 
this time. After Chalcis was defeated the Athenians were faced with 
the threat posed by the fleet of Aegina when it plundered Phalerum 
and raided the Attic coast. The military necessities alone may have 
been sufficient to delay the institution of any proposed military 
reorganization. 
But this is probably only part of the answer. In a general 
sense it is perhaps logical enough to believe that the total military 
reorganization only followed after the civil side of the system had 
been set up in working order, which only occurred, as has been indi-
cated, about the time of the archonship of Hermocrean, in 504/3. 
Bactim-i's suggestion may be correct that the precise method of election 
and the precise powers of the generals and their relationship to 
the polemarch, were issues which did not necessarily admit to an 
immediate decision, and that the several years of delay were spent 
in debate. He is certainly right that the fear of tyranny would play 
a part in ensuring that a concentration of military powers in the 
hands of one official, such as the polemarch, did not eventuate. 52 
Such an interpretation is admirably compatible with the Ath Pol. 
On the basis of the considerations outlined above, and 
conforming with the natural meaning of Ath Pal 22.2, it was not until 
501/0 that the Athenians finally brought their military organization 
into line with Cleisthenes i tribal reforms. In the first place, 
and in a general sense, the popular election of the strategoi fits 
neatly the obvious intent of chapter 22 to illustrate the progressive 
democratization of the state after Cleisthenes t reforms. The army 
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has been democratized. The hegemony of the polemarch, however 
that worked in practice, with its implication of acknowledged super-
iority, subordinated the military to the civil power. But a limit-
ation on the authority of the poletuarch was imposed by the institution 
of a board of democratically elected tribal generals. One effect 
of the reform was to make the polemarch dispensable. But no one 
man controlled the army and the chance that a military leader could 
now establish a tyranny was virtually eliminated. Secondly, it is 
not known what the pre-Cleisthenic military organization of Athens 
was, whether strategoi existed or not. If the organization was based 
on the old SoIonian tribes, as appears likely from Herodotus 6.104.2, 
we do not know what relationship such tribal commanders had with the 
polemarch, or how they were elected if indeed they were elected at 
all. The dangers of making assumptions about both the pre-Cleisthenic 
system and the situation between 508 and 501, it is hoped, have been 
made patently obvious. The only sensible procedure, I believe, is 
to adhere as closely as possible to both the chronology and actual 
meaning of the Ath Pol. 	In 501/0 the ecclesia elected ten generals, 
one from each tribe, and the emphasis of the wording does not allow 
the assumption that ten strategoi existed before this date and were 
now elected for the first time or that the reform was in fact a 
modification of an election procedure which had been instituted when 
Cleisthenes tribal system took effect. The nature of the case 
allows no conclusions to be drawn about the military organization 
prior to 501/0. The only thing that Ath Pol 22.2 may indicate about 
the years 508 to 501 is that the Athenians were debating the method 
of election and powers of these tribal leaders in relation to the 
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civil executive, or that the military situation allowed no time for 
52a a change, 	or that an alteration of the old organization did not 
even occur to Cleisthenes or the Athenians until after the establish-
ment of the boule set up the civil side of the system. 53 If the 
delay was the result of negotiations to democratize the army deliber-
ately and minimize the possibilities of the re-establishment of the 
tyranny, the chances are that elements in the old system which permitt-
ed a military leader to use his position as a stepping stone for 
control of the state were removed, and the reform of 501/0 was in fact 
a substantial innovation. 	But we do not have the evidence to know 
whether the innovation also consisted of having tribal commanders 
elected by the ecclesia for the frist time, although the remark about 
the pplemarch may be an indication of this. Simply, 501/0 was the 
first time that TEN tribal commanders were elected by the whole 
Demos. 
CHAPTER 
Hegemonia and the Command at Marathon  
A great deal of attention has been paid to the relation-
ship between the strategoi and the polemarch in the early years 
of the fifth century. Virtually the only evidence available is the 
c 
phrase in Ath PoZ 22.2 Is Is‘E. cfLrrefaris 	t-rtcfi vElatOv 
t / 
rioA.9.tqpKoS , and Herodotus' account of the Athenian command at 
Marathon. 
What is the precise meaning of rp'EttuN as used by Aristotle? 
There are not enough instances of this word in the Ath Poi to be 
1 i sure. 	Hammond has argued that the ricYii-tovhct of the polemarch 
meant only honorary and nominal leadership of the army. 2  The pole-
march marched at the head of the armed forces on ceremonial occasions 
and on military occasions where they left the city, and he occupied 
the right-hand position when the army was in line. 	-11gE/A-OVIek, 
simply means that the polemarch retained some residual powers or privi-
leges of his traditional office, functions which had originally been 
the prerogative of the king at Athens. Thus, at Ath Pol 20.4, 
/ 
Of, CUE V1 01 ett, 	V 01-1 1-05s Nipou Trpos-ranis , ih-E/.44 , only 
expresses the position of a leader in the state who leads the way and 
not as one who exercises command. Similarly, the related word 
c ^ 	 et 
-rcti means "he leads the way", as at Ath Poi 61.1, ... CS 
rcraTrto T3V oc rrXIT3%/gv£g.u5j , which translates as 	... who leads 
the hoplites when they go out". 
23. 
24. 
However, it is questionable whether Hammond is justified 
in using Ath Pa 20.4 to support his interpretation of 22.2. 
Certainly, 1VElliaVf. at 20.4 is used in the general sense as "leader" 
rather than in the more specific sense as "one who exercises command". 
This is no indication that the general meaning applies to 22.2. We 
are not here dealing with a word which has only one exact meaning. 
The context within which.the word is used surely must be our first 
criterion for judging what is meant. It has already been emphasized 
that one of the glaring weaknesses of some attempts to explain the 
nature of the reform at 22.2 has involved making the remark about the 
polemarch somewhat superfluous. If TrEttuJV is only a reference to 
nominal rather than real leadership, Aristotle's comment indicates 
the opposite to what the word, in the whole context of the sentence, 
suggests, that the remark was intended to be highly relevant. Why, 
if Aristotle meant to say that the strategoi were now the real comman-
ders of the army and the polemarch only the titular head, did he use 
the word /now's", unless he was being deliberately vague? Why did 
he not state explicitly that the polemarch was not still in overall 
command of the army? 
But there is no reason to think that Aristotle was being 
vague. It would be difficult to find a more succinct statement and 
indeed hard to know what other word he could have used. Furthermore, 
it is clear from Herodotus and Thucydides that vittwil is used inter- 
changeably with Trrareros 
commander. 3 For example, 
and CipX4,0V in reference to a military 
q, at Herodotua 7.62.2 Irai.vioi 	Kant-artr 
Kira' s-ciszi.xccriojr.y.dm -a-tkrodikevo PlEywravcv.... Herodotus 
c 	/ names the commander of the Hyrcanians as ngikA/after listing the 
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commanders of the other contingents in Xerxes' army as ap(ovre.5. 
At Herodotus 7.158.5, 	;171 El A4-,Ae 
• - rotpue Ta0E VZ*LCFX0,4tai t E7e q; re (TTparriljg TE Kal 
iiyejzv 7631! c EAATil*C011 i'cop.aL 17pOs 7-6z. Petpi3apov 
the historian informs us that Gelo of Syracuse offered aid to the 
Greeks against Xerxes on the condition that he be appointed overall 
commander of the combined forces. 	At Thucydides 3.105.3 77gitirovat 
nKaL jvi 	 r6v es Tip AtTcoXeav A0vai.ov crrparypjaavTa. 
c 	•/ 
57rc05 	0-01cri 	/7€1.Lan, 	717vn Tat • Demosthenes is made tirepuWby the 
Acarnanians. This does not mean that the Acarnanian strategoi relin-
quished all command of their forces. 	Demosthenes and the Acarnanian 
commanders are frequently mentioned together. But are we to believe 
with Hammond that IrCEpuN means Demosthenes held merely a position 
of prestige which included the leading place on the march and the 
right-hand place in the line of battle?4  Thucydides is more explicit. 
At 3.107.2 he states Kaa .7`17eilo1'a TOV wav76 ev,u,itaxtkot1 aipoiwrac 
lliocr- Obi) 	Ite-ra raw 	ac-P'74paw arpaTTICov. It is clear from the 
succeeding narrative that -TA/ 04ETT4W erferriell are the Acarnanian 
generals and do not include the Amphilochians and the Argives. It 
is with Aros-aevEl  id% ToiS AkapVtivoN strixtrirojs that the Peloponn-
esians propose a truce. 5 The phrase boitsoet/EVIS 	-r(.41v 
C tverrpagiruiv'Aectrivah is an indication that Demosthenes was TO:ftviV 
by virtue of being on the Acarnanian board of generals. Thucydides 
3.107.2 is surely not an indication that the Acarnanian generals were 
caparypro I and not Trfj.1.0%,£5 , as Hammond believes. 7 The natural 
meaning of the passage is "they chose Demosthenes leader of the whole 
allied force with their own generals.". 
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Thucydides' use of the word ei..t.u.; ■/ at 3.105.3 with 
reference to the Acarnanian request to Demosthenes may simply mean 
that they wished the Athenian to have an active role in the command 
structure of their army. The fact that the Acarnanians entrusted 
Demosthenes with the duty and honour of leading out the, army, of 
making arrangements on how it was to march and of commanding the right 
wing in battle, is not necessarily an indication that he was official-
ly commander-in-chief. He was, after all, the military representative 
of Imperial Athens, and this alone may have been sufficient reason 
to ensure he occupy the position of prestige, ceremonially at least. 
However there is another consideration which perhaps should not be 
overlooked and which may give a more precise indication of the mean-
ing of ilfftwV in Thucydides 3.105.3. By 426 the Acarnanians had 
probably come to rely heavily on Athenian military expertise and to 
expect from Athenian strategoi a high degree of competence. Several 
years previously they had requested that a relative of Phormio be 
sent as an official representative and partner in command. 	The 
successes of Phormio and the respect engendered among the Acarnanians 
signalled the beginning of a unique relationship between individual 
Athenian strategoi and Acarnania, a relationship which was not upset 
when Phormio disappeared from the scene, a relationship which in 
practice enabled Athenian generals to have a greater influence on 
the military policy and a stronger control over the forces of an 
independent ally, than we should reasonably expect. 	Thucydides' 
whole narrative makes it very clear anyway that Demosthenes did 
occupy a position of real command. But whereas Thucydides 3.107.2 
is an indication that theoretically Demos thenes shared the command 
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with his Acarnaniaa counterparts it should be noted that there 
are instances when he appears to have had, in practice, the chief 
role in decision-making. To cite but one, when the word was brought 
to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the Ambraciots were marching 
to Olpae, it was Demosthenes alone who made the decision to send a 
force to occupy strategic positions and to follow with the rest of 
the army. 8 I don't think it possible to be more precise than this 
because Thucydides' phraseology at several points through the narra- 
tive contradicts the notion that Demosthenes was officially commander-
in-chief. To summarize, the Acarnmaians asked Demosthenes to be 
their leader, 9 and they elected him to their board of generals and 
gave him joint command of their forces with their cr,rn generals, theo-
retically. 10  But in practice he was deferred to not only in being 
allocated the duty and honour of leading out the army and commanding 
the right wing, but also in having the major role in decision-making. 
Hammond's belief that iotu.6V only allows ceremonial leader-
ship will not do. 	This was certainly part of the Acarnanian offer, 
for Demosthenes did fulfil such a function, but it is more than doubt-
ful that the word can just be removed from the context in which it 
is used and be seen purely and simply as the embodiment of that 
function. There is every reason to believe, as has been shown, that 
Thucydides means Demosthenes was offered a military command in a very 
real sense. The only difficulty, or so it seems to me, is in evalu- 
c 
ating whether ortiftwV means "commander-in-chief" in this context, or 
something less. If the interpretation offered above of the relation-
ship between Acarnania and individual ,`,thenian strategoi is correct, 
Demosthenes' position of prestige when on the march and in battle 
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line is a reflection of that relationship, an extension of privilege 
to the man possessing the greatest real authority in a collegiate 
command. 
To give a second example, at Thucydides 2.87.9, when oi .n.2v 
TrE)sorroVvicri/WV crrict-rivoi liaddressed their men before a sea battle 
with Phormio they promised to prepare for it no worse "than the 
previous commanders" — ii3 ■/ t!).. lir STE 0 V (94 0'00 V. When the word 
c. 
TT/WV is used of the military in our sources it invariably means 
"cne who exercises command". Manifestly, Aristotle's use of this 
word at Ath Pal 22.2 has the same meaning. The problem of defining 
/ 
the actual powers of the pattkiv' is no less present in Aristotle's 
terse phrase than in Thucydides 3.105.3. This is not to say that 
Demosthenes' position in relation to the Acarnanian strategoi is 
parallel to that of the polemarch in relation to the Athenian generals, 
but simply that Ath Pal 22.2 gives no indication of how the Athenian 
command structure operated in practice. 
Herodotus' description of the events at Marathon is the 
only other evidence available for the relationship between the polemarch 
and the strategoi during the early fifth century. According to 
I .  Herodotus the Athenians were commanded by ten generals — fplOV 
/ 	c , / 
£CLS ffrettlY0 I tiEk0-, 1-1A3 ti 0 E-KCCTOS civ 	12 when the 
strategoi became deadlocked on the issue of whether to fight or not, 
Miltiades went to the polemarch, Callimachns, for there was 
1..3c'tcaroy Oign6ocpdpos. 6 rKv6i-up Aaxioz, 'A6r;vai:,_ov 
13 iroXepapOw (76 raAaLew yhp 'Mqvaiot, 61.4(hinictov rv 1TOA eilapX01/ k.oLegvro rao- L crrparrrydiat) • 
Miltiades persuaded Callimachus to vote for an engagement. pEra ot 
	
'arparnyct rwv i ymep.r/ gOrpe o-v1213c1XActv, 	itcciarov an-6'w lyivero 
29. 
.irpvravitij rijs. 	Martc,'..33 zapebi6otrap• 6 Zi betcci iuevog 
art KO) 0-144,30)aill ET:MEET°, 7:pl.!, ye 3'1i 	vporcanitri 
14 
.-y‘zrero 	
. 	On the day when Miltiades was in command the army was 
drawn up for battle, and n 	z TO- 1.1.11 -C,L0_ K_pcos iiye'ero 
6 roXlpapxos [1(aXXCIAaxasif 7; yzp  
	
1 .0110S• TOTE EIXE Ogn) 	roicn 
rOv voitijuapxot , gxeti) KEpur rO 8f$t(51. , . 	7)yeolarov N. 701;70U 
15 iEeUtcovro 	itp..tildovro al ckvAat, 	xc'ti.cEvat. aA,kriXluni . 
The conventional view of Herodotus t account is that Miltiades 
ie portrayed in the text as superior to his colleagues, the other 
nine strategoi, and that the generals themselves occupied a more 
important position than the polemarch. 15a Most recent scholars 
have discounted both the primacy of Miltiades and the inferiority of 
Callimachus, believing from Ath Pa 22.2 that the polemarch was 
commander-in-chief, and inferring that Herodotus inaccurately trans-
ferred to the time of Marathon the system of command as it functioned 
in his own day. 16 Some have been content to foist upon Herodotus 
their own conceptions of the mid-fifth-century strategia and have been 
all too ready to reject parts of his information without making a 
real attempt to understand him. 17  The only worthwhile method of 
approach is to trust the main facts of Herodotus unless there is good 
evidence for not doing so, and these facts can be adduced by carefully 
evaluating the narrative. Even if he was thoroughly confused this 
will become apparent once we have looked closely at what he actually 
says. 
Fornara has convincingly demonstrated that the arguments 
which have been put forward to indicate that Herodotus thought 
Miltiades was superior to his colleagues or held supreme command are 
30. 
largely based on the conclusion that certain technical expressions 
18 were used by Herodotus to convey the legal pre-eminence of Miltiades. 
Thus, the reference to Miltiades as •; ./i:aft)s at 6.103.1 suggests 
);■ (.-KeLics ctorcs 19 to 	How, implying superiority. 	However, all 
that Herodotus says is that "Miltiades was one of the ten (generals)". 
Similarly, the sentence,o uro'  Ei) Lv 767-E 1, Mtitriribus 
iimov x rc Xepo-ovcrov 	iKrorpEvris bcrXdov Ocivo.rov 
'Ath 	20ivaCwr , is thought to be an indication of the legal supremacy 
of Miltiades. It was Miltiades alone, and not the board of generals, 
who was in command of the Athenians. 21 However, the point is that 
Herodotus is in the middle of relating the history of Miltiades and 
his father Cimon. 22 He is merely emphasizing that the man who was 
named Miltiades after the founder of the settlement in the Chersonese 
'e.` 	S` was the man (cults di V), who was one of the generals of the 
t  v , Athenians (E rf ariVEZ nult/ctti.a ). Herodotus is even more specific 
at 6.104.2. Miltiades was elected a general after he had been tried 
and acquitted for establishing a tyranny in the Chersonese. We have 
a description of a reversal in the fortunes of Miltiades. He narrow-
ly escaped a !•str-Vipti 19e./ Ati-Dv, and after the second escape "he was 
c/ 
thus chosen as a general of the, Athenians" - CreaTIYOS Ou ThJS 
jA1911/42A/ &11-44(ai. 23 This is not a description of the constitutional 
refinements of his position, a statement of his legal pre-eminence. 
It is not in any way a comparison with the other strategoi. 24 
Herodotus' whole narrative implies the pre-eminence of 
Miltiades, that his strategia was more important than that of the 
other generals, but it cannot be inferred from the text that the 
reasons for his pre-eminence were constitutional. In fact, if 
31. 
anything, Herodotus stresses the collegiality of the strategoi. 
When they became deadlocked over the issue of whether to fight or 
not, Miltiades was not able to break the indecision by overruling 
the generals opposed to action. 25 	The :c.inuse. , 	'Aelvcjov 
6-Tra-rvi gad' .61/t/f.; VTD ():Ct. C&L WC3it,t(1.1 , probably means that there was 
an even split of opinion, five generals voting for battle and five 
opposing. Herodotus does not allow Miltiades any predominant role 
in the debate which produced the deadlock, merely noting that he was 
\ 
one of the group in favour of battle - 	V Si Ic-Q.1 
k-E),F-uccrikb/. 26 
It has been concluded from Herodotus assertion that each 
general held the writraViii for one day, that its holder was in 
3 e) 	3 / supreme command of the army, and when EKatfrot3 cts.pru-v sb-Ive -ro 
/ 	c / 	/, 
rip o rakhri IrgriS) ATiGion 115413E :•N Oda V; 2 7 that Miltiades was g. 
effectively supreme commander, even on the days when he did not have 
/ 	28 the irrcoilii • 	an interpretation is supported by the 
succeeding narrative. Miltiades refused to fight until the day of 
his own Ts-m.001 implying that he made the decision as to when battle 
should be joined. Hignett believes that this section in Herodotus 
is traceable to a Philaid source, anxious to emphasize the constitut-
ional propriety of Miltiades' behaviour and to vindicate for him 
the chief credit of the victory. 29 The statement that each general 
held the rrru-rttli in turn is but a further indication of collegial-
ity. The other strategoi voluntarily deferred to Miltiades. H 
ever, is Herodotus confused at this point? 	Are we to understand 
that the 7-ru-c-avettl came into force only after the decision had been 
made to fight the Persians? If the word means supreme commander 
32. 
it would seem rather pointless for the strategoi to vote on policy 
unless the command began to rotate only when it was resolved to 
offer battle. Otherwise, Miltiades need only wait until his day 
of the command, or persuade the commander of the day to fight, the 
other generals having no power to obstruct a colleague when he was 
the irrro.VIC . I do not think it helps at all to suppose that we 
here have a retrojection of a practice which developed later than 
490, that Herodotus transferred to Marathon the conditions of his own 
time. It is just as likely that rotation of the nrraviii did 
occur in 490 and that Miltiades held this position on the day of the 
battle. On the other hand there is no reason to believe that the 
account of the division of opinion among the generals and the role 
of the polemarch in breaking the deadlock is unhistorical. We must 
attempt to explain the apparent contradictions. 
The answer may be that Herodotus did rely on the information 
that contemporary members of the Philaid family gave him. It must 
be remembered that by the time he was writing some years had elapsed 
since Marathon, the institution of the strategia had much matured 
and the polemarch was no longer an active official with any powers 
in the military. More specifically, Philaid attempts to preserve 
Miltiades t claims of credit for the victory involved a distortion 
and an exaggeration of his role as the sirrcWis , which, naturally 
enough, Herodotus was not able to reconcile, at least to our satis-
faction, with other information he had about the command structure. 
Bicknell has ably demonstrated the extent to which Herodotus may have 
been influenced by propagandist information of a pro-Miltiades 
31 character. 	Briefly, Bicknell suggests that a picture in the 
33. 
Peisiandcteion (later the Stoa Poecile), a building completed pro-
bably not long before 462/1 and intended as an advertisement for 
Cimon, strongly influenced the account of Herodotus. The represent-
ation not only gives Miltiades the position of command, but has much 
else in common with the description of Herodotus; — the arrival of 
the Plataeans, the death of Callimachus at the ships, the hacking 
off of the hand of Cynegeiros, the blinding of Epizelos and the 
absence of Persian cavalry. 32 
If Bicknell is right about the influence of evidence such 
as the picture in the PeisianaCteion on Herodotus, this consideration, 
in combination with the incompatibility of two sections of Herodotus' 
account, one which appears to suggest a rotating supreme command, 
(TrrwTwirl), and the other, the vote by the strategoi to determine 
policy, which suggests strict collegiality, provide some grounds for 
believing that irruTco/vvvi was in fact something less than supreme 
command. When the Athenians were drawn up for battle, Callimachus 
the polemarch led the right wing, in accordance with the law at that 
time, and the tribal contingents were placed to his left, one after 
the other, in an unbroken line, with the Plataeans stationed on the 
far left. 33 Some scholars have believed, following Plutarch, that 
the tribe of Callimachus, Aiantis, occupied the right wing. 34 
Plutarch's inference is probably incorrect. Herodotus did not con-
ceive of the polemarch ,as leader of his tribe, as is clear from 
e_ 6.111.1, where we would expect to read cu cIN■cti 44a ( 	such was 
the case. 34a The leadership of Aiantis would have been exercised 
by its ow.: strategos, wherever it was placed in the line. 35  However, 
one tribe had to be given the post of honour on the right, where 
34. 
the polemarch was stationed. This may be the essence of the mean-
ing of the npuravil , as It originally operated. The TrptroviS 
may have been the strategos who led the army into battle from the 
right wing, and at Marathon this man was Miltiades.
36 By the time 
Herodotus wrote, the real meaning had become lost and his account 
simply reflected the distortions. We do not need to deny that 
Miltiades was recognized by his colleagues as the most capable and 
experienced commander present, that he surpassed the others in prest-
ige, and that they all gave him their am position on the right wing 
on their day of the trrnwil. 
In conclusion, firstly, Herodotus, in his word usage, 
cannot be said to have attributed to Miltiades superior technical 
authority over his colleagues. 	Popular tradition made Miltiades 
the hero of Marathon, and rightly, as Burn notes, if his was the master 
plan. 37 . But the description of the debate between the strategoi, 
the t aoSra2 rpcov Sg actut_s errr:r-Tro NE4.-ct, 	and the clear indication 
that the n-pt.rreoliti was rotated among the generals daily, all suggest 
that Herodotus envisaged a collegiate command at Marathon. Sevcondly, 
the interpretation here offered of the trpuroli
/1 straightens out 
some inconsistencies otherwise apparent in the narrative. It con-
forms very neatly with the system of command which Herodotus des-
cribes, the working of the principle of collegiality, and it suggests 
some answers to problems for which the historian gives no clues. 
Equality is more fully preserved if Tifurn.vitl did not mean operation- 
al command in the hands of one general. We therefore need not 
assume the Athenians adopted a rather inefficient system whereby 
each strategos had supreme authority a day at a time. Furthermore, 
1 	•8 
35. 
the willingness of nine generals to hand over their nrorcuill to 
Miltiades is much more suitably explained as a means they utilized 
to effectively strengthen the vital right wing and hence enhance 
their prospects for a victory - Miltiades being recognized as the 
most experienced and capable military commander present - rather 
than as a virtual surrender to him of the powers and prerogatives 
vested in the strategia. Presumably the tribal contingent of the 
tretrrctvis fought on the right wing and the rotation of the nru-rw/.111 
served the additional purpose of deciding that in an army composed of 
ten equally competent divisions, the regiment which occupied the 
right on the day battle was joined, did so only by chance. A 
further advantage of this interpretation is that the question of 
whether the polemarch was in command of a detachment of troops such 
as his own tribe, whether his tribal affiliation meant the presence 
of that tribe on the right wing, is satisfactorily resolved. The 
strategoi were in command of their own tribal contingents and the 
polemarch was stationed with the regiment whose general was treuraviS 
for the day. At Marathon any tribal jealousies arising from the 
decision to keep Miltiades' tribal contingent on the right would have 
been outweighed by the practical consideration of permanently station-
ing the most experienced tribal commander at the dangerous and 
crucial point in the line. 
Scholars who insist that the Trevretvril was not of this 
nature are confronted with difficulties in explaining the arrangement 
of the Athenian army at Marathon. Burn states that Callimachus led 
the right wing with his tribal regiment, Aiantis, 39 and yet he implies 
that he believes the tribal contingents were commanded by strategoi, 
36. 
for he notes that - Themistocles and Aristeides, as generals of 
their tribes, Leontis and Antiochis, may have commanded the centre 
of the line, if Plutarch can be trusted. 40 Presumably. Burn has 
noticed no contradiction for he does not say what happened to the 
general of Aiantis. Perhaps his belief that Herodotus' story of 
the rotating irre,Vill is both fatuous and anachronistic and must 
be completely dismissed on the grounds that the polemarch was the 
permanent president of the war-council, 41  has forced him to conclude 
that the general of the polemarch's tribe was deprived of actual 
command. But he does not say so. 	Hammond does not dismiss the 
story in Herodotus, but like Burn is convinced that/re -re-v.11 can 
only mean "presidency" in the sense of "commander-in-chief". This 
does not however belong to the polemarch but to each general in turn. 42 
To Hammond, Miltiades was commander-in-chief at Marathon. 43  Because 
the generals decide strategy and tactics and have operational 
command of the whole force they are envisaged as army, rather than 
contingent, commanders. Ham ond supposes that the tribal regiments 
44 were commanded by taxiarchs both in and out of battle. 	Presumably 
this explains why he fails to suggest where Miltiades fought in the 
line, whether on the right wing where the polemarch was stationed 
and which was the normal position for a commander-in-chief, or at 
some other point where he could have effective control over the march-
ing line of the army. 	It is in fact difficult to know where else 
the strategoi could have been than with their respective tribes, 
and if this was the case there was no need for subordinate officers 
such as taxiarchs to act as tribal leaders. 44a It is virtually 
inconceivable that the generals did not occupy command positions at 
37. 
different points of the line, and hard to see why the natural 
division of the army into ten tribal groups should be abandoned at 
the highest level of command. Furthermore, there is no -evidence 
for the existence of taxiarchs as early as 490, and Ath Pa 22.2 - 
is surely sufficient indication that the strategoi were tribal 
commanders at this time. 4• 
	Hammond also follows Plutarch in assign- 
ing the polemarch's tribe to the right wing, not because the pole-
march was there but because Marathon was a deme of Mantis. 46 There 
is a possibility that the Athenians may have arranged their army in 
this way when fighting in Attica but the evidence needs to be more 
substantial to conclude that it is any more than just a possibility. 
It was left for others after Herodotus to infer this position for 
the tribe Aiantis, as Fornara has noted, 47 and although Hammond 
does not consider that CallimachuS commanded his tribal contingent, 
it seems more likely that later tradition secured the right wing. 
position for Aiantis from Callimachus' tribal affiliation than from 
the fact that Marathon was a dame of Mantis. 48 
The question of the role of the polemarch in the command 
structure, of his relationship with the strategoi, still remains. 
Hammond postulated that Callimachus had no operational command and 
was simply the right-hand man in the line. 49 One of the arguments 
he uses in support of this hypothesis his interpretation of the 
word iprsi.Awv as used of Military command in our sources, and speci-
fically of the polemarch in Ath Pa 22.2 .1 has already been discussed 
in detail earlier in this chapter, and it is thought, been demonstrat-
ed to be questionable. 	However, Hammond's conclusion that the pole- . 
march lost all power of command and deliberation to the strategoi 
38. 
in 501/0 is also based on the considerations that he may have 
ceased to be directly elected, and thathe no longer had an equal 
vote with the strategoi, by the time of the battle of Marathon. 
c Hammond suggests that Herodotus' description of Callimachus as 
KtAtetti XCOOlsV XelVOitiJV nOkipexpXLv may be correct. 50 The ortho- 
dox viewpoint, on the basis of Ath Pol 22.5, is that sortition was 
not introduced for the election of archons until 487/6, 51 but Hammond 
states that Aristotle was advancing a controversial view since 
Herodotus laid such emphasis on -Fly kuo)lv, 51a ^ 	It is surely simpler 
and more convincing, as Bicknell notes, 52 to suppose that Aristotle 
had foolproof grounds for dating the election of archons by sortition 
from the year of Telesinus. 53 Aristotle corrected the error in 
Herodotus. The only worthwhile conclusion is that HerOdotus was 
unaware of the reform of 487/6 and that his phrase is an anachronism 
of the situation existing after the archonship of Telesinus. The 
fact is that Herodotus was not interested in constitutional matters, 
unlike the author of the Ath Pol. 54 The choice between the two 
sources is obvious. Herodotus mistakenly assumed that the polemarch 
was appointed by lot in 490. 
Hammond's other argument, that at Marathon the polemarch 
no longer had an equal vote with the strategoi on policy, that he 
had already lost his deliberative powers to the generals, is based 
on his interpretation of rO Tra)..culw in the phrase rO irct_XRICV 
AOTAA,70 t ecy.L.ekt cv 	ITC X41.13Y,CV trolEolrro 
at Herodotus 6.109.2; 55 jos 	aixa re iyivorro ica rCKa 
xeCpwv 	yvcoidcov, v a tir a , 7izr _yap evocKaros 0708o4Opos 6 
.7(7) Imam) Xaxow Athp.,a(cov. ..7roXelhapx‘etv (r6 IvaAatat, yap 'AOrivaiot 
39. 
01.1011111(p' OV 7Zi! 770Xg :.tapX0V 40(6,170 TaCrt o-rpaniya(ri), 
71;rE 170XE fiapXOS • KaAAtilaxos 'AO .orctiov, rpin roOrov jX01/.. 	:Xeye 	TAE • 
He suggests that TO Frev\e410V- refers to the period before (but not 
in) 490. He comes to this conclusion from his "acquaintance with 
the style of Herodotus"; - fo rmActioV is written in relation to 
the word TOTt in Herodotus' next phrase, and means "in earlier times 
than then". According to 'Hammond, Miltiades went to the polemarch, 
Callimachus, because the polemarch was the eleventh voter because in 
earlier times (before 490) the Athenians continually made him equal 
in vote to the generals. The word SpcicttritcS does not have the same 
meaning as IvE.i.krercs Ltisticsfolepo on this view, and Hammond considers 
it logical and reasonable to believe that the.:j.icitlikictcs the polemarch 
once was is an explanation of his being VSEIKEt1t6 	iSc (tr os at 
Marathon, in the sense of having a "casting vote" only. 
This interpretation of Herodotus 6.109.2 is not without 
its difficulties and indeed has attracted a deal of criticism. In 
the first place, as Hammond himself admits, Herodotus t use of the 
words TO tra).aloiv at 3.58.2, which is a good parallel to 6.109.2, 
clearly refers to the time of the action itself. Secondly, within 
the context of the whole passage, the phrase under discussion makes 
perfect sense if -rol. irct)k,eti civ has the same meaning as at 3.58.2, and 
does in fact include 490. To repeat Badian's discussion of the matter, 
the natural and obvious meaning of the phrase, as an explanation of 
why there was an eleventh vote, is fairly conclusively proved right 
1  by the presence of the word yap• 56  Quite simply, Herodotus is 
saying there was an eleventh vote "for the Athenians formerly made 
the polemarch equal in vote with the generals." We need not assume 
40. 
with Hammond that IVO £KYLTOS 41 1(taaq103- means a casting vote exer-
cised by the polemarch only in the event of the council of ten 
generals reaching a stalema te. 56a Callimachus certainly used his 
c f vote as a casting vote but because there were eleven opotqcs 
c / It is indeed very difficult to understand how the opoblOS the polemarch 
once exercised, some time before 490, can logically explain why he 
was entitled to be EVI1rcTos 414i3oforos in 490. 57 Furthermore, 
Herodotus' account does not allow the inference that the polemarch 
did not have a place in the council of generals from the beginning. 
To be sure, Callimachus did not vote until Miltiades had persuaded 
him to decide in favour of battle, but this is not to say that the 
polemarch sat alone in his tent while the strategoi debated without 
him. 58 Nor does it mean that two meetings were necessary before a 
decision was reached, 59 the first resulting in a deadlock, with the 
polemarch either absent or abstaining, and the second occurring after 
Miltiades had spoken to him. It is possible, of course, that the meet-
ing was adjourned and that Miltiades used this opportunity to talk 
alone with Callimachus. From Herodotus' account, the inference is 
equally as plausible, if not more so, that the polemarch was undecided 
about which course of action to support. As Badian notes, Callimachus, 
in his role as hegemon, may have presided over the meeting and as a 
cautious chairman may have been reluctant to swing such an important 
60 	 c 	s tk 	/ issue with his own vote. 	All that Herodotus says is UJS OE AWL VE 
s / 	1 	/ 	c 	f 	^ 
EZOVOYTO Ka,EVIKO. 1 yetruit/T1411/ neulACW..ortpos rownoV (Callimachus) 
,IX61(1)V tiArAls nErE- Tai. There is nothing here, or in 
Miltiades' speech, which forces the conclusion that Miltiades had 
/ to leave the meeting to make his appeal. 60a The word EACWO ■/ is quite 
41. 
compatible with the view that at this critical point in the debate, 
the chief advocate for what Herodotus states is the losing argument, 
perhaps left his position to approach the polemarch directly, who as 
yet had not been an active participant. For all we know, Herodotus 
may have imagined the generals conferring on their feet, as Burn 
notes. 61 
To summarize Herodotus, at Marathon the polemarch had an 
equal vote with the generals on policy (0/1-4‘qh16), and when the 
strategoi became deadlocked he was persuaded by Miltiades to vote 
) 
(emSficarros thCtioeforos ) in favour of an engagement. Herodotus has 
given neither Miltiades nor Callimachus any special authority. The 
polemarch s vote was decisive only because a deadlock existed, not 
because the ultimate and final decision belonged exclusively to him. 
To put it differently, Herodotus has made the polemarch into an 
eleventh strategos, coequal in authority with the others ,62  and yet 
at the same time his account has emphasized the importance of the role 
the polemarch played. Fornara has argued that because the polemarch 
was a relic at the time Herodotus was writing, and because any inform-
ation of a technical,constitutional kind which defined the relation-
ship between the strategoi and the polemarch in 490 was only incid-
entally preserved, the historian was confused when confronted with 
the task of reconciling the tradition which attested to Callimachu.s' 
importance and that which accredited the victory to Miltiades. 63 
Herodotus has attempted to give Callimachus partial responsibility 
for the victory but he knew of no other role to assign him than that 
of eleventh strategos. What is significant is that Herodotus attests 
the importance of the polemarch at Marathon, although the office 
42. 
was merely a fossil when the historian was writing and although 
there may be some confusion in the account of the command structure 
as a result. 64 It is difficult to determine the extent to which 
Herodotus' inability to envisage military command except as emanat-
ing from the strategoi, has prevented him from achieving an accurate 
portrayal of the polemarch's actual powers and position in the 
command structure. 
The orthodox viewpoint is that he has stressed sufficiently 
the importance of Callimachus for the conclusion to be drawn that 
the polemarch was superior to the strategoi in authority, that he was 
in fact commander-in-chief. 65 For example, the mere fact that 
Herodotus placed Callimachus on the right wing of the line permits 
the inference that the polemarch held supreme command. The only 
/ 	a 	ra 
He attached no military relevance to the polemarch's position. 
In other words, the orthodox interpretation holds that Herodotus 
envisaged a system of command in which a67 coarmander-in-chief played 
no part. He was confused by his sources and completely distorted 
the position of the polemarch. This interpretation of Herodotus t 
account is strengthened by IC i2 609 and the fact that Callimachus 
as the Athenian spokesman made the Marathon vow to Artemis. 68 How- 
ever, neither of these pieces of evidence, nor the fact that Celli-
machus held the position of honour , conclusively proves that the 
polemarch was supreme commander. 
The whole question, of course, revolves around whether it 
is possible to isolate the fact from the fiction in Herodotus 
explanation Herodotus 
A 	/ 	66 netivatoial 	- indicates 
there. 
can offer - o 'sap vopos Tore El Kt:, (Porto I-01cl 
that he did not know why Callimachus was 
43. 
6.109.1-2. Are we in a position to assert that Callimachus was 
able to override the vote of a majority of the strategoi, that the 
generals were merely za-t advisory body and the polemarch not bound to 
follow their advice? 69 As Herodotus envisaged the situation, this 
would not seem to be the case. 	His phrase, 1Viika 	XEfircutI TiDV 
IsvtuiusuiV, 70 may mean that those opposed to battle could achieve their 
objective by simply maintaining the deadlock. The failure to reach 
a conclusion was tantamount to accepting the decision not to fight. 
However, he may be suggesting that a majority decision not to engage 
would have resulted if Miltiades had not approached the polemarch, 
aid if so, we have an indication that the polemarch could not act 
against a majority of the generals. Miltiades spoke to Callimachus 
at this point in a desperate attempt to force a c.anclusicn before a 
majority of the generals adopted the decision not to fight. Obviously, 
such conjecture should not be pushed too . far. But neither are we 
justified in concluding that the polemarch had the authority to 
overrule the strategoi. Perhaps a vote of the polemarch was necess-
ary to give validity to a majority decision among the generals, and 
no action could be taken before such ratification. Ultimate respons-
ibility rested with CalLimachus. This would explain why he initially 
decided not to participate in the debate. In the final analysis if 
the wrong decision was made he would suffer the consequences. He 
preferred to let the strategoi thrash the issue out in the hope that 
they might make the final decision for him. 
I do not believe that the position of the polemarch can be 
defined much more closely than this. He was :Virtu)." of the army in 
the sense that his was the final responsibility for adopting policy. 
44. 
If he could not act against a majority of the strategoi, which is 
however not clear, he could act with the support of only half their 
number. To be more specific, he had three courses of action open 
to him. Firstly, he could refrain from voting at all and thus 
tacitly support the indecision among the strategoi. Secondly, he 
could vote with those opposing battle, achieving the same result as 
in the first alternative, but more effectively because conclusively 
deciding the issue. The third alternative, and that which he opted 
for, was of course, to vote for an engagement. What Herodotus has 
preserved, it is here suggested, is not that the polemarch was inferior 
to the strategoi in deliberation and command, or ranked below them, 
but that no action could be undertaken if he was indecisive. Both 
the strategoi and the polemarch could effectively veto each other, 
in a sense. The endorsement by the polemarch of a majority opinion 
among the generals was necessary to finalize a decision, and the pole—
march was prevented from acting if opposed by the strategoi. The 
possibility that the fate of Athens rested with an official who ranked 
below the generals is not commensurate with the importance of Celli-
machus in Herodotus t account. At the same time we should perhaps 
avoid labelling the polemarch as supreme commander. The concept 
is loaded with a certain inflexibility and decisiveness which may 
not be applicable. In the first place the situation at Marathon 
was unprecedented. This was the first time the ten generals and the 
polemarch had operated together since the reform of 501. It is 
probable that no one was sure what the structure was, the polemarch 
included. 71 The constitution had not as yet been tested to define 
specifically the relationship between the two executive offices. 
45. 
Secondly, it cannot be asserted that the strategoi were, even at 
this early time, purely tribal leaders. They were elected by the 
whole Demos. It follows that they were envisaged as the chief mili-
tary leaders of the state, as well as tribal commanders. They were 
certainly given command of Athenian forces operating overseas as 
early as two short years after 501. The 20 ships sent by Athens to 
help the Ionians were no mere tribal contingent and were led by an 
Athenian general, Melanthius . 72 Furthermore, the functions of the 
strategoi were incredibly expanded by the time of Xerxes' invasion, 
if they only operated as tribal leaders in 490. 
In conclusion, the Athenian command as it existed at the 
time of Marathon may have been more flexible than is generally thought. 
We cannot assume that the role of the strategoi was similar to that 
of the taxiarc.hs in the days of the primacy of the strategia, 73 and 
any description of the polemarch as supreme commander needs to be 
strictly qualified. However, the polemarch as rititIVJ V had certain 
prerogatives and powers which were recognized by the generals. 
Essentially, the ultimate responsibility rested with him, not with 
the strategoi, and he would be the first to be prosecuted if things 
went wrong. Accordingly, he held the position of honour on the right 
wing, although he did not command the troops in that position. It 
was no more than coincidental that the battle took place when Miltiades 
was nrUMVIS, if this is not merely a Philaid myth to emphasize the 
constitutionality of Miltiades' behaviour. The authority vested 
c 
in the polemarch as rply.AW must be balanced against the fact that 
the strat--goi were more than contingent commanders and possessed very 
real positive powers of deliberation. The two offices juxtaposed 
46. 
approximated very nearly to a complete collegiate command. 
Pausanias' description of the picture in the Stoa Poecile probably 
gives us the most accurate account we are likely to get - T3,/ 
/ pax0p€.1%/tAJV 	t1e1Xot pAicrret. tins; Zrv 	vpartii KgAvAcixos TE ) es 
i 	
, 74 Yherigatots rralig.pxeiV C4firro) icat 	Air -rat irrpari /town;hr. 
Miltiades was instrumental in forcing the decision to fight but the 
C 	/ strategoi could not act without the vote of the TrEtt-u,N. 
CHAPTER 
Election Procedure  
Very little is known of Athenian election procedures, 
yet this has not prevented some scholars from developing elaborate 
reconstructions concerning the precise nature of the procedure 
adopted by the ecclesia to elect the strategoi. The first such 
attempt was made by Wade—Gery in the early 1930's, 1  and his theory 
remained virtually unchallenged until the mid 1960's. 2 In 1966 the 
problem was once again subjected to close scrutiny by E.S. Staveley, 3 
and more recently by P.J. Bicknell, who utilized a suggestion by 
A.H.M. Jones, 4 to propose an alternative hypothesis. 5 All three 
scholars above mentioned have been concerned with the problems connect-
ed with the tribal double representation in the strategia in the 
fifth century, and have consequently formulated election procedures 
to explain this phenomenon. 
According to Wade—Gery, Aristotle's statement at Ath Poi 
44.4 that the ecclesia conducted the elections of the strategoi 
$ tt 	A o -ri cw rQ6,ittcy csit<2,1 , can be dated to the fifth century. A 
nrof3o0Xcotut was required each year to determine what method the 
ecclesia would choose in that year. 6 In some years it was decided 
to elect a aTrfcaritc/s 4 ArrittrrLuV and nine tribal strategoi. Pre-
sumably this meant that elections were held in two stages. 7 In the 
first stage one general was elected without regard to tribal repres- 
- 
	
	entation. In the second, ten tribal strategoi were elected, one from 
each tribe by the whole Demos, and the one with the fewest votes 
47. 
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was dropped. If the man with the smallest vote belonged to the 
k 
same tribe as the o-rrniiirosEc einnOlIDV , double representation did not 
occur, but if he belonged to any other tribe that tribe had no general, 
and the tribe of the crrra.-rizro`5 I.c furciltruAl had two representatives. 
Wade-Gery used as support for the procedure he envisaged, that is, 
of dropping the man with the fewest votes, the method Plato prescribed 
in the Laws for the election of E viral for Delphi - 	st: 
etnyrn-as Tpls cfrFpb-creaav. it.,;v al 74.7-rapES (111,1>.(11 :TETTaPeti` 
grcao-rov et aln-c7w, Tpeic & CZ;aV .. 9rXelaTr, 7,=!v7J-rat APPichos. 
00ncetta7av7ac 	71-11tr7retv Ely AEA-007.'1.Z CIL'eiN.EZ:" t 	El•Ci;0- 1- 11 ,7 
: Tptel8o ,; 	gva . 
8 Wade-Gery translates: Exegetai : three groups 
of four tribes each (literally three times over, the four tribes) 
shall elect, each group, four; one per tribe. The state shall put 
through their dokimasia the three (in each group) who get most votes 
and send these nine to Delphi, who will choose one from each group 
of three."9 
	
However, it is by no means certain that this interpre- 
tation of the passage is correct. In the first place there is some 
evidence to support the reading rfar after the words Toos OE 
Secondly, the phrase (pep E-rtzd'a.V JAI V at -rcrrqrss 
/ •fuAcu re--ratios may be a description of the nomination, rather than 
the election, of men as candidates for the position of exegetes. 
c/ 	N 	C " Thirdly, it is debatable whether Ektla'rov Eg 4:1_4fr-r-Lov must rae an 
C 	 ci 
EVeurrriS 	lUAlS. Eva, as Wade-Gery asserts. 11 This is crucial to 
an acceptance of Wade-Gery's theory , for if Plato is not advocating 
the representation of each of the four tribes, there is no analogy 
in the ancient sources for dropping the tribal representative who 
receives the smallest total vote. Quite simPly, an alternative 
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translation, replacing iris with Tpas , may be : "As regards the 
exegetai three (in number) let the four tribes nominate four (men) 
each (man) from their own personnel, and let them (i.e. the State) 
scrutinize whichever three gain most votes and send nine to Delphi 
12 to appoint one from each group of three". 
There are other difficulties with Wade-Gery's theory. It 
is based on the assumption that only one tribe could be doubly repres-
ented in a given year, but double representation of two tribes occurs 
in 433/2, 431/0 and 426/5. Secondly, there is no support in the 
sources for an electoral reform geared to singling ovt one candidate 
for special treatment, allowing a single general to be elected 
c airaitatiV. 	Aristotle refers to only one reform, at Ath Pal 61.1, 
a change from electing each general from one tribe, to electing them 
all without regard to tribal representation - .XEtparopoi3ot • • • 
. 	 Vim!. TrpOl-cpoy p..“, a 	eica a, s 4A-rjs. 	vi3v 8' 
dirdprwv • 
Staveley has attempted to overcome the major difficulties 
apparent in Wade-Gery's hypothesis by suggesting an election proced-
ure which both allows double representation of more than one tribe 
and also (he believes) accords with the reform mentioned by Aristotle 
in Ath Pal 61.1. He does not, however, question Wade7Gery's assumption 
that double representation occurred because one of the two generals 
from the same tribe had been elected if Etric(ArrwV. But he rejects 
the theory of the two-phase election process on the grounds that the 
Athenians would have considered it unattractive and unworkable. In 
the first place such a process would have involved voting twice on 
) c all candidates, except for the man elected qarriam-rwV. Secondly, 
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the results of voting in the first phase would indicate the compara-
tive popularity of rival candidates from the sane tribes, and would 
- 
thus most likely encourage inter-tribal electoral agreements design- 
ed to eliminate close competition or overtake more popular tribal 
rivals in the second phase of the election. Staveley also rejects 
Wade-Gery's provision requiring the tribal representative with the 
smallest total vote to be dropped. In practice it would prove to 
be inequitable and therefore unattractive to the Athenians. lie 
explains that the candidate in the lowest position of the ten elected 
must have had either a multiplicity of tribal rivals or a very small 
majority over a single opponent. 
Staveley suggests that starting about 441 the ecclesia 
ceased to choose in turn between the several candidates from each 
of the ten tribes and inaugurated the procedure of voting on the-
entire list of candidates, from all tribes, in one operation, and 
without regard to their tribe of origin. The successful candidates 
were the ten, each from a different tribe, who had severally polled 
a higher total than their tribal opponents. A provision also accom-
panied this reform which allowed the possibility of double represent-
ation of one or more tribes. A candidate who received a vote total 
above a stipulated minimum was automatically elected 	Ax-cl,,,rwv. 
The remaining positions were filled by each tribe's most popular 
candidate, and could include a second representative from the tribe 
which produced a frflawri lrOS 	1:orgv-rwv, the tribe (or tribes) with 
the least total vote being excluded. In other words, if a candidate 
(or candidates) from a tribe (or tribes) which produced an elected 
representative kOz.r-civ-r-cov polled high enough to obtain a place among 
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the remaining positions to be filled, double representation occurred. 
The problems associated with dropping the man with the fewest votes 
under Wade-Gery's hypothesis do not exist because Staveley envisages 
that the voters were free to distribute their votes as they saw fit, 
voting for as many candidates as they wished, perhaps merely refrain-
ing from voting for men whom they held in low esteem. Any tribe's 
failure to gain representation was thus due to a lack of popular 
support for its candidates. 
The strength and attraction of this theory resides in the 
fact that multiple representation is allowed in a system where the 
principle of tribal representation is also recognized as of some 
importance. The major weakness is that it is riot compatible with the 
obvious interpretation of Aristotle Ath Pol. 61.1. According to 
Staveley, Ath Pal 61.1 means that the Athenians no longer concerned 
themselves with the tribal membership of the candidates during the 
course of the voting. 13 But Aristotle says more than that. 
suggest that 	XELpoTovoikit_ .••__ 	SIIca, 	-rpOrEpcn.,. UEP 
Ziedarw4 _ 	s6v- Airg- 	 . 	 8' j; diTlvrwv. means: 
	"They elect .. ten 
generals now from the whole (electorate) but previously one from 
each tribe. „14 Surely, precisely what the wording implies is that 
there was no longer a necessity for each of the ten strategoi to 
belong to a different tribe. Theoretically all could belong to the 
same tribe. Aristotle's choice of words demonstrates that the reform 
involved not a procedural change in the voting system, that is, merely 
a change in the method used by the ecclesia in voting on candidates 
for office, which in no way altered the previous arrangement whereby 
each general still came from a different tribe, 15 but a fundamental 
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change in the nature of the electorate from which the strategoi 
were chosen. The object of xtiforovovcra is dypollyous oetcCt and 
they were chosen j turc,v'ruiv , that is, regardless of their phylai. 
It would certainly seem to follow from this - the removal of the 
provision requiring the Athenians to be concerned with the tribal 
affiliation of the "(rpa.-Trprous OEM" 	that there was also no regard 
paid to the tribal membership of the candidates during the course of 
the voting. Surely Aristotle would have been . more specific if the 
process involved the allocation to office of the ten candidates who 
had polled highest within their own tribes, as Staveley asserts. 
There are other difficulties with Staveley's theory which 
cannot be overlooked. As has already been noted the view, which 
he shares with Wade-Gery, that double representation was the result 
of the singling out of one candidate for special treatment - based 
on the belief that in all cases one of the two generals from the same 
tribe would have received great popular support - which involved the 
) c / 
election of a single CT() (Lir? YOS E§ eirewil411/, or more, depending on 
whether one or more tribes was doubly represented, finds no support 
in Ath PoZ 61.1. 16 Furthermore, there is no analogy in our sources 
, 
for the accoQntnc . procedure ,v:/hteh-lhOliVisc_tS41-7,*gs used to determine whether 
) c 
a crreocorros E,§ ctitcaruA/ was elected, and to explain how double 
-representation occurred in practice. 
The most attractive theory so far advocated to explain double 
representation in the strategia is that of Bicknell. His theory is 
based on a suggestion of A.H.M. Jones that Aristotle's phrase "one 
from each tribe" in Ath Pol 22.2 and 61.1 is not accurate. 	If each 
tribe nominated candidates before the election, it may have been 
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possible for a tribe which lacked distinguished candidates to 
nominate outsiders. Thus, every tribe had a representative among 
the strategoi, but it sometimes occurred that generals were not 
members of the tribes they represented. A similar arrangement allow-
ed denies to be represented in the Council of 500 by members of other 
demes. 17 Bicknell suggests that support for this explanation can 
be found in IC i2 929, a casualty list of the tribe Erechtheis dated 
to the campaigning season of 460. The relevant sections of the 
list are as follows: 
line 5 [cr]T[Fc,]TeY2v 
6 
62 frecrrees 
63 4s wiro (le as 
Two generals from Erechtheis were killed in action in the same year. 
Unless one general was elected for 461/0 and the other for 460/59, 
double representation occurred in either one of these years. 
Hippodamas,called 	yoS , was the representative of Erechtheis. 
whether he be Phrynichos or Phylarchos, unexpectedly 
'N 17a described as 6rpcurri VAN, 	which word Bicknell accepts as a genitive, 
weaning "of the generals"; was the elected nominee of another tribe. 
In conjunction with this hypothesis Bicknell extends 
further the analogy drawn by Jones between election of councillors 
and election of strategoi. On the evidence of Aeschines 3.62 - 
which indicates that substitutes may have been held in reserve when 
councillors were chosen by lot, presumably in the event of bouleutai-
elect being rejected at their dokimasi,7 18 - he suggests that at the 
cheirotonia of strategoi the ecclesia may have chosen not only ten 
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generals but ten alternates as well. This would explain some of 
the examples of double representation, particularly during the 
Peloponnesian War, 18a substitutes having assumed office when strategoi 
died or were deposed. 
The possible analogy between the election of bouleutai 
and strategoi and the supporting evidence of IC i 2 929 gives Bicknell's 
hypothesis a greater degree of credibility than the theories postu-
lated by Wade-Gery and Staveley, but perhaps a closer look at the 
evidence that does exist concerning the election procedure used by 
the Athenians to choose their generals, such as it is, should be 
surveyed before any further conclusions are made. 
Aristotle's statement, How Ocn (Ss 
elpxatpecriag I arparriyc7n , kca 1,-,777- pxaw Kai 70-)V (MUM 7,7,v 77pOs •
19 
.TV 775A4tov_ apxci:w V 7-fr"j 	Ka0 5 5 11 ay 	511p.Cp ;:101:71 * 	may mean it is 
virtually impossible to reconstruct procedure used to elect the 
strategoi. The statement is so broad as to prohibit us speculatively 
defining the degree to which the ecclesia could manoeuvre within a 
set procedure. We do not know what the variables were. On the 
other hand, it does seem unlikely that some kind of framework within 
which the ecclesia consistently operated, year by year, was not fairly 
firmly established. The Athenians, after all, did develop elaborate 
and stable election procedures for most of their magistracies and 
administrative offices. But, be that as it may, caution is required, 
for there is a possibility of a certain amount of variation from 
year to year in the way the elections of military officials were 
conducted. 
There are several indications that the ten tribes had some 
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part to play, at least in the early stages of the electoral process. 
We know from Aristotle's phrase, 	excurrris y)tis s'a., at Ath Poi 
22.2, that at the beginning of the fifth century each one of the 
strategoi came from a different tribe. Secondly, from an overall 
survey of yearly lists of generals for both the fifth and the fourth 
centuries, although they are often only partially complete, it can 
be seen that a wide range of tribal affiliations was more usual than 
not. Thirdly, as a general rule, the Athenians adhered to the princ-
iple of choosing each of its many boards of officials on a tribal 
basis. 
There is some evidence in our sources to support the view 
that candidates for offices were nominated and then a vote taken 
between them. A passage in Demosthenes indicates that when several 
nominations were made in the assembly for an individual to pronounce 
a funeral eulogy over the bodies of troops slain in battle, a show 
of hands decided the successful candidate. 20 Again, when ambassadors 
were elected to treat with Philip concerning the peace of Philocrates, 
this was conducted in the ecclesia, after candidates had been nomin-
ated, also in the ecclesia. 21 Whether candidates for the strategia 
were nominated in the ecclesia in the same way as these extraordinary 
officials is a matter for conjecture. The fact that we are dealing 
with a regular magistracy may or may not mean there was a slight 
difference in procedure. Ath Pol 56.3 seems to demonstrate that it 
was the responsibility of each tribe at its atm assembly to nominate, 
every year, a person for the position of choregus for the competitions 
at the Dionysia, and every two years a choregus for the festival 
22 at the Thargelia. 
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In the absence of any direct information regarding nomin-
ation of candidates as strategoi, and on the strength of the chance 
of an analogy to be drawn with the methods used to appoint other 
officials, two procedural possibilities seem open to us. Each 
individual tribe may have been responsible for preparing a list of 
nominees at its own tribal assembly, which were then subsequently 
voted upon at the electoral ecclesia, held in the prytany after the 
sixth, when the omens were favourable.
23 This is analogous with the 
procedure for appointing the choregoi, up to a point, but not complete-
ly, because each tribe may have forwarded only me nominee as a 
potential choregus to be approved by the eponymous archon. 24 A 
formal probouleuma was required for the election of strategoi, as for 
any other business,25 and if the nominating procedure was the same 
as that for the choregoi, the Council may have included on its pro-
bouleuma the list of nominees from each tribe. All that would then 
be required of the ecclesia would be to vote in turn on each of the 
ten tribal lists, or on a list of all candidates in one operation, 
the most popular candidate from each tribe being elected genera1. 26 
The reform of Ath Pol 61.1 does not necessarily mean that nomination 
by tribes was abandoned. Once the restriction compelling tribal 
representation was removed, perhaps the ten tribal lists were amalgam-
ated into one, if this was not already the case before the reform, 
and the most popular men elected irrespective of whether some tribes 
remained unrepresented or not. 
Alternatively, and using as an analogy the procedures 
evident in Demosthenes and Aeschines for electing extraordinary 
officials, the nomination of candidates may have waited until the 
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convening of the electoral ecclesia. In that case the nominations 
and the elections occurred in the same place and at the same meeting. 
Whether each tribe decided by prior arrangement a list of nominees 
who were ncmt formally nominated or whether this occurred on the day 
of the election, we do not know. Under either system, notninations 
would be called from the floor and would not be incorporated in the 
probouleuma of the Council which authorized the electoral proceedings. 
If tribal lists were already decided, the most straightforward method 
of election, after the names of candidates had been received by the 
meeting and made public, was to vote on the entire list in one operat-
ion and to allocate office to the most popular candidate in each 
tribe. After the reform of ./Ath Pa 61.1 the successful candidates 
would gain office in competition with all those nominated, not merely 
in competition with their respective tribal rivals. If however 
nominations were not previously decided by tribes, it would only be 
practicable to conduct the operation in a slightly more complicated 
manner. To ensure that candidates from each and every tribe were put 
forward, perhaps nominees were called for in official tribal order. 
Under this system the ecclesia could receive nominations for one tribe 
and immediately choose one from among them to be general, or receive 
the nominations for every tribe and then vote on each list in turn 
or all together. Now, the question of whether it was necessary for 
the Athenians to be ordered into tribal groups for the purpose of 
nominating, rather than voting, only seems to arise if it was the rule 
that candidates could be nominated only by fellow-tribesmen. Such 
being the ease, it would be natural enough anyway for prospective 
candidates to mingle with their fellow-tribesmen, but efficiency 
would be greatly facilitated by the absence of the necessity to check 
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on the credentials of nominators while the nominating process was 
being conducted. However, if there was no restriction and a 
candidate from a particular tribe could be nominated by an individual 
from any other, it would be no less expedient for nominations to be 
put forward, firstly for men belonging to the tribe Erechtheis, 
secondly for Aigeis, and so on, by any individual present in the 
assembly, without a division of the people into their tribal groups. 
Thus, even on the assumption that the election procedure 
adopted by the Athenians for the strategia conformed with either of 
the two procedures to elect other officials for which we have evidence 
in our sources, there is still a myriad of possibilities to choose 
from. There is one other consideration which may have been signifi-
cant in determining how the Athenians conducted the electoral ecclesia 
and that is the question of the voting method, and the counting pro-
cedure. I do not believe there is any reason to doubt that voting 
‘. 
was determined by KE,TotoVick... in the fifth century, as in the fourth 
century. 27 There is no evidence that the vote was taken by written 
ballot, as at an ostracism, and such a method may be ruled out on a 
number of other general grounds. At an ostracism it was quite a 
simple matter to inscribe, or have inscribed, a name on a piece of 
tile or a potsherd. 28 All voters would know whether they wished to 
ostracise a man or not, and if a choice was to be made it was pro-
bably restricted to two or three names. 29 	At the election of 
strategoi it would be much more difficult for voters to remember the 
names of all the candidates and much easier for supporters of parti-
cular candidates to remain undetected in manipulating illiterate 
voters. 
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If we accept the literal meaning of xEyorovict in the 
Ath Pal, how were the votes counted? In the fourth century one 
/ k 
of the duties of the nine rreoedrot was to count votes at a XEirorolict. 
These officials were selected by lot by the ta-tercerris of the ruling 
pry tany on the day of the assembly, one from each of the other nine 
30 prytanies in the boule. 	According to Staveley the 
may have been joined by the Lrarror_rris to produce ten 
each of whom would concern himself with the counting of votes of his 
own tribesmen. In the fifth century the 50 councillors of the prytany 
may have divided this responsibility amongst themselves. 31 If in 
the fourth century people were strictly grouped according to their 
tribes at the electoral ecclesia, it is quite likely that this arrange-
ment also existed in the fifth century. However, it is by no means 
proven that at either routine legislative assemblies or at electoral 
assemblies the citizens were grouped by tribes. It does appear 
however, that at special plenary assemblies which were held to decide 
the rights and fate of certain individuals, to decide for example, 
if anyone should be ostracized, the citizens were arranged into 
tribal groups. Xenophon's account of the trial of the generals in 
406 indicates that a probouleuma of the Council, drafted by 
nine iTpo£droi 
enumerators, 
CallixeliO4:4 required the Athenians, Oia0701craa0at 
_Ka :a cSuNt'zs. &€va & Cc T;p, cpvXip 
gicd0-79 	79 cb0,9 	 rolpirrTetv. 
• • • ,417raVT,.17, • 
36(. bEplas. 
32 Xenophon's last phrase 
"in each tribe a herald shall proclaim" — clearly means that the 
Athenians were arranged by tribes. 
There is some evidence to suLgest that plenary as  
may have been organized differently from legislative and electoral 
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assemblies. They seem to have been held in the market place rather 
than the Pnyx, 33 they required a quorum of 6,000 and they possibly 
were presided over by the nine archons and the whole boule rather 
than one of the ten tribal sections of the boule. 34  The division 
into tribal groups may therefore be peculiar to plenary assemblies 
and not a reliable guide unless evidence suggests otherwise. 
Excavations on the Pnyx have revealed three beddings for 
stelai, which were interpreted as indicating some sort of division 
of the seating area. The beddings were too few to plot any system 
/ 
of division. 35 If each of the nine TTsears were responsible for 
counting the number of hands in a separate distinct area (in the 
fourth century) when there was a Xi..1 OTO V I , perhaps there were 
posts erected at intervals to divide the seating arena into nine 
If, however, as seems more logical, there were ten 
/ k • divisions, and the pooi were assisted by the On CTO-Tir either 
it was thought that an official from each and every tribe should 
participate in the counting or the supervision of the counting of 
votes, or the ecclesia was ordered according to tribes, each teller 
counting the votes of his own tribe. The evidence clearly indicates 
that a citizen could ordinarily sit where he wished when an assembly 
was held on the Pnyx. 37 At the time of the debate on Sicily, 
Nicias evinced alarm on noting that the supporters of Alcibiades 
were congregating together.
38 This, together with the indication 
in Plutarch that Thucydides, son of Melesias, persuaded his supporters 
to sit themselves apart, 39  may mean it was customary for supporters 
of particular political leaders to sit together in the same part of 
40 the assembly. 	The collective weight of evidence is strong enough 
divisions. 36 
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to override the conclusion that political groups sat together only 
so far as was allowed by the division of the assembly into tribal 
sections. 41 
Obviously, the lack of information does not allow us to 
conclude one way or another whether citizens sat where they wanted to 
at electoral assemblies, as they did at legislative assemblies. 
/ 	. Voting was determined by Xsporovon-in both cases and there would be 
no less a need to check the credentials of the voters at routine 
assemblies, than at the electoral assemblies. Presumably the six 
lexiarchs and thlArassistants,the thirty collectors, who were respons-
ible for ensuring that only qualified citizens attended a meeting, 42 
were equipped with deme lists for this purpose. Certainly, the task 
of these officials would be greatly facilitated if the citizens sat 
by tribes, as Staveley notes, 43 but ordinarily they did not. Clearly 
the scrutiny was conducted in some other way, perhaps as the citizens 
entered the assembly area, but as the need to check credentials did 
not force the Athenians into tribal divisions at legislative assemblies, 
there is no reason to assume it did at the electoral assembly. 
We are not in a position to know whether any restrictions 
existed limiting the number of candidates for office, but at the 
KElporostia- we may reasonably expect that there was a need to count 
votes carefully, and it would certainly have been a lengthy and 
difficult task to count with any exactitude the number of voters in 
favour of each candidate, especially if-a long list of nominations 
was received. It has recently been suggested that Xenophon, Memora-
bilia 3.4.1, may be an indication that only two nominees could be 
put forward by each tribe. 44 The passage is as follows : 13WvSg 
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TrOTENIKOpaXithil, 	apXalpt";(11.61V a7tOvTa riper°. TiVEC, (7) 
NIKopaxi,871, (TTpaT))701 ->fimivTat ; 
.Ka l Os, OE; 	(1) 	 Teurro‘ elo-tv 'Aeqvalen, 6a7c 
yet , obx ei:Xovro, 81c; g.K icaTaXc'ryau crTpaTet..6,uevas 
KaTarTjTpeppai 	Xoxwycin, Kai, Taiap7n, Kai Tpa6paTa 
.•L7r; Ir e;l1) 	71-0Xell,(r-OV 1-oo-ain.a gro• rAs ctiXas Toy TpaVildiltn) .(17r011111 . 1)07"1-ZEPOS; 
? 	. tITEGEL-FCVL4F.)" 'Avvaegyriv 8g, gc577, gi'XopTa, 761' Or/TE OT. rXirqv 7rt0 aTTparevacittevar 
Te Tois tT.1EUY LV ci)&v 7repilditew-Tuv T,-ota-(2vr(L E7TI7TatIEVOLI TE 
Oa° • Obe■ Er 7.) Xprj,uara atAXe-yetv. 	Most scholars have accepted without 
question that Nicomachides and Antisthenes were fellow-tribesmen 
and therefore that only one person could be elected from each tribe 
at the end of the fifth century. 45 Antisthenes may be of the deme 
Kytherros and therefore a member of the tribe Pandionis, 46 but there 
is no corroborative evidence for the tribal affilitation of Nico-
machides. 47 He may or may not have belonged to Pandionis. There 
is no reason to suppose, at least from Xenophon, that both men belonged 
to the same tribe. Quite simply, Nicomachides complained about not 
being elected because he thought his own qualifications for office 
were greatly superior to those of the successful candidate, Antis- 
thenes. As Fornara notes, it should not be concluded that the ecclesia 
48 could not have elected them both if it so desired. 
We cannot safely deduce from Memorabilia 3.4.1 that there 
could be only twenty nominees for office. Futthermore ) may we be 
sure that in most years more nominees were put forward than4:tre - wtre 
places to be filled? 49 	Socrates' initial question to Nicomachides 
c/ TiVes) co Nucop4axlèp Cr lrel 	; - may imply that there was 
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a list of candidates from which the strategoi were selected, but 
this is not inevitable. Perhaps it is safe to assume that Nicomachides 
was a nominee, yet this is at best still only assumption. Neverthe-
less, the possibility that the ecclesia had to choose from a list 
of thirty or forty nominees cannot be ruled out. Clearly, if such 
was the case, the votes for all candidates would have to be recorded, 
with the provision - for as long as the procedure of Ath Pol 22.2 was 
in operation - that the top man from each tribe be elected. If the 
attention to detail and the time consuming voting habits of the 
routine assemblies can be taken as a guide, there is no reason to 
think that the Athenians would have baulked at such a complication, 
or at the lengthy proceedings which would be involved in choosing 
between forty or so candidates. 
Plato, in his Laws, devoted a chapter to describing the, 
• officials to govern his State, including strategoi, and prescribed 
the methods used to secure their appointment. Where Plato does not 
explicitly prescribe provisions it is safe to presume that they 
mirrored actual Athenian procedure. 50 In his State three generals 
• -• %/ I` A 	c, / are to be elected Crects 0E ) 015 av TWATTI XelporOVIOL ifirViTctl ) 
••••-■ 
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%52 	On two points, namely, the number of candidates, 
and the counting procedure, Plato is silent. What is clear, however, 
, is firstly that there is no suggestion of any restrictions on the 
64. 
• number of nominees who could be put forward by the nomophylakes, 
but merely that all nominees should be citizens of the State. 
Secondly, it is obvious that the votes on all the candidates would 
have to be counted carefully and recorded in order to decide which 
three men received the highest totals. Plato's very silence on both 
matters, I suggest, is significant. There is no need to describe 
procedural details unless they differ from what everyone would natur-
ally expect. 52a May we not believe that in Plato's own day there were 
no restrictions on the number of candidates for office, and the count-
ing procedure employed was the same as must of necessity be connected 
with the election of his three strategoi? 
If we can therefore reasonably conclude that the actual vot-
ing and counting of votes was a lengthy business, and bearing in mind 
that together with the strategoi, the other military officials - taxi-
archs, hipparchs and phylarchs - also have to be directly elected 
annually, it would perhaps be all too time-consuming an affair to 
conduct both the nominations and the vote at one and the same meeting.53  
On these general grounds therefore, it is more likely that a formal - 
- list of candidates was prepared before the election day, probably by 
the prytaneis, incorporating all the names decided on at tribal meet-
ings. Plato's statement that, in his state, at the XeiroTovia of 
the strategoi, it was possible for a citizen to propose the substitution 
of a candidate of his own for one who was already listed 54 may in 
fact be an indication of exactly this. The list of candidates was 
prepared beforehand, and additional nominations could not be accepted 
at the assembly. Any citizen preparing a substitution would surely 
need to be fairly confident of his chances of success in a straight 
65. 
trial of strength with the supporters of another candidate to make 
it worth the effort. The substitution provision would therefore be 
used sparingly, and while on the one hand ensuring that no worthwhile 
candidate was overlooked by the tribal assemblies, it has the great 
advantage of being quite a straightforward matter not involving much 
time. Furthermore, if as many as three recounts of votes could be 
asked for, presumably by unlucky candidates, 55  there is all the more 
reason to believe that the electoral ecclesia dealt exclusively with 
voting; and as previously noted, the extant lists of generals support 
the notion that the tribes were individually responsible for provid-
ing candidates from among their own number. 
Lack of epigraphical evidence prevents definite conclusions 
about procedure adopted by the Athenians to elect strategoi, but if 
it be accepted that Plato may be a guide (or rather his omissions 
may be), whether his detailed provisions adhered fairly strictly to 
actual Athenian practice or not, we are in fact dealing with probabi-
lities in proposing solutions to the problems here discussed. The 
evidence tilts in favour of supposing that the tribes were charged 
with the responsibility of nominating candidates, a procedure which 
would be analogous with that for appointing choregoi rather than that 
used to choose extraordinary officials. At the actual ecclesia voting 
would commence immediately after the list of candidates had been read 
out, in some instances being delayed for a short time while a prelim-
inary vote was taken to decide if substitutes should replace candi-
dates already on the list. Presumably, the names would be arranged 
in official tribal order so that candidates for Erechtheis would be 
voted on first, those from Aigeis second, and so on. The counting 
66. 
.) of hand votes Was the responsibility of the irroENro and trrieruris 
in. the fourth century. We can assume that the need for accuracy 
meant a responsible board existed for this purpose in the fifth 
century, perhaps the en-to-ra-rfis and members of the ruling prytany. 56 
The assembly arena on the Pnyx was probably divided into ten counting 
areas by stelai located at intervals, and each teller was responsible 
for counting the hands raised in one of these divisions. This is not 
to say that citizens were grouped by tribes, but other than a ten-
fold division would surely be inappropriate, for the same markers 
were probably used to define tribal areas at plenary assemblies in 
the earlier years of the fifth century. When the voting on all candi-
dates was completed, the results were probably read out, and candidates 
who had lost narrowly could demand a recount. 
There are certain other problems which this inquiry has as 
yet not touched on. No comment has been offered on the question of 
whether every citizen was restricted to only one vote or could theore-
tically vote on as many candidates as he wished. On the one hand, if 
the Athenians employed the principle of "one man, one vote", the count-
ing would be greatly facilitated, but on the other hand it would be 
very difficult to police, especially when votes were counted on 
thirty or forty candidates in turn. 	However, even if it was possible 
for an individual to vote for several candidates, the chances are 
that most electors restricted themselves to only one or two votes. 
In the first place, although there is no way we can measure the strength 
of tribal loyalty, the consideration that every tribe will have 
wished to secure the election of one or more of its candidates, cannot 
57 be casually dismissed. It is not possible to determine whether 
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or not only outstanding political and military leaders would be 
assured of support outside their own tribes, 58 but in many cases 
it is likely enough that little-known candidates received the bulk 
of their votes from fellow-tribesmen. Secondly, many voters would 
have realized, as no doubt prospective office-holders reminded them, 
that a vote for one's second preference was a vote against one's first 
preference. Perhaps only those voters who were fully confident that 
their first choice was virtually assured of election would hazard 
to vote for other candidates anyway. 
No account of election procedure adopted to appoint Athenian 
military officials would be complete without devoting some attention 
to the methods used to fill vacancies created by the injury, death 
or disgrace of commanders in the field. As already noted, Bicknell 
has suggested that at the Xesporovia. the Demos not only elected the 
strategoi but alternates as well, who would serve if a general was 
rejected at his dokimasia, killed in action or otherwise relieved of 
office. 59 It may very well be that the scrutiny was generally only a 
formality, but it would be very unusual if no procedure existed to 
cover the possibility of a general being rejected at his dokimasia by 
ensuring that his place would be automatically filled by another man. 
Each tribe would undoubtedly select only those nominees whom it felt 
would have no trouble passing the dokimasia. This would certainly 
lessen the chances of officials being rejected. 59a But only if the 
scrutiny was conducted before the vote, on all the candidates, could 
we be sure that there was no necessity to elect extra men as a pre-
caution. However, it is abundantly clear from our sources that the 
dokimasia was an examination which magistrates had to undergo between 
68. 
their selection and entry on office. 60 Furthermore, Ath Pol 61.2 
indicates that in every prytany the strategoi were subjected to an 
examination in the ecclesia on the satisfaCtoriness Of their admin 
e 0 3 e. ) k istration to date - errIXE-Torovia d auTiA.W aTri kara rrv TrUrOLOLICAI, 
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To return to Bicknell's hypothesis, there is:no supporting 
evidence that alternates were selected. His suggestion that Pythodorus, 
who took command from Laches in Sicily in the winter of 426/5, was 
elected as alternate when Laches was deposed, is far from certain. 62 
Both men probably belonged to the same tribe, Kekropis, 63 However, 
Thucydides, in his account, does not say that Laches was deposed, 64 
although the inference has been drawn by most scholars. 65 It may 
well be that Laches was tried for misconduct in Sicily, but if so he 
was acquitted. 66 From Thucydides it seems reasonable enough to con-
elude that Laches did not leave Sicily until Pythodorus arrived. If 
that was the case, on Bicknell's viewpoint Pythodorus was elected as 
substitute even before Laches had the opportunity to defend himself 
in a law court. If, on the other hand, Laches had been recalled to 
Athens and tried before Pythodorus was sent out (an improbable alter-
native, for in the intervening period there was no strategos in 
Sicily) the latter was chosen as alternate even after . Laches was ac-
quitted and presumably restored to offic,c.t. Clearly, Bicknell's 
suggestion will not do unless we accept the possibility that the 
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Athenians resorted (at times) 67  to the practice of electing substit-
utes for officials charged but not convicted - that is, after their 
, 
errlitElparovta_ but before their trial. In the event of the official 
being acquitted as in Laches' case, this would mean in effect that 
the numerical strength of the board was increased by one. 
Surely, what is more likely is that Pythodorus and Laches 
had both been elected for 426/5 and double representation existed 
for Kekropis. Either Sophocles or Eurymedon could have been chosen 
as Laches' immediate ,Olabc,Yos . But it was a coincidence, nothing 
more, that his successor was a fellow-tribesman. 68 Whether Laches 
was replaced because the Athenians expected more of him, or simply 
because he had been in Sicily from October 427 until February 425, 
we do not know. If the former alternative be preferred, this does 
not necessarily mean he was immediately prosecuted. Aristophanes' 
Wasps was not produced until 422. Therefore, even if this is evi-
dence that Cleon brought charges against Laches, 69 the information 
against him may not have come to light until a year or two had elapsed 
after his command. 
There are several other instances during the Peloponnesian 
War when generals were dismissed from office, but the first certain 
instance of by-elections is not until 411, when the troops at Samos 
removed some strategoi and trierarchs from command and elected 
replacements. 70 Thucydides gives no hint that a substitute was 
elected when Pericles was deposed in 430, or when Sophocles, Eury-
medon and Pythodorus met the same fate in 426/5, or when Procles 
(426/5), Hippocrates (424/3), Lamachus (414/3), Nicias and Demosthen2s 
(413/2) were killed. 71 - Thucydides' treatment of Pericles' dismissal- 
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may be an indication that the ecclesia could hold a by-election 
whenever it wished. Pericles was probably accused at a regular 
- ETIAEiroTovio-, convicted in a law court, fined and removed from 
ci office. According to Thucydides oxtubov S aoGis ou TEDX63 orrep Li 
te 404i cyAlmos rtel4 crparylov etAovro •.. These words do not 
suggest that Pericles had any recourse to appeal after he was fined 
but they do suggest that he did not have to wait long before he was 
again in office. If he was deposed in the summer of 430 and Thucydides 
means he was elected in the spring of 429 to enter office later in 
the year, we must suppose that he was out of office for nearly a year. 
It would be strange if Thucydides had departed from his usual pre- 
c/ 	, cision in using the phrase thfreecw ... ou 	As Gomme states, A... 	 , 
the historian is more likely to mean that Pericles was back in office 
only a few weeks after his dismissal. 72 I have argued elsewhere73 - 
that Clean was chosen strategos in 425/4 at a by-election to command 
at Pylos. The two cases are very similar, the only difference being 
that Pericles was reinstated whereas Cleon was an addition. 
This in no way proves that it was a regular practice for 
the Athenians to replace dead or disgraced strategoi at by-elections, 
but it may serve to demonstrate that the ecclesia was not bound to 
follow rigid constitutional guidelines in such matters. By the time 
of the Peloponnesian War precedent had probably been established 
for most, if not all, of the various exigencies which could arise, 
for example the failure of a strategos to pass his ei0Kv-icurict. or 
3 EITIXEIrrOVIO.- , or his death in battle, and the ecclesia probably 
relied to some extent on past experience. However, even allowing for 
this, we should probably expect a certain amount of flexibility in the 
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action taken by the ecclesia when dealing with similar cases, and 
depending in large measure on the circumstances in which they found 
themselves. Procedure which may have seemed appropriate to the 
ecclesia in one case may not have been judged as the correct measure 
in a similar case several years, or even months later. In the early 
summer of 411 the soldiers at Samos immediately elected replacements 
when they dismissed their strategoi, 74 and after Arginusae Athens 
deposed eight strategoi and immediately elected two men to replace 
them, 75  but in 430 the ecclesia probably did not bother to replace 
the dismissed Pericles. It is certainly true that the strategia was 
affected in the turbulent and unstable period between 411 and 404, 
but it is difficult to determine if the by—elections held in these 
years were a complete abrogation of custom and bore no resemblance 
to the procedure used, for example, when the three generals, Eurymedon, 
Sophocles and Pythodorus were deposed in 426/5. 	There is a possib- 
ility that the evidence about the strategia after 411 is valuable 
information. 
Xenophon,HeUenica 1.7.1 indicates quite clearly that at 
least in the latter years of the fifth century the ecclesia did not 
elect alternates, or that if it did it preferred to elect new strategoi 
rather than to use them. Furthermore, the fact that only two men, 
Adeimantus and Philocles, were elected to replace eight, does not 
necessarily mean that the old rules had broken down. There is no 
other evidence at all to suggest that the ecclesia was bound to act 
in any other way than it thought appropriate, either after or before 
411. The evidence we do have, as already noted, 76 demonstrates that 
one must be cautious in advocating "standard" procedures. In this 
72. 
^ 	.‘ context it is here suggested that Aristotle's statement notoun S . 
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ecclesia. After the elections the assembly retained full control 
over the board and its personnel. An integral part of the arKarrictt 
trrpCirri4ve was the !,■:)/<,/,to.4- 1/(x. 	It was up to the ecclesia to decide 
what was to be done if a general failed this test - KaVOTI 4iveft04aJJ < 
.6.0q. If the ecclesia decided to replace him, perhaps a by-election 
was held in some instances (if the ecclesia so desired), or perhaps 
the candidate at the top of the list of unsuccessful candidates filled 
the position. Before the reform of Ath Pal 61.1 this would be done 
on a tribal basis. 
Pursuing this line of thought I surmise that Aristotle's 
statement extends further and includes all action taken by the ecclesia 
connected in any way with the composition of the strategia after the 
formal elections. This of course involves accepting that Aristotle's 
phrase is not entirely precise, at least for us. But it is exactly 
the type of generalization and lack of attention to procedural details 
which is characteristic of the whole Ath Pa. 	I imagine that the 
whole process worked roughtly in the following manner. Every year a 
TrpopouAsUpo was required to determine what method the ecclesia would 
use to elect the strategoi in that year. This may simply mean that 
there were slight modifications (in the interests of efficiency) in 
the presentation of the list of candidates and the voting and counting 
procedures, depending on such variables as the number of candidates 
who were running for office and the number of citizens who were able 
to attend the assembly in a particular year. 77a The Treopo6Xsto. may 
) ^ ) , / ci A / arpa_Trier-/V... ev -r1 EkkAld-Ift.) /Caw- 0 T( av rv oritiu) 
restricted in its reference merely to the electoral 
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also have contained the method, if any, that would be used to 
replace a general who was immediately rejected at his .0Kiii-asria. 
If a single. general was charged at an eniKeirroVIct and convicted 
/ in a WklaTTrifieN.dr, military circumstances and the length of time that 
remained before the 'next board took office probablydetermined whether 
or not the eccletia filled the vacant position, and whether it did 
so at a by-election or by appointing, for example, the most popular • 
unsuccessful candidate of the last election. The same kind of factors 
were also involved when a single general was charged with a crime 
unconnected with his military administration, and therefore not at 
> 	 • a regular trrIXEircrrovta. for example Alcibiades. 78  • • Furthermore, 
the assembly probably was able to re-elect in the same year strategoi. 
79 • who had been -deposed and fined, however rare this may have been. • 
3  The payment ot the fine removed the teChnicalariLti / n. It was prob- 
ably more 'usual for a general who was fined to remain louvails for 
the rest - of the year, but he could of course hold office:again, as 
„did Eurymedon. The possibility of - re-election In the same year • 
-may not be applicable to .generals who were convicted and Imprisoned,. 
and certainly not to those who were banished. 
Irrespective of these considerations, the numerical strength 
of the board could be increased at the discretion of the assembly 
when leadership resources were stretched to the limit or when it 
wished a particular man, who had not been elected in spring, to con-
duct a particular expedition, for example Clean at Pyles in 425/4. 
Similarly, when a general was accused of misconduct, in his absence 
from Athens, and it was necessary to aynoint a biaboXos immediately, 
a by-election would be held only if there was no general available 
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in Athens at the time. Are we to believe with Bicknell, for 
example, that the alternate Pythodorus was sent out to Sicily 
to replace his fellow-tribesman, Laches, when there were two other 
generals (if not more) who surely ranked above an alternate, in 
Athens without commands? In other cases, such as when a general 
on operations was accused, but like Alcibiades, opted to desert, or 
like Demosthenes after his failure in Aetolia, only returned when 
he felt safe against successful prosecution, I suggest that replace-
ments were elected if the military circumstances warranted it, but 
not if there were strategoi in Athens waiting for a command. In a 
situation where the majority of the board, or all the generals, were 
deposed at the one time, as after . Arginusae, replacements had to be 
elected immediately, before the trial of the accused took place. 
Plato' s statement - U41, 	s.)//./oalcul 
apxip, pxcov a7roemv i, 	41;ICEtt , 1267- (7) I-7)v cipx;it, 77Xeioi, 7) 
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80 
;(1XxerKaOto- T(ivat 07.c 4v TotiTo 7rpocr7vc6v1-cosiXov 	- 	may be an 'indication 
that machinery was there to be used if strategoi died or were deposed, 
but this passage is not necessarily the full answer. Plato may 
indeed have borrowed this procedure from Athens, but the silence of 
Thucydides, Aristotle Ath Po/ 44.4 and Xenophon's account of the last 
years of the Peloponnesian War may reflect the fact that in practice 
the ecclesia had other options to choose from if it so desired. The 
system was flexible. In other words, once the ten strategoi assumed 
office, and military operations got under way during the campaigning 
season, the size of the board fluctuated, sometimes containing more 
than ten members, sometimes less. This is not to say that the Athen-
ians did not consider it desirable usually to keep the board up to 
full strength, but it may be misleading to consider that vacancies 
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were automatically filled as they occurred, that in fact each indivi-
dual seat on the board was, as it were a recognized entity and that 
strict emphasio was given to this principle to ensure that each 
position was always occupied. The fifth-century strategia cannot be 
compared with the board of nine archons and their functional special-
ization. Certainly, by the time of the writing of the Ath Po1, five 
of the strategoi had been allocated specialized duties, but the duties 
of fifth-century generals were the same as the remaining five, as 
01A% described by Aristotle - TOLT 0 OAAour wroS ra maroV 
, 
ErTTUVOCIV . 81 To put it differently, the Athenians were concerned 
not with ensuring that individual positions be occupied, but with 
ensuring that the state had the military leadership it wanted at a 
particular time. When the Athenians replaced eight generals with two 
after Arginusae, obviously they were not filling vacant positions on 
the board, otherwise they would have elected eight men. We cannot 
assume that when a strategos was killed in action or deposed, the 
Athenians elected another man to fill "the position" left vacant. To 
fill the dead man's shoes, perhaps. In this sense it is possible 
that the procedure outlined by Plato was regularly followed. 
The whole problem is quite simply solved if it be accepted 
that the ecclesia could hold by-elections whether it was replacing 
strategoi or not.This would satisfactorily explain all the instances 
in our sources where it is otherwise necessary either to postulate 
a departure from usual procedure or to force an interpretation on, 
for example, Thucydides, which stretches the natural meaning of his 
words. Are we to suppose that the Athenians would have committed all 
their strategoi to Samos in 440, or eight to Arginusae in 406, unless 
they were either so confident that an emergency would not occur, 
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requiring at short notice a major military operation on a second - 
front, or as is more likely, unless they were able to obtain command-
ers by some other means than recalling those on active duty far 
away? Furthermore, Thucydides' account of the early years of the 
Peloponnesian War clearly shows that it was not unusual for six 
or seven strategoi to be absent from Athens on operational command 
at the same time, and he was only concerned with giving the details 
of the more important events, not with listing the activities of all 
the strategoi. Many routine operations involving generals, such as 
the collection of tribute from the Aegean states, were not worthy 
of mention. When one considers for example that in 433/2 a minimum 
of eight strategoi (if Archestratus. had more than two colleagues, 
more than eight) were involved in activities in the vicinities of 
Corcyra and Potidaea, there is not much scope for other military 
activity simultaneous with these operations, routine or otherwise, 
when only two generals at the most are immediately available. The 
appointment of extra strategoi was in all likelihood very rare, even 
at times when resources were fully stretched, if not over-extended, 
but I do not believe it is plausible that the ecclesia would commit 
as many as eight generals to two fields of action as late as 433, 
even if those at Corcyra were expected to be absent for only a short 
time, if rigid constitutional guidelines existed which would effect-
ively limit the military capability of the state in the meantime. 
If this whole hypothesis is correct, obviously at some point 
in time during the fifth century the strategoi ceased in every way 
to be tribal representatives or tribal leaders or commanders of 
contingents within the armed forces, - and became exclusively military 
77. 
officials of the highest rank, in command of Athenian armies and 
navies no matter what the tribal composition and irrespective of what 
specialized contingents were incorporated under their command. It 
has already been argued that as early as 490 the strategoi were more 
than purely tribal commanders, and indeed they possibly always had 
been, at least since their inauguration in 501/0. However, as long. 
as the principle remained in force that each of the strategoi had to 
belong to a different tribe it cannot be assumed that in practice the 
generals had shrugged off all the functions associated with tribal 
leadership. For this reason it is likely that replacements were 
necessary for individual generals who were deposed or died in office, 
and that new appointees belonged to the tribes of the Men they were 
replacing. When did all this change? 
The first change which may reasonably be expected to have 
affected the structure of the Athenian military command in the fifth 
century occurred in the archonship of Telesinus in 487/6. The system 
was then introduced of appointing the archons by lot, including the 
polemarch. 82 The reason for this reform remains a vexed question, 
and there is the possibility, among others, that it was a relatively 
minor administrative reform entirely in keeping with Cleisthenes' 
democratic legislation. 83 We are not in a position to know whether 
the reform almentailed . the removal of the polemarch from his position 
as riV dpr.wv is cuircusilscrreanits, or indeed, from the army altdgether. 84 
Badian has argued that the reform made no recognizable difference to 
the quality of the men who held the eponymous archonship, 85 but it 
would be illogical to believe that the office retained the same 
attraction for Athens' leading statesmen and politicians The only 
78. 
other alternative Was the strategia. Even before 487/6 this office. 
had a natural advantage over the archonship, the absence of any 
restriction on re-election. Generals, of course, were not entitled 
to membership of the still prestigious Areopagus Council, but the 
strategia already allowed ambitious ex-archons-the opportunity for 
continuous participation in the decision-making process in addition 
to that which went with belonging to the Areopagus. - Whether or not 
there was a change in the position of the polemarch or in his powers 
as a consequence of the reform of 487/6 it cannot be denied that the 
natural advantage pertaining to the strategia would only be further 
emphasized. Because re-election of generals was permitted, in all 
likelihood the strategia would ultimately have come to be the supreme 
politico-military executive institution even withcut the reform of 
Telesinus. It is almost certainly inevitable that the polemarch 
would have become completely dependent on the strategoi for advice, 
that he was nominally9YE/AW and nothing more. Perhaps the most 
important effect of 487/6 was that the process was speeded up. The 
polemarch was rendered redundant and dispensable sooner than other-
wiSe may have been the case. Due to the fact that we hear nothing 
more of him - he is present in 490 but absent in 480/79 - this effect 
may have been almost immediate. 
It cannot be assumed that the Athenians deliberately 
reformed their command structure between 490 and 480. Whether or 
not the reform of 487/6 involved a demotion of the polemarch, in the 
war against Xerxes in 480/79 the commanders of Athenian forces, both 
naval and military, were strategoi. The answer may simply be that 
with the Persian invasion of Greece the polemarch became an anachronism. 
79. 
The strategia was a much more flexible institution, better equipped 
in all respects to deal with the militarycircumstances. The pole-
march could only be at one place at a time. But this war was not 
fought on a single front, on a single battlefield. Some generals 
were needed-with the fleet, some with the army. Consequently, any 
vestige of authority retained by the polemarch as irEiptihtwaS effect-
ively pre-empted by them. Furthermore, the precedent had already 
been established of sending generals on military operations outside 
Attica. The expedition of Miltiades in 490/89 and that of Melanthius 
in 499/86 6 are probably the two most important of a number of military 
excursions undertaken by.Athens in the early years of the fifth 
century. Many of the strategoi who participated in the Persian Wars 87 
would already have had some experience of military command. For all 
we know the Polemarch may have been present at Plataea, for example, 
but he had no important place in the command structure. The men• 
who are described by Herodotus at 9.46.1 as .07 ‘Trarprot 1 -3v 
3 
AO/Ivonov held the top command posts at Plataea. 
The fact that strategoi were army and navy commanders rather 
than contingent leaders during 480/79, in combination with the fact 
that they were divided up among the two wings of the armed services, 
meant that they could in no way act as tribal leaders. All ten 
generals could not conceivably have participated in the battle . at 
Plataea because some were required with the fleet. However, the 
Athenian army was composed of the ten tribal regiments and presumably 
the organization of the Athenian line on the left wing of the Greek 
-87a army was by tribes, as at Marathon. 	Even irrespective of the 
role of the strategOi now as supreme commanders, Clearly leadership 
80. 
•of these contingents must have been transferred to other officials 
merely on the grounds that there were not enough generals available 
to lead them individually. It is generally assumed by most scholars 
that the ten TagickeKot were instituted either simultaneously with, 
or soon after the reform of 487/6, 88  or at some time after 480 and 
479. 89 	 90 They are first mentioned by Aeschylus, which certainly 
dates their introduction to about the first 30 or so years of the 
r fifth century. 	Obviously, the -To t_slopoi were instituted when the 
,strategoi had ceased to be commanders of the tribal regiments, and 
most locically therefore before the battle of Plataea, or possibly 
as successors to officials appointed to lead the tribes at that time. 
It makes little difference Whether they were introduced after 487/6: 
or after the Persian invasion. What is important is that the 
74
/ v 4311,A01 relieved the strategoi of their command of the tribal 
regiments, and once this occurred there was no reason for each of the 
generals to belong to a different tribe. 
There is a strong possibility that double representation • 
in the strategia occurred for the first time in 479/8, if Leocrates 
belonged to the same phyle (Akamantis) as Xanthippus. 91 The problem 
is neatly resolved if Bicknell's hypothesis is correct that a 
strategos did not necessarily have to belong to the tribe he repre-
sented. 92 However, on this view it must be accepted as plausible • 
that one man - such as Pericles or Carcinus or Glaucon from Akamantis 
or Phormio or Hagnon from Pandionis - would be continually re-elected 
as the representative of another tribe. Moreover, the frequency of 
duplicatim, even before the Peloponnesian War, and the instances • 
of double-doubles, and a possible triplication, make this theory 
difficult to accept. They may even, as FOrnara believes, 93 disprove 
81. 
it. Even without the indication at Ath Pol 61.1 the most obvious 
e / explanation is that all the strategoi were elected gc curav-ruwv. 
There are just too many cases of double representation in the fifth 
century, where it is unlikely that either strategos was deposed and 
where it is known that neither was killed, 94 to consider that the 
procedure whereby the ecclesia elected its generals '<VIA 401.11\C(S0 
tild411S4AqsAta was not changed. Most scholars have thought that 
e the reform of Ath Pot 61.1, the election of generals 	WitlVTIALIV 
should be dated to the last third of the fourth century. 95 As 
Fornara has asserted, Aristotle's Vav in the phrase rrpcircrovitav 04 1 
,‘ 'cc t < ci 
EiCaCTIS 44195 CO:l b WV 6 CS 0.-litttfiJV need not only refer to his own time, 
especially if Trorerov refers to the procedure he knew was adopted 
/ in 501/0. 96 The formula rporEroVit£V 	bE is common in the 
Ath Pol. 97 In most cases, it is impossible to know whether Tripory0V 
refers back to the fifth century or not, but at 53.1 it certainly 
does, and may also at 45•3• 98  It is by no means inevitable that 
Aristotle's words at 61.1 imply that election of all strategoi 
c curraV-rw V was recent. 99 
I suggest that the ideal time for a change in election pro-
cedure was about the time of the Persian invasion of 480/79, if it 
had not already occurred. If there was a time when the undesirabi-
lity of limited eligibility to the strategia was obvious, it was in 
these years. Athens needed her strategoi to be the best men available, 
irrespective of tribal representation. It is not as if all the 
ingredients necessary before such a change can be postulated are not 
evident in 480/79. 	The polemarch has disappeared from the scene and 
Is no. longer an active participant in the command. Whether or not 
82. 
\ 	^ the reform of 487/6 meant the polemarch was no longer ivehLwv rqs 
c 	^ arrasqs nrcertas, his absence in 480 is by itself sufficient indi-
cation that "final responsibility", as it were, in decision making, 
which the polemarch enjoyed in 490, had passed to the strategoi. 
However important the generals were at Marathon and however far 
their function extended beyond tribal leadership in the first twenty 
years of the fifth century, the removalof the polemarch from his 
position of responsibility over the entire army weakened still 
further, if it did not destroy) the already tenuous role ofthe generals 
as tribal leaders. Secondly, there is evidence that tribal command-
ers, the ten Ta /ya.pXol described by Aristotle at 14th Pa 61.3, exist-
ed at Athens at least in the first third of the fifth century. 
These officers, or their forerunners, must have commanded the Athen-
ian hoplites In and out of battle at Plataea, unless we assume that 
tribal organization for military purposes, when the entire Athenian 
army was in the field, was abandoned after Marathon, or consider that 
each of the strategoi present commanded a combination of two or more 
tribal contingents •100 Thirdly, there is a likelihood of double 
•representation in 479/8. This should not be dismissed on the grounds 
that double representation did not occur until the 430's. Nor can 
it be explained by assuming that one man was the representative of 
another tribe, when the frequency of double representation in the 
second half of the fifth century is more satisfactorily explained by 
c / election Ecaram-nol, a procedure which we know was definitely used 
in the fourth century. 
• If the reform can be dated to about 480 rather than the late - 
101 	102 460' 	or the 	's or 440' s 450 	s, 	the absence of any mention of a 
83. 
reform in the historical part of Aristotle's work is more easily 
explained. In 501/0 the Atheniansbrought their military organiz-
ation into line with Cleisthenes' new constitution, and the instit-
ution of the ten tribal strategoi at this time was a natural and 
logical development following the new tribal reorganization. It was 
equally natural and logical that the strategoi be replaced in this 
role by other officials during the Persian Wars. The dichotomous 
position the strategoi had alwaysoccupied by being the elected 
contingent leaders, but in practice army commanders as . well, worked 
well enough while the polemarch retained an active role in the command 
structure and when there was no need to split Athenian forces, but 
this was not the case in 480. The change may have been merely a 
mechanical administrative adjustment in recognition of the fact that 
the strategoi were the supreme military executive and had completely 
outgrown in practice their function as tribal leaders. It may be mis-
leading to suppose that there was a legal obstacle which needed to 
be eliminated by a deliberate reform before.the strategoi could be 
elected without regard to tribe. 103 The taxiarchs or their fore-
runners simply replaced the strategoi as tribal leaders, and thereby 
removed the obstacle to an efficient Strategia filled by the best 
men available. The Persian invasion acted as a catalyst. The Athen-
ians began to elect their generals E§ curctitruJV in the latter years 
of the 480's to ensure they had the best possible military leadership 
for the next confrontation with the Persians. 
Essentially, therefore, election of generals may not have 
involved a deliberate reform to Change the nature of the strategia, 
but rather arose quite naturally from the emergency Situation created - 
84. 
• by Xerxes, and was a culmination anyway of the gradualdevelopment 
of the functional role of the strategoi during the first twenty * 
years of the fifth century as the supreme military officials of the 
state .103a The importance of the strategoi during 480 and 479 
ensured that by the end of the Persian Wars they were firmly established 
as army and navy commanders. From 479 onwards Athenian strategoi 
were continuously in the field and speaking relatively, the role of • 
, the generals before 480 as army commanders was the exception to what . 
. became the rule immediately ,afterwards. 	If the reform of .Ath P01 
' 61.1 occurred about 480, it was so timely as to be almost completely • 
unobtrusive. • May not Aristotle's silence about the date in the 
, *historical part of his work be an indication that the transition 
from electing generals icarcx. fuXcis to electing them 	aircivrov was so 
smooth as to occur without notice? The decision by the Athenians 
may not, in fact, have been acknowledged by them as a reform of the 
procedure which 'existed from 501/0, either at the'time it occurred 
or in the years immediately following, due to the .circumstances under 
which the change took place and the pre-eminence of the strategoi 
after 480. This is not to say that Plutarch's sentence at Cirmin 8.8, 
• ,• that Cimom peTa Toi7)V crvo-Tpwritycov z-peraXN ■ z, EI:S* T6 OgaTpav 517r664o-avo 
- Bei? TAs vevoilto-ttevas avoll8cis : (nix 	(the archon) d 5 A ,KEV 
• ab -rotis etreXtleiv, eck";N: ciptaLtrac ip.471cao-e icaOicrac %al ATival Z4ma Op' Tas, 11.7r 
OuVis- yeas t7KaaTov , (in 469/8), is inaccurate. 	It is quite 
possible that in many years each one of the ten generals belonged to 
a different tribe afterthe reform of Ath pa 61.1. After all, the 
tribes were probably always responsible for nominating candidates,. 
and tribal loyalties probably ensured that complete tribal represent- 
ation Was often the case. However, it is just as likely as not that 
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87. 
to Akamantis. If one replaced the other, obviously the Athenians 
were not concerned with tribal representation in 480/79, or- else 
- Themistocles would have been replaced by A fellow-tribesman. 
Secondly, it disproves the hypothesis which maintains that later 
cases of duplication are due to the death or disgrace of either general. 
Thirdly, it destroys the notion that alternates filled positions 
vacated by fellow-tribesmen. On the other hand, if the tradition 
followed by Ephorus is incorrect, it is still difficult to know how 
the story could gain any acceptance at all unless no regard was paid 
to tribal representation in the replacement of Athenian smategoi 
during the fifth century. In other words Ephorus may have simply 
transferred to 480 the procedure applicable to his own time. 
Ovbiously, the hypothesis is not capable of proof,. but if 
double representation occurred in 479/8, it was certainly not' to 
replace a dead or disgraced general, because .Xanthippus was -a strategos 
in the previous year and was a general engaged in the subjugation 
and capture of Sestos after a winter siege, in 478, 114 an operation 
115 which he survived. 	From about 480 the Athenians were no longer 
concerned with tribal representation in the strategia, perhaps out 
of a desire to ensure that their military forces were commanded by • 
the best men available and in recognition of the fact that the 
generals were no longer tribal leaders. This does not mean that the 
election procedure inaugurated in 501/0 was appreciably modified 
either at this time or later in the fifth century., The nature of the 
election procedure, incorporating the nomination of the candidates 
by tribes, was probably never changed, and the force of custom was 
ziesponsible for the continuing adherence in .practice to tribal 
88. 
representation,evident in some of the years of the Pentacontaetia, 
for example 469/8 and 441/0. Custom was probably also responsible 
for limiting the numerical strength of the board to ten in most 
years. However, after the reform of Ath Pa 61.1 it was only the 
force of custom which.prevented departure from tribal representation, 
and this inevitably broke down. At the annual electoral ecclesia 
throughout the fifth century the Athenians elected ten men as their 
military executive for the year, but the ecclesia maintained strict 
control over their destiny and number, rather than any constitutional 
et 	A 	ev 	 k 	,••• guidelines. The strategoi were treated krteto-ri (wry? Tug doll. 
When generals were killed or deposed the board was probably restored 
to full strength in most instances, but there is evidence, beginning 
with the list of generals for 441/0, that the number of strategoi 
varied during the year, occasionally exceediag the number initially 
elected and occasionally being less than ten. 
PART 	II 
CHAPTER 4 
The Persian Invasion, 480/78. 
1 N.G.L. Hammond has recently argued that during Xerxes' 
invasion of Greece, when Sparta was entrusted by the Greek states 
with leadership Of their forces by land and by sea, the Spartans not 
only employed the system they always used of being led and commanded 
in the field by a single officer who enjoyed full powers, but they 
also imposed such a system upon each of the national contingents of 
the other Greek states, including Athens. The Spartan officer, who 
was both commander-in-chief of the combined forces and commander of 
the Lacedaemonian army, had as his immediate subordinates the next 
ranking officers within the Spartan army itself, and, in accordance 
with Spartan practice, the commanders of the allied contingents, 
one officer for each contingent. Therefore, in effect, the command 
system within each of the contingents which combined to form the Greek 
army and navy resembled the Spartan system. In Thessaly, the Athen-
ian forces, the Theban forces and the Thespians were each commanded 
by a single genera1. 2 Similarly, at Artemisium and Salamis one 
strategos commanded the Athenian section 3 and one the Corinthian, 4 
and at Plataea, Aegina and Sestos we find a single commander for the 
Athenians each time. 5 
Furthermore, Hammond considers that the tenure of command 
of all the commanders in the Greek League forces was from spring to 
6 spring. 	Each of the Greek states appointed one officer to command 
89. 
their forces from spring 480 to spring 479 and continued this practice 
90. 
annually for at least three years. - As far as the Athenians are 
concerned Hammond suggests that the tenure of command of their 
commander-in-chief was changed to from midsummer to midsummer in 477. 
Therefore in the years .480, 479 and 478 the Athenians appointed 
strategoi whose tenure of office was entirely different to the regular 
board of generals, for these latter officials assumed office in mid7 
summer. In 480 Themistocles, in 479 Aristeides and Xanthippus, and 
in 478 Aristeides, were all appointed by the ecclesia to full and 
sole command of the Athenian forces under the Greek League. They 
were probably not chosen at the same election which appointed the 
regular strategoi, although Hammond concedes that Themistocles, for 
example, may have been one of the ten strategoi elected for 481/0 
and 480/79, as well as being commander of Athenian forces from spring 
480 to miring 479. 7 
% •-% r 	/ The especially elected afrIVoliW CtAkpfWv in command 
of the Athenian contingents contributed to the Greek armies and fleets 
) c / were, Hammond believes, elected £4 aircorru"V . They formed an entirely 
different category to the ordinary generals who are described as 
+tix"s C7CITlYa l MID 	• Indeed, the practice of electing generals of 
two categories did not cease when Xerxes was repulsed, but continued 
at least until the death of Pericles. Briefly, what happened, in 
Hammond's view, was as follows. When the Spartan Pausanias was 
recalled in autumn 478 and the Greek alliance offered the supreme 
command to Athens, Aristeides succeeded Pausanias as commander-in-
chief of the combined Greek forces', and Athens continued the Spartan 
system of command. In the following years such Men as Cimon, 
Leocrates Myronides, Tolmides, Pericles, Ephialtes and Charitimides 
91. 
were elected 	ac ircfv.ruiv to hold the position of o cirrarvos 
e 	/ EXHVIAW. This position became an anachronism, of course, once the 
.Athenian Alliance ceased to exist as an autonomous combination of 
states, either during the early 440's or with the attack on Samos 
in 440. However, the double representation of Pericles' tribe during 
some years of the 430's indicates that the Athenians continued to 
elect him as eTpar1;14 	LrlefolruYV even though the function for which 
the position had been invented had come to an end. Once the tenure 
c / of the office of the OrearlY0S cc malikellaV had been brought into line 
with that of the Grrairpail atli ■D +001.5 in 477 the Athenians used two 
methods of election. In some years (for example in 469/8 when Cimon 
was commander-in-chief of the combined forces of the Athenian Alliance, 
and when there were ten strategoi,arrl (tuXisplas &asr0V8), they 
elected ten strategoi, one frAyDS :LITC(j/fWV, and then, discount-
ing his tribe, nine drfctrvpoi csoi-O434)ViS. In other years (for example 
in 441/0, for which year we have a list ofeleven generals with 
double representation of Pericles phyle, Akamantis), they elected 
N, 	) 	C I X 	X 
eleven generals, one erarrs aspairnol and ten crpo-riroi CUTO 
Hammond's construction, if it were plausible, would certain-
ly explain the double representation of Akamantis in 479/78, as 
Bicknell has noted, 9  as well as the later much more frequent cases 
during the 430's and later years. I do not however, believe it satis-
factorilyexplains the double representation of Erechtheis in 460/59. 
Although our lists of etrategoi for the late 460's and the 450's are 
very sparse it is wild speculation to conclude from the mere fact of 
this double representation that either Hippodamas or Phrynichos was 
92. 
of the required eminence to be appointed as Hammond's crrrctrir-25 
c • / EXX: i V LIJ V 	If we were to make any evaluation of the eminence 
of military and public figures in Athens in the late 460's from the 
evidence, scant as it is, apart from Cimon, a choice of who would 
be most likely to hold the hypothesized position, would seem to be 
between Ephialtes, Myronides and Leocrates, the latter two holding 
office in fact in 460/59. 10 
It is also difficult to accept Hammond's assertion that the 
tenure of command for all commanders in the Greek League forces was 
from spring to spring, at least on the basis of the evidence he presents 
in support of the view. According to Hammond, 11  the fact that 
Themistocles commanded inThessaly in spring or early summer 480, 12 
and the fact that Xanthippus commanded an Athenian squadron in 
spring 479 13  and besieged Sestos in winter 478, 14 means that both 
men were appointed immediately after the cvatrenat crpar1a3v 
held in late February or early March of 480 and 479 respectively. 
The other strategoi elected at the same time or at a separate election 
about this time (in both years) waited until July before they 
assumed office. However, there is nothing unusual about Athenian 
strategoi being given operational command of forces in spring. 	It 
happened quite regularly during the Peloponnesian War. •The coming 
of spring, after all, merely signalled the beginning of a new campaign-
ing season. Surely any Athenian general who is mentioned on opera-
tional duty in the spring of any year, whether it be as early as 480, 
or in the later years of the fifth century, must have been elected 
at the electoral ecclesia of the previoL3 year. It is quite clear, 
for example, from Thucydides' narrative of events through the winter 
93. 
of 426 to the spring of 425, that the generals Sophocles and 
Eurymedon, who Were sent to Sicily in the early months of 425, 15. 
were generals in 426. 16 They commanded in spring 425 as strategoi 
holding office for the archon-year 426/5. There is nothing in 
Herodotus' narrative to suggest that either Themistocles or Xanthippus 
were specially elected to command in spring. All that the historian 
5 says of Themistocles is Ecre4rret'... 5A014/a4JV 	6V.Lieroalip ci 
isleo /KAEOS , 17 and all that he says of Xanthippus is 'Reivq,i,jv 
5 	/ EsTarrf_-_avvira 	rfrovos roso . 18  This merely proves that Themis-"Ai 
tocles was a general for the archon-year of 481/0 and that Xanthippus 
was a general for 480/79, and is no indication that their tenure of 
office was for a different period of time than that of the other 
generals who held office in 481r0 and 480/79. There is no evidence 
whatsoever to support the view that the Athenians differentiated 
between generals of two categories on the basis of tenure of office, 
in order to conform with the Spartan system of command, and that they 
C / accordingly elected a single 4Tpca1tos Ec cigavTIOV to hold office 
from spring to spring. 
Of more serious ramifications, however, for an evaluation 
of the fifth-century Athenian strategia, is Hammond's proposal that 
from 480 until at least 429 the Athenians regularly entrusted one of 
her annual strategoi with a position of superior responsibility and 
power than the others; a position which in the first few years meant 
command-in-chief of the Athenian forces participating in the war 
against Xerxes under Spartan hegemony, but from 477 to probably 440 
meantli4pAqm of the alliance of Greeks as well; a position defined 
by Hammond as o erroxrros-ra/ 	vov Wtially relinquished by 
94. 
Pausanias to Aristeides and sometimes identifiable by the double 
representation of one tribe. The idea that the Athenians appointed 
a single supreme commander during the Persian Wars is of course not 
new. 19 Nor is the idea that Pericles, whose tribe, frequently pro- 
vided two generals to the board in the years between 441 and 429, 
e / was elected as the tr-rpoLryfos 	cv/-ruN and therefore occupied a 
position of superiority to his colleagues. However, Hammond's theory 
that there is a direct connection between the position created by the 
Athenians in 480, and that occupied by Pericles in the 430's, is new. 
It has been the usual view that the creation of the single °Tr:Ix/pros 
>, 
qctra.VTWV was a development of the second half of the fifth century. 
Hammond not only shares with some other scholars the view that Themis-
tocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides held the superior position of 
' C. / % 5 	/ 67QT1YOS lael.JV or cTralyos cwroKrortur but argues that they were 
/ also crirealY6t t; ctiroN4-WV. 
I have already argued that the Athenians reformed the elect-
oral procedure in the late 480's eliminating the necessity for tribal 
representati6n in the strategia and began the practice of electing 
1 C all the generals garravrtdv. 20 Furthermore, as previously noted, 
\ 	3 1, HamMond's argument for the existence of a single freaTipcos es 
e / amv/ri.JV in 480 is seriously weakened by the absence of evidence to 
support his conclusions that this position differed in terms of tenure 
from the Other annually elected positions on the board. 	However, 
quite obviously, if the. theory is correct that double representation 
beginning in 441 is an indication that one general was elected C 
3 \ 4 .1.m7IEVI-LANand the others am> (10W1S, and If Hammond is right that the 
origins of this system can be directly traced to a procedure 
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instituted in 480 of electing a single general with superior powers 
to the others, then the proposal that all generals were elected Zg. 
c aroVruAlas early as 480 merits no serious consideration. The problem 
divides itself into three separate areas of investigation. Firstly, 
is there any evidence in our sources for the period of Xerxes' 
invasion to support the view that certain generals held a superior 
position to their colleagues? Secondly, is it plausible to conclude 
that the instances of double representation which occur in the second 
half of the fifth century result from the election of the so-called 
c / single CrloaTer;os ecetircv/ruiV? Thirdly, is there any evidence for 
the years after 477 to indicate different levels of authority among 
the strategoi? It is the purpose of this section to answer each of 
these questions in turn and to attempt to demonstrate that it is 
difficult to Except the widely held viewpoint which maintains that 
the principle of collegiality was not a characteristic of the strategia. 
It is here postulated that the extant evidence, far from proving that 
the Athenians either entrusted an individual strategos with superior 
powers and authority over his colleagues or created a position within 
the board which conferred more authority or prestige, indicates, in 
fact, exactly the opposite - strict adherence to the principle o f  
collegiality. 
Support for the conclusion that the ecclesia entrusted one 
of her strategoi with hegemony over his colleagues or supreme command 
of the Athenian contingent within the Greek League forces during the 
Persian invasion of Greece, is based to a large extent on Herodotus' 
account and to a lesser extent on certain expressions Plutarch •uses 
in describing Themistocles and Aristeides. At Aristeides 8.1, Plutarch 
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says that the Athenians recalled exiles who had been ostracized 
because they feared Aristeides might go over to the Persian side, 
/ 	.1 	/ and he goes on to state ...0EpictorcXeoos derxrrreciwTos auroKparoros t 
tyl m lv suvcaraxTe (Aristeides) tao crovispoo4AWEv, EVdog'araroV En/ 
/ 	„., 	,., 	■ 	_1i , OfiJmnowx kotvil trottiN TN eXleiCroV . 	At Aristeides 11.1, Plutarch ti  
refers to Aristeides' position at Plataea with the following words: 
Xetporo1ni0eis &.. o-Tparyy;is e.ez)roicp(11-cop E?'7;1. 7;;Z, ILC;,),:711,', Ka l 70,10 'Atinl'al.(01) 
" 	• 
6KTaK taVALOV3 07X1.7 	etiva)■..a,3c:w, ircev dc 11)4.m-fur-is% 
> Plutarch's phraseology, describing Themistocles as 0-rtriVros aorcKtax141, 
in 480 and Aristeides in 479, does not count for much, as Fornara has 
pointed out. 21 His sources, including Herodotus, have emphasized 
the role played by the most important of the Athenian generals, and 
he has gone a step further and transferred his own preconceived notions 
of the Athenian command structure onto Themistocles and Aristeides. 
Plutarch, writing in the Roman world of the first century A.D., has, 
quite simply, used the Greek equivalent of "imperator" 22 and has 
assumed that such an office existed in fifth-century Athens. 23 How-
ever, it is clear from Thucydides that the three generals sent to - 
‘ 3 Sicily as firrITOi auroquorcs in 415 held no special office but 
were auroleearCrES by virtue of special powers which enabled them to 
enjoy more freedom in certain areas of decision making. 24 Plutarch's 
conception of the Athenian command system is amply demonstrated in 
an anecdote he relates, derived obviously, from the same hostile 
tradition so apparent in Herodotus which testifies once more, to 
the corruption of Themistocles. 25 According to Plutarch, 
'11871 Se Toil 1\14So-v-ic-a. aRatroPTos. 	T;171 (EXA.c:Sa A.-. a TCOZI 1A0rivataw 
PouXevoictlpon,__irept arparwoO, Ta,sjv kXous 11:6;,Ta-s 
iilc 	cEl-pwr7)7Las- 	X-yauo-tz, • • • ApX7ic 
97. 
E'cbi€0,9a.t. 	 1!.771,8cv ci'vett, 77-1 ',yet pc7irita, 	Toll 01 , 1, 
, 
t C x-Va 8E10:ctv-ra, 	Tr.1 irprz-huaTa 8 fa (1)0 apt-Ey 71-arrt;7ra cr TiiT 
, 	- 
717ep„uviac eIs 	.,-!;27retro1'icw, XP7ULIGI  7iiJ cbt17t i21.1.; 	 Oat 
. 	If I am not mistaken, this passage strongly 
implies that Plutarch envisaged the Athenian strategia as an executive 
institution of one elected official. When the Athenians were deliber-
ating as to whom they would choose as their general, (Trip 6"TarrOu 
all the candidates Crous 	laoos ) withdrew from the contest for 
office (Tils 	) except Epicydes and Themistocles. When it 
seemed that the office (Ts *tp)(is ) and leadership of the Athenian 
forces (tic pripov(o..S ) would fall to Epicydes, Themistocles resorted 
to bribery. 
If this is not enough, there is one other story recounted 
by Plutarch which demonstrates even more conclusively how he has thrust 
his own notions of command onto the Athenian command structure, a 
story which again involves Aristeides and the Plataean campaign. 
According to Plutarch, Alexander of Macedon secretly visits the Athen-
ian lines during the night and asks for Aristeides. 26 Once Alexander 
has achieved his purpose and left and Aristeides has reported the 
27 information gained from him to Pausanias, the Spartan commander-in-
chief orders Aristeides to transfer the Athenian contingent from the 
left wing to the right wing. 28 The other Athenian strategoi are 
at first openly opposed to Pausanias' new orders and are only finally 
agreeable when Aristeides convinces them of the greater advantages 
29 
and distinction of fighting on the right wing rather than the left. 
Plutarch says Herodotus is his source for the information that 
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Pausanias ordered Aristeides to change the Athenian position in the 
line. In his awn words, 'Pp. 7 OLITC:j 3. c:ic II C'TC 
rlaucravi.ac 	 ciele7 , Toils "ixthiziatouc girl 76 bset:16v 
• • • 30 Yet in Herodotus' account Aristeides is not mentioned 
at this point. It is the Athenian generals, and not Aristeides, who 
report Alexander's message, C 0: b o-7-parwol 76v 'AO ,Ivatow AtIdirres• 
rO 	BeEam 	xpas. 	Acyov 	I1avo-av(17 	ra ;rep iiKovcrav 3 ". 	 ) 	and 
Pausanias orders them collectively to switch their position with the 
Spartan troops. Furthermore, when Alexander rides to the Athenian 
guard-posts it is to have a parley with the Athenian generals, (... 
W4xV4 og 	fro Tall 0-pari rad"( s.X4.9c7v ) 3.2 whom 
according to Herodotus, he names, and not to have a private convers-
ation with Aristeides, although the latter was presumably one of the 
generals Alexander requested to see. The only commander on the Greek 
side mentioned by name by Herodotus in relating this story is 
Pausanias. There is no indication that a difference of opinion exist-
ed between Aristeides•and the other Athenian generals. Quite to the 
contrary. The Athenians immediately acquiesce and respond to Pausanias' 
orders. 33 
There is no question as to the relative reliability of 
Plutarch and Herodotus. Where various actions attributed by Herodotus 
to the Athenian strategoi are ascribed by Plutarch to Aristeides, 
Plutarch's ascription may be due to constructive inference, 34  and if 
tot, his source is more than likely Merely a later untrustworthy em-
bellishment, a later accretion, overemphasizing for the sake of 
glorifyin . the.pre-eminence of Aristeides. Yet, even though Plutarch 
'uncritically reserves a pre-eminentposition.for Aristeides where 
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Herodotus does not, it is significant that he has Aristeides persuad-
ing his fellow strategoi to accept PauSanias' orders. How did.this 
story develop if not on the underlying basis that the Athenian command 
ssystem involved collegiality? Plutarch has unwittingly preserved - 
the real mechanics of the internal decision-making structure of the 
strategia. However, it Should be emphasized that the view is not 
acceptable which maintains that Plutarch should be preferred to Herodo-
tuS because Herodotus does not bring out the Athenian system of 
commanch 35 If Herodotus thought Aristeides was in sole command why 
does he have Alexander ask to talk to the Athenian generals collective-
ly? 	Quite simply, scholars who start with the assumption that the 
Athenians conformed with the Spartan system of command by appointing 
their own commander-in-chief cannot then conclude that Herodotus is 
no help because he does not demonstrate the existence of a supreme 
strategos. I would suggest that the absence of an Athenian commander- 
,-/ in-chief is not due to carelessness on the part of the historian. 
Far. from it. Command of the Athenian contingent was in the hands of 
" 31_ Oi tfirt,118.01 IlLA/ /tENVQ.14) 1 , in the hands of the men who received 
Alexander, reported to Pausanias and carried out his orders, and was 
not the preserve of a single general. 
The only time Aristeides is mentioned in the ninth book of 
Herodotus is at 9.28.6 when the historian is detailing the size and 
order of the Greek forces at Plataea. According to Herodotus 
TEAEVTal.01. ZE 	Trpc7)rot. 'Athivarn. i'ret0-0-0/1710, KC? ()CIS gxovr 
r 6 E.66;vvy.ov, dKraKto-VALot• icrrpa74yEe 6' ain-cZn! 'Apurreaqs 
6 AvolpAixov . Hammond would have us believe that this is an indication 
that the Athenian contingent was commanded by a single officer. 36 At 
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first sight, certainly Herodotus' later narrative 37 is contradicted 
by 9.28.6. However, the historian names only three Athenian strategoi 
for the years 481/0, 480/79 and 479/8 - 	Aristeides and 
Xanthippus. His interest is concentrated on the main actors. Pre-
cisely the same kind of apparent contradiction which exists between 
9.28.6 and 9.44-48 is repeated in Herodotus' account of the operation 
at Sestos in 479/8. When the Greek forces which sailed from Mycale 
to the Hellespont found that the bridge had been destroyed, the 
Spartans under Leotychidas returned to Greece, 38  but the Athenians 
A 	) 	C remained - IA010:1104111 11 e Kai ..::.avu errrto Th.) el-par-41(w rwrou utrcvaEivavraS ‘
TrEipareat +715 XErtsowroo, and they besieged Sestos. 39. At the con- 
clusion of the operation the captured Persian officer Artayctes 
1 3 attempted to bargain with his captors, but ...7704/ TrpccoeloV 
eaEuh, (Artayctes). 40 Both these phrases in Herodotus seem to suggest 
that Xanthippus was in sole command of the expedition. However, 
during the actual siege, which.prove4 A more drawn out affair than 
the Athenians anticipated, the troops Ef3E OP .TO TE T 
o-rparliy6v Otadc arrciyotfy cyqas. drtacu o S an( 44iao-av rrplz. 
?elAteo-c rO 'Aelivaiwv KOLVOV o-(freas ilErarr-linkgrat . 
41 If Herodotus considered 
that Xanthippus held the supreme command surely the Athenian soldiers 
would have addressed their request to him. It is implied that all 
the Athenian generals were of equal rank, that. Xanthippus had no 
special or overriding authority. 42 
Herodotus' descriptions of Aristeides at 9.28.6 and of 
Xanthippus at 9.114.2 and 9.120.4 are no more an indication that these 
two officers held supreme command at Plataea and Sestos respectively, 
than they are evidence for the presence of only one Athenian general 
in these areas of operation. If Herodotus knew the names of the 
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other strategoi who took part in the various battles against the 
Persians, it was not important to him. The same applies to his 
description of the battle at Marathon in 490. Of the three Athenian 
officers mentioned by name in his account of the Marathon campaign, 
the general Stesileos is noted simply as having died in action. 43 The 
prominence given to Miltiades does not dispute the fact that the 
Athenians were commanded by ten generals - la-cW oe s*las 6rrix1lcol 
gr<ct . 44 Nor does Herodotus' statement that Miltiades t6r ci-r /wEs r 
Jite,,,,„(„Jv45 mean that Miltiades held a specially defined position of 
superiority, as the subsequent narrative proves. 46 Just as it cannot 
be argued that Herodotus is incorrect in assigning Miltiades and 
Callimachus the most important roles at Marathon, nor is it likely 
that the tradition preserving the importance of Themistocles, Xanthippus 
and Aristeides is incorrect in emphasis. However, it is an entirely 
different matter to assume that the historian's emphasis on the import-
ance of Themistocles, for example, is in any way a comment on the 
position Themistocles occupied as strategos, a comment on the precise 
legal position he held in the strategia in relation to the other 
elected members of the board. The statements of Herodotus that 
Themistocles in -Thessaly EsyrrerrEa ... AOD V /Loy cAl 	, 47 and that at '  
Artemisium he was TOV 'AialVd(WV ifTraTlvgV 4 8 and at Salamis 61- r IrC's Va 
AOT/c4v, 49 and that at Aegina Xanthippus )AOlvailuis/ a 	al- )4f 5° r 
do not intrinsically define positions of superiority within the. 
strategia. We cannot, of course, categorically conclude that other 
generals were present, for example, in Thessaly with Themistocles or 
at Aegina with Xanthippus, and that these two officers were trammelled 
by equal colleagues as were Aristeides at Plataea, Xanthippus at 
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Sestos and Miltiades at Marathon, for reference to other generals 
is absent from the narrative. However, the statements under dis- 
cussion have the same meaning as the statement at 6.104.1 that -) 
Miltiades ctfirrilprEE /cart ILAW and cannot be used in support of the 
hypothesis which maintains that the Athenians conformed with the 
Spartan system of command by appointing a single commander to lead 
their contingents within the Greek League forces. To put it differ-
ently, where Herodotus' narrative indicates that the Athenians employed
a collegiate system of command, as at Plataea, Sestos and Marathon, 
the phraseology he uses in specific reference to Athenian generals 
he names is similar, and in some cases exactly identical, with the 
phraseology which describes individual generals engaged in operations 
where his account does not include any indications that more than one 
strategos was present. 
Where Herodotus names only one Athenian general, his 
intention is not to indicate that the strategos in question did not 
share his command with other Athenian officers of the same rank, or 
to suggest that other-strategoi who may have been present were sub-
ordinate to the man named. Rather, his intention is to inform us 
which of the three Athenians who gained in large part the credit for 
the Victory over Xerxes participated in which action, to place the 
three strategoi Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus at the various 
battles and areas of military operation. The anecdotes related by 
Herodotus about Themistocles actions at Artemisium and Salamis, which 
demonstrate the important and influential role of Themistocles in 
determining the final decision to fight in both instances, do not 
Provide any information about Themistocles' position vis-a-vis other 
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Athenian strategoi who may have been assigned with him to the fleet. 
/ In the case of Artemisium, the Euboeans bribed To/ netiValkA/ 
/ 51 
6TpaTIKDV, Themistocles, to influence Eurybiades, the Spartan command-
er, and the Corinthian Adeimantus, to stay and fight. It is most 
unlikely, however, that the series of events as related by Herodotus 
ever took place. The whole story of the Euboeans successfully resort-
ing to bribery can be refuted on a number of grounds. 52  If we can 
glean any information from the anecdote at all, we may perhaps be 
entitled to consider that there was some indecision among the Greek 
command as to the course of action to be adopted. At a conference 
on tactics, Themistocles may have been instrumental in settling any 
disagreements which existed. He may have simply presented a plan of 
action which was acceptable to the other Greek commanders, including 
Eurybiades, Adeimantus and perhaps Athenian strategoi as well. 
It may very well be that the tactics employed by the Greek 
fleet at Artemisium to hold the Persians were Themistocles'. It is 
no more safe to conclude from this, however, that he was the only 
Athenian officer involved in the decision-making process than it is 
to assume that Eurybiades, Adeimantus and Themistocles were the only 
officers entitled to a voice at conferences. Surely the commanders 
of the contingents fromMegara and Aegina, for example, were not 
excluded from deliberations. 53 It would be just as unusual, to say 
the least, if the Athenians entrusted only one of her strategoi with 
the command of a fleet as large as 127 ships, especially when it be 
considered that several Athenian strategoi were assigned to the Greek 
fleet of 110 ships 54 at Mycale. 55 If it be accepted that the Athen- 
ians may have assigned more than one general to the fleet at 
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Artemisium, the possibility cannot be excluded that these commanders, 
in addition to Themistocles, attended council meetings and in the 
final analysis received orders directly from Eurybiades. 
According to Herodotus 8.1, fourteen states were represented 
at Artemisium on the Greek side. Therefore, if at least one general 
from each contributing state sat at conferences a minimum of fourteen 
men were present. However, the Plataeans served in Athenian ships 
within the Athenian command, and other states such as Styra and Ceos, 
which each supplied two ships, and Troezen, which supplied five, 
were probably also attached to a larger squadron, such as the Corin-
thian, and served under its officers. On this consideration the 
size of the council would be somewhat less than fourteen but may in 
fact have exceeded this number if some of the larger contributors, 
such as Athens and Corinth, 56  employed a collegiate system of command. 
There is indeed no reason to assume that the Greeks limited 
the size of council meetings to one representative from each state 
at either of the two sea battles, Artemisium or Salamis, or at 
Plataea, as Hammond asserts. 57 Hammond is certainly right in con-
cluding that if ten Athenian generals and perhaps five Corinthians 
and so on for twenty-four states all assembled when summoned by 
Pausanias at Plataea, the combined total of over one hundred men would 
be too unwieldy to operate, either to deliberate on tactics or to 
receive orders. 58 However, there are several weaknesses in this 
argument. In the first place, some Athenian strategoi were with the 
fleet and not all ten were present at Plataea. This would also apply . 
to the military executive of other states like Corinth and Megara 
who spread their resources between the army and the navy. 59 Secondly, 
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such a huge total of general officers only exists if it be assumed 
that all states provided four or five commanders of equal authority. 
It seems a little perverse to argue along those lines. Even though 
the Athenian practice was to elect a board of annual strategoi, Sparta 
certainly did not. For all we know, none of the states represented 
at Plataea (with the possible exception of Corinth) had developed an 
institution in any way comparable with the Athenian strategia. Their 
systems of command may have conformed with that of Sparta quite by 
nature. The Athenian strategia, after all, developed as a result of 
Cleisthenes' democratic reforms, if its creation was not incorporated 
within the changes themselves. We may be sure that if the battle 
at Plataea had taken place in 510 instead of 479, the Athenian pole-
march, and not Athenian strategoi, would have attended deliberations • 
with military leaders of other states and received orders affecting 
his command from the Spartan commander-in-chief. Thirdly, although 
twenty-four states. provided troops, Herodotus clearly, indicates that 
some of them did so not as separate contingents but in combination. 
The three hundred troops from Potidaea in Pallene were added to the 
Corinthian contingent. 60 The twin cities Mycenae and Tiryns 'jointly 
contributed four hundred hoplites. 61 Therefore, twenty contingents 
rather than twenty-four comprised the Greek force. 
It is still difficult of course to determine the exact size 
and composition of the group of general officers mentioned by Herodotus, 
for example, in the following statement: Tot;rov TOI0t;TC'V 
yirop/Pov ot rc.Z), `EXA7;mv urparqya, are rob' re i',3aros. a-rep7i0EIVi1.: ri)s _ 
a7partfir Kai k.Z, 	1.777r011 rapacrooptirqs., avveAxOlo-av wepi 
ain-61v re ro&cov Kai cay\wr, iXedvres irapa flavcrov:171 , _ 	_ 
ra SEELciv rIpas .
63 • Although any attempt to determine the number of 
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generals at war councils is purely guesswork, the problem can be 
approached with perhaps some degree of objectivity by an examination 
of the Greek army in line. The army was arranged in four - divisions. 
This is not apparent in Herodotus' list of the Greek contingents but 
is noticeable in his account of the actual battle. The right wing 
was composed of the Spartans and their old ally Tegea. The Conaithians 
were at right centre, the Megarians at left centre andthe smaller 
contingents were apportioned to these two divisions, 64 undoubtedly 
with a view to making both centres approximately equal in strength. 
On the left wing the Plataeans were stationed with the Athenians. 
Quite obviously, the arrangement of the line, with the two most power-
ful contingents from Athens and Sparta on the wings and the Cor/fith-
ians and Megarians in the centre, was planned. Instructions issued 
by Pausanias would be directed to the various divisions, rather than 
to contingents, and Corinth, Megara and Athens furnished the backbone 
of three of these divisions. Again, this is not to say that only 
four states were involved at meetings of strategoi. But if generals 
or polemarchs from, for example, the ten or to separate contingents 
'which fought at right centre with the Corinthians attended confer-
ences, the Corinthian high command (the most important) would have 
been present in whatever capacity it was constituted, whether it 
involved one general or several. Similarly, as in the instance of 
the Alexander episode, there is no reason to believe that the Athenian 
strategoi as a body did not report to and receive orders from 
Pausanias whenever it was necessary. It is at any rate preposterous 
to consider that the.smaller contingents In the centre of the line 
would not have been satisfied - with . the presence of only one of their 
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officers at conferences, even if they employed a collegiate system 
of command. This consideration, in conjunction with the probability 
that collegiality was at this time unusual, makes it highly unlikely 
that Pausanias had to deal directly with more than about thirty 
generals. 
In brief, the evidence in Herodotus that Athens assigned 
several strategoi, equal in power, to the command of her various naval 
and military contingents during 480 and 479, cannot be dismissed on 
the grounds of the impracticability of the system when operating in 
conjunction with a whole host of allies and the Spartan hierarchical 
system of command. What does seem remarkable is a situation where the 
Spartan commander-in-chief dealt with commanders of twenty or so 
separate contingents as if they conducted their activities on the 
battlefield completely independently. This is patently unreal. But 
this is exactly the situation envisaged by those scholars who assume 
that one officer commanded each allied contingent because the assump-
tion is based, in the final analysis, on the consideration that the 
Spartan commander could only personally deal with and issue orders to 
officers if their numbers were restricted in such a manner. However, 
as hopefully has been demonstrated in the case of Plataea, the Greek 
line was not organized haphazardly but in distinct divisions. Each 
division, whether it comprised ten i different contingents or only two, 
was itself a unit. It is not at all unlikely, but in fact eminently 
reasonable to consider that at conferences the generals were organized 
by their divisional groups and that the Spartan commander-in-chief 
therefore dealt with groups of officers rather than individual conting-
ent commanders. 
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To return to Herodotus' narrative, it has already been 
argued that none of the historian's statements about Themistocles, 
Aristeides and Xanthippus indicate that these Athenian strategoi 
occupied a special position in the strategia. It has also been 
noted that these individuals were singled out for attention by Herodotus 
because they were the men recognized as playing major parts in the 
Greek victory over Xerxes. 65 Herodotus' attention to individuals is 
by no means unusual, often to the extent of gross distortion as, for 
example, in his assignation of the causes of the Ionian Revolt to 
the two tyrants Aristagoras and Histiaeus. Again, this is not to 
say that his emphasis on individuals during the Persian invasion is 
far wrong, particularly regarding Themistocles. In the last years of Ihe 
/ 480's Themistocles was 0 rrraros air in Athens. After the ostracism 
of Aristeides in 482, Themistocles had probably gained almost complete 
control of Athenian foreign pol-icy. 	It was, at any rate, at his 
instigation that Athens developed her naval strength, not only for 
the war against Aegina, 66 but also in anticipation of the Persian 
invasion. 67 Furthermore, he persuaded the Athenians to make their 
main effort by sea in 480 and not to attempt to defend Athens. 68 The 
ecclesia had accepted Themistocles' advice to evacuate Attica as 
somas it was threatened with imminent invasion. 69 When Attica was 
evacuated, the refugees went to Troezen, Salamis and Aegina. 70 In view 
of this we can hardly consider that the Athenians did not expect the 
Greek fleet to fight at Salamis. In this context, and bearing in 
mind that it was Themistocles' plan which was adopted, it is no 
surprise that Themistocles was responsible, at the third conference 
of generals, for finally persuading Eurybiades, against the prevailing 
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mood of other Greek commanders, 71 to fight at Salamis. We can be 
sure that the arguments used by Themistocles, detailing the tactical 
advantages of engaging at Salamis rather than at the Isthmus of 
Corinth, were his own. 72 However, as Fornara has pointed out, 73 this 
does not mean that the decisions enunciated by Themistocles.did not 
represent the collective opinion of other Athenian strategoi present. 
Yet even so, Fornara, I suggest, understates the situation, or at. 
least does not define it with perhaps enough precision. Themistocles 
enunciated the decisions made by the ecclesia. He was the natural 
spokesman for other Athenian strategoi, but also for Athens, for 
Athens had committed herself to his strategy. 
In a similar way that the Athenian generals at Marathon 
each gave up the Tr-ro,vplei to Miltiades, it is not inconceivable that 
Athenian generals at Salamis allowed Themistocles the important task 
of influencing Eurybiades to fight at Salamis. On the other hand, if 
Themistocles' own arguments and tactics were the major reasons for 
the victory of the Greek fleet, the chief credit for the success 
should go to him. Suffice it to say that the prominent role played 
by Themistocles can be explained satisfactorily without needing to 
assume that he held a position within the strategia of higher rank 
and authority than other Athenian generals. The role of Aristeides 
and Xanthippus in the remaining campaigns of the next year can be 
explained in exactly the same terms. Themistocles apparently, for 
whatever reason, 74 had no further significant contribution to make 
after the battle at Salamis. His proposal that the Greek fleet should 
consoli&te their position by an expedition against the Hellespont 
and .Ionia in order to cut the Persian army's communications with 
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Persia, was initially rejected by Eurybiades. If Herodotus is 
right, Themistocles may nevertheless have continued to press for such 
an offensive during the spring of 479• 75 His arguments failed to 
impress the Athenians for the first time. By the spring of 479 the 
combined Greek fleet numbered only 110 ships. 76 The Athenian conting- 
ent alone at both Artemisium (127 ships) and Salamis (180 ships) far 
exceeded this total. 77 The Athenians had abandoned Themistocles' 
strategy of making their main effort by sea. Xanthippus and Arist-
eides were probably directing Athenian policy at this time. The two 
returned exiles were certainly restored to favour, for they were both 
elected generals in the spring of 479. It is here suggested that 
Herodotus' mention of Xanthippus and Aristeides during his narration 
of events is due to the fact that they were responsible for reversing 
Themistocies' strategy of the previous year, by advocating a more 
cautious naval campaign and an increase in the hoplite strength of 
the army at the expense of the navy. They were, for the time being at 
c least, of 1rr3r01 avers, as Themistocles had been before, and this 
justifies the attention paid to them by Herodotus, rather than any 
legal powers of superiority they were granted over their fellow 
strategoi. They were the most important of the Athenian generals 
because they were also predominant as politicians. 
In conclusion, I agree generally with Fornara's analysis 
of the Athenian command system as it operated during Xerxes' invasion.78  
There is no doubt that when Sparta held the 14F)Ltov((\ of the Greeks 
against Persia she employed her awn system of command, and appointed 
a commanderin-chief, 79 conveniently described by Thucydides, in 
reference to Pausanias, as 0 6ITQTTOST3V CEAivIAN," and described 
by Herodotus, in reference to Leonidas, as. 17-(11/1"i)S TGU S.TraTet9,1(LICS 
• c 91(c4iVoS. 81 However, it is far from proved that each allied 
state had to provide a single commander for the operations of the 
/ war and for meetings of ol TrAJv tAAT/kh/ TT:envoi , and that Athens 
\ 	c especially elected a single crrrtriYos Ec cuTto/rt.JV to take his place 
(`En/ 	/82 among of TIAN —Jr/Wvrqu'inlY0i. 	It certainly cannot be implied 
from Herodotus' use of the words of .n3t/TXVu/verpaxiiY0i in 9.50 
that we have here a strictly definable term which was applied to a 
special group composed of a single officer from each state. Herodotus 
does not use the phrase consistently, 83 and even if he did, it would 
hardly be enough to warrant the assumption, for example, that some 
Athenian generals (those elected Iggcsrcfv -rwv on Hammond's hypothesis) 
ca‘1/4 	 \ were known as dipaTIY0111JV WV while others (Chose elected °To 
4uV9s) were not. Furthermore, there is no need to assume that a 
single Athenian strategos succeeded Pausanias as commander-in-chief 
/  of the Greeks, as dvarprosilw t..)%\i/i-JV 84  whenSparta was deprived 
of a hegemony of the Greek forces in 478. The Athenians, to be sure, 
'85 accepted the linitovia, and her strategoi would now be ri,..toVas 1-65 
Trav/ros TiparEvrefos . This does not mean that the Athenians also 
continued the Spartan hierarchical system of command by appointing a 
single officer as commander-in-chief from among their own strategoi. 
If Aristeides was the only Athenian strategos with the squadron of 
thirty Athenian ships " attached to Pausanias' command, which raided 
- Cyprus and Byzantium in 478, 87  he did in fact become the supreme 
commander of the expedition when Pausanias was recalled to Sparta. 
However, and in brief, the evidence in our sources for the structure 
of the Athenian strategia during Xerxes' invasion of Greece does not 
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indicate that individual generals were entrusted with special 
authority giving them legal superiority over their colleagues. 
The importance of Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus is. not to 
be explained by their possession of any such superior position within 
the strategia of crpa:revos erstiuuxv or irracrs GAProilerartl, nor 
by their regular appointment as sole commanders with any particular 
contingent by virtue of a special election procedure required by the 
need to conform with the Spartan system of command. The Athenian 
strategoi serving in operations against the Persians were of equal 
authority and when several generals shared the command of Athenian 
contingents within the Greek League forces under Spartan hegemony, 
they dealt with the Spartan commander-in-chief collectively. 88 
CHAPTER 5 
Double Representation and the  
Strategos ex hapanton. 
If it be accepted that the Athenian strategia was a 
collegiate military executive during the war against Xerxes, that 
all Athenian generals who served in the Greek armies and navies in 
the various operations were of equal rank, then quite obviously the 
more orthodox viewpoint which maintains that a single strategos 
became commander-in-chief upon the demise of the polemarch is unten- 
able. The probable double representation of Akamantis in 479/8 cannot 
be explained as a consequence of the election of a single aTrarelYs 
c 
tccurav-rwv. However, until recently, double representation of a 
tribe in the strategia of the fifth century was thought to have 
involved only Pericles' phyle, Akamantis, in the years of his politi-
cal predominance at Athens - and also that of Alcibiades, Leontis, 
in only once instance, 407/6. The known cases involving Pericles 
are as follows: 
441/0 Pericles and Glaucon And. F38 
439/8 Pericles and Glaucon IC i2 50 
433/2 Pericles and Glaucon Thuc.1.51; IG i2 295. 
19-20 
432/1 Pericles and Carcinus Thuc.3.13.1; 	23.2; 
IC i 	296.36-38. 
431/0 Pericles and Carcinus Thuc. 2.31.1 
It was on the basis of these examples that the theory of 
C / the single errrasTscs 	ctricivrwv initially developed which reserved 
113. 
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for Pericles the position of commander-in-Chief or chairmanship 
of the board, or which merely allowed other capable men to be elected 
from Akamantis in the period when Pericles' continuous re-election 
was taken for granted. However, even though it became increasingly 
obvious that double representation was not confined to the tribe of 
Pericles, and often involved strategoi who were not particularly 
eminent, either militarily or politically, the theory remained well 
established until convincingly refuted by Fornara. 1 In short, the 
occurrence of double representation of one tribe on the board of 
strategoi during some years of the fifth century had hitherto (before 
Fornara's contribution) been explained as a consequence of the election 
c / 2 of a single arrrrs c carcwri.o./. 
No apologies are made for .entering this field of conjecture, 
not because the disruption of the. orthodox theory leaves .no satis-
factory explanation of double representation, (although Fornara's. 
solution ignores the fact that double representation may have occurred 
before about 460. 3 Fornara, to be sure, argues, as I have done, 4 
that double representation is a consequence of the obvious, namely 
), c / the election of all the generals E an'AUT4W, rather than just one, 
although he dates this innovation to the time of Ephialtes' reforms 
in the late 460's rather than to the time of Themistocles' political 
predominance in the late 480's), but, in view of the fact that for the 
years of 441/0, 426/5, 425/4 and 424/3, evidence for the existence 
of a board comprising more than ten generals is difficult to dismiss. 
It is here suggested that an important consequence of the reform which 
enabled all the generals to be elected without regard to tribe was 
in effect the removal of obstacles which prevented a numerical increase 
- • - 
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in the strength of the board. 6 It is for this reason that an 
examination of well known evidence yet one more time is felt to be 
justified. This is not to say that double representation, as a 
general phenomenon, was the result of an increase in the number of 
strategoi but, if I am not mistaken, it may very well be that in some - 
specific instances doubling should be explained by the election of 
extra generals. At this point it may be as well to state quite cate-
gorically, and to repeat, 7  that there is no evidence of the Athenians 
ever having elected more than ten generals at the regular annual 
electoral ecclesia and therefore it cannot be concluded that this ever 
happened. But there is evidence that the Demos elected strategoi at 
assemblies other than the regular electoral assembly during the 
Peloponnesian War. It is the purpose of this chapter to attempt to 
demonstrate firstly, that double representation is not evidence for 
the existence of a single general elected Icccorcivr41./ who held the 
position of commander-in-chief or chairmanship of the board, and second-
ly, to provide an explanation for the apparently extraordinary size 
of the board in some years during the last half of the fifth century. 
This involves in the first instance, a review of the literature which 
has made some impact on the evolution or modification of the theory 
\ 	c / of the El-pm-pros tgaalmwruhi. It involves also a detailed examination 
of some examples of double representation which pose, it is thought, 
a decisive threat to the traditional theory, and an examination of 
the evidence, particularly in Thucydides, which indicates for some 
years a numerical increase in the size of the strategia. 
The theory of the crrappros t cmavTLAA/was first advocated 
by Beloch in 1884. 8 Beloch believed that one general was regularly 
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elected without regard to tribe, while the other nine continued to 
be elected one from each tribe. This man was president of the board 
of strategoi for the year and commander-in-chief,-and such a man 
could be identified by. the double representation of his tribe. The 
commander-in-chief was elected d rard.V .rt.av/ and the other man from the 
.same tribe was elected &T1 luAig . Beloch's arguments have been modi-
fied somewhat in the intervening century, but this concept of a single 
c / general elected 	am-merIAJV has remained unquestioned, except by 
Fornara, Bicknell and Staveley, as the explanation of double represent-
ation of Akamantis by Pericles and Glaucon or Pericles and Carcinus. 9 
The first Significant modification came in the early 1930'S 
with Wade-Gery's idea that the original purpose of double represent -
ation was to allow an exceptionally eminent man, like Pericles, to be 
elected from all Athenians, and not permanently bar preferment in 
his awn tribe. Wade-Gery considers that no strategos of the 420's, 
including Nicias, was of this eminence. 10  Wade-Gery's hypothesis 
that there was a modification of election procedure whereby after the 
election of a dligulros Egcmautir4iV the remaining nine positions were 
filled by dropping the man with the fewest votes, thus leaving a tribe 
unrepresented, has been accepted by Jacoby, Gomme, Sealey and Hignett.11 
The effect of Wade-Gery on the development of conclusions concerning 
the strategoi is of some importance. Beloch's hypothesis that there 
existed an annual president of the strategoi was replaced by the 
c / notion that the 070.771Yos 	clarcohl,JV had no strict legal basis. 
The prevailing opinion which has persevered since the time of Wade- 
c 
a. Gery is that the election of a single criratels eAirqvr-wv was 
created to overcome the difficulty, caused by the continuous re-election 
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of Pericles, and that a general so chosen did not have increased 
legal powers but increased prestige. 12 Although it became the 
orthodox view that the position was created due to the eminence 
of Pericles and for the benefit of his fellow-tribesmen, the suggestion . 
of Accame and Ehrenberg that Pericles was not the only errrivros ES 
CILIMV -rtH between 441 and 429, replaced Wade-Gery's premise that the 
privilege was the private monopoly of Pericles. 13 
To this extent has Beloch's original theory been modified. 
His dictum of presidency has finally been discredited by Dover's demon- 
/ 	/ stration that the phrase sF__Kcs. -nOs aoros cannot be used as evidence that 
one general on the board had superior powers, as this adds consider-
able if not overwhelming weight to the argument that superior powers 
) c / cannot be inferred from election Ec crootruiv. 14 u There are neverthe,less 
some scholars who still accept Beloch's original thesis in terms of 
"chairmanship" rather than "presidency". Jameson suggests that the 
/ 
frroxklicos 	a-vrootrtiA/ was the annually elected chairman of the board 
who had no superior powers to his colleagues, but whose special 
function, which entailed additional prestige, meant presiding over 
meetings of the strategoi and acting as group spokesman. 15 As late 
as 1961 Lewis made the statement that "the formulae which had been 
thought to indicate chairmanship are not reliable guides but there 
remains some force in Jameson's contention that double representation 
• 3,- c / of tribes arises rather from electing one general EcallraVil4V to pro-
vide a chairman than from any desire to ensure fairness to candidates 
in a tribe where the post was monopolized over a long period by one . 
candidate". 16 Hammond is critical of the -view that the introduction 
/ of the erfarilros egan-ck■kruN was due to Pericles' continuous re-election, 
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c f yet his belief in the Tirrirms z (\II -with/. demonstrates how the 
theoryhas proved irresistible to modern scholars as an explanation. 
of double representation. 17 
The generally accepted view may be summarized as follows: 
1. In any particular year, but not necessarily every year, 
(I - the Demos could elect one oircorrs 	amlwIli.N. In such 
a year nine other generals were elected, each from a different 
tribe, but one of whom may have belonged to the tribe of the 
) 	c 	/ 	' Cfpal K Os Sc curcl.‘trvi V 
2. At least nine tribes were represented in any particular 
year, and if a arrccr-TroS sc ci-Int.VrOV was not elected, all 
ten tribes were represented. 
3. There were never more than two generals supplied by one 
tribe in any particular year. 
\ > c 4. The position of cioxrVos Ec osnIxtrOv did not confer special 
powers but entailed special prestige and was therefore limited 
to the outstanding statesmen . Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades. 
(Some scholars would also include Phormio in this group.) 
> C/ 5. Election e.gctitodi-wv was a device to break the monopoly of 
a man who was prominent enough to be assured of continuous 
re—election, by allowing another to be elected from the same 
tribe. 
\) c / The modern term Trpcolibst curootruw has been derived from 
Ath Pol 61.1, from Aristotle's statement, 	Neipo .rovoija 
rpa r f o 	agKr.c,_ _irpc'rrepo.p. 	,c1¢ gh:Arr77c' Okc gtTL, 1,01' 
ciircivrcov, 	As has been shown there is general agreement that a 
reform did take place in the fifth century, albeit one which is not in 
119. 
keeping with Ath Pot 61.1, and seeks usually to explain the double 
representation of Pericles' tribe, Akamantis, between 441 and 429. 
Most scholars have followed Wade-Gery in ignoring Ath Pol 61.1. 
Jameson's contention that until shortly before the time of Aristotle 
each of the ten generals was elected from a different tribe, expresses 
the widespread opinion which places the reform mentioned in the fourth 
century. 18 It is indeed incongruous that those who have placed Ath 
Pa 61.1 in the fourth century are also those who would extrapolate 
C / the three words 6rear1os. t arroArruiv to justify a theory explaining 
double representation in the fifth century. The fact is that the con-
cern with the single Tyarryos j  cc-a-co/Toy has directed all attention 
away from the significance Of Aristotle's mention of a reform, the 
only reform which is attested in the ancient sources. There is no 
evidence for the existence of a single claTlYos escupaypW in the 
sources for either the fifth century or the fourth century. As I have 
noted in the section where I discuss election procedure, 19 Ath Pa 
61.1 refers to a procedural change whereby all the generals, not just 
one, were elected without reference to tribal representation. 19a 
As yet there has been but one attempt to explain double 
representation in the fifth century in terms of the reform mentioned 
in the sources and that by Fornara who thinks the Athenians effected 
a reform not for Pericles or his fellow-tribesmen but for everyone 
at the same time. 20 Fornara's argument may be summarized as follows: 
In 501/0, when the reform of Ath Pot 22.2 was effected, the 
ten strategoi were elected by their respective tribes, each one of 
Cleisthenes' ten new tribes electing one general. 21  The elections to 
the strategia were modified some time after 487/6 when sortition Was 
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introduced in the choosing of archons, and the strategoi became 
both politically important and no longer merely the leaders of their 
awn tribes but on occasions of the whole army. 	The reform took 
place after 469/8, possibly as a consequence of the democratic 
innovations of Ephialtes in 462/1, but before the double represent-
ation of Erechtheis in 460/59. 22 Fornara's theory is that the reform 
effected two basic changes: 
1. The generals were now elected by the Demos as a whole. 
2. The generals were elected without regard to tribal representation. 
According to Fornara, his hypothesis allows more than a 
democratic improvement in accord with the reforms of Ephialtes. He 
argues that the archaic provision limiting representation to but one 
man in each tribe must have been felt to be unduly restrictive23 
during the Pentacontaetia when the strategoi had become the politico-
military executive of a now imperial state. A reform at this time 
(that is, the late 460's) which logically removed the restrictions to 
an efficient strategia composed of the most capable men 24 explains 
very satisfactorily the instances of double representation, except of 
course that of 479/8, and is precisely the innovation of 11th Pol 61.1. 
Furthermore, the need to devise a complicated election procedure 
3 	 k whereby one general was elected tc ertret/vrwit and the rest cum (uk.fis 
\ 	C / is thus eliminated. The modern term arparlYos Z.o.trav-rtAJV and all 
it means in the currently accepted view, is relegated to the realms 
of fiction. 
However, in addition to the fact that Fornara t s conviction 
is highly questionable that Ath Pol 22.2 means each general was 
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elected by his respective tribe, I would also suggest that his argu-
ments are just as applicable, perhaps more so, if the reform (that 
is, the election.of the strategoi without regard to tribal represent-
ation) is dated some twenty years earlier, in the 480's. 	At least 
the problem of double representation as early as 479/8 is thereby 
neatly resolved. Certainly there is no reason why Ath Pol 61.1 must 
describe a reform which belongs to the fourth century rather than the 
fifth century. 2 The silence of the Ath Pol on the date of the 
reform which eliminated tribal representation indicates that the 
author either did not have the information or considered it unimport- 
ant. 26 If he did not have the information and the reform occurred 
in the fifth century, as has been demonstrated is highly likely, it 
follows he was ignorant of the reasons for it, and the consequences 
of it. In the context of the circumstances of fourth-century Athens, 
it mattered little if the strategoi were chosen with respect to 
tribal affiliation or not. They were no longer the military executive 
leading Athens in a fight for survival against Persia any more than 
they were the politico-military executive of an imperial state leading 
Athens in a fight for the control of Greece. 27 To be sure they were 
still the military executive, but in times of war or peace each 
general had specific and narrowly defined duties to perform. 	It 
seems that only one general had the opportunity to gain distinction 
on the battlefield, for only one was assigned the duty of leading 
•28 hoplites on foreign expeditions.. 	The. primary responsibility of 
four other generals was the organization of the defence of Attica 
and the Peiraeus and the tedious supervision of the symmories. 29  At 
the time of writing of the Ath Pa the strategoi were largely an 
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administrative body. concerned with the day to day running of the 
mundane affairs of state. The contemporary situation was inimical 
to an understanding of the significance of the strategia in the fifth 
century and the significance of a reform which eliminated tribal 
representation in election to the office. 
Cases of double representation, to be examined in detail, 
which pose a decisive threat to the traditional explanation and which 
strongly support a dating of the reform of Ath Pal 61.1 to the fifth 
century, are as follows: 
Year 	Generals Tribe 
479/8 Xanthippus, Leocrates Akamantis 
460/59 Hippodamas, Ph(ryni)chos Erechtheis 
440/39 Phormio, Hagnon Pandionis 
433/2 Archestratus, Proteas Kekropis 
432/1 Proteas, Eucrates, Callias Kekropis 
431/0 Phormio, Hagnon Pandionis 
430/29 Phormio, Hagnon Pandionis 
426/5 Lamachus, Sophocles Oineis 
426/5 Hipponicus, Aristoteles Antiochis 
425/4 Lamachus, Sophocles Oineis 
424/3 Thucydides, Nicostratus Leontis 
423/2 Cleon and unknown Pandionis 
Nicias, Sophocles Aigeis 
418/7 Alcibiades, Nicostratus Leontis 
414/3 Lamachus, Charicles Oineis 
479/8 Xanthippus and Leocrates  
There is a strong possibility that double representation 
occurred as early as 479/8. This is argued by Bickne11. 30 He 
suggests that if Leocrates, son of Stroibus, who was strategos in 
459/831 can be identified with the Leocrates who was a strategos at 
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Plataea in 479/8, 32  and if the inference can be drawn from IC i 2 821 
that Leocrates Stroibou belonged to the deme Hagnous, then there was 
double representation of Akamantis in 479/8, as Xanthippus, of the 
deme Cholargus, was also general in that year. 33 Fornara has also 
identified the son of Stroibus with the general of 479/8, but is 
silent about his tribal affiliation. 34  
IC i2 821 is a dedicatory inscription found at Markopoulo 
which fell within the territory of Hagnous. 34a 
It reads as follows: 
^> ) .5 / [E 	pC WDD5.] 	TO [ graX 4.4 	AC0K[parES.1 	colEOCKaS] 
c- ^ 	/ zopzi, KaAAIKop-us CUk eAcLOCS [XarrekS] 
Bicknell suggests that Leocrates had this caption written for a 
dedication that was linked with his successful participation in the 
battle at Plataea. 35 From the evidence Bicknell presents - the - discov- 
ery of several grave inscriptions of Hagnousioi at the same site, and 
the discovery of a fourth-century inscription, which accompanied a 
dedication to Hermes by a known Hagnousios evidently set up, like 
Leocrates', at a local cult centre of Hermes at Hagnous - it would 
indeed by unusual if Leocrates was not a demotes of Hagnous. 
460/59 Hippodamas and Ph(ryni)chos. 
In a casualty list of the Erechtheid tribe, 36 which Fornara 
dates to the archon year 460/59, 37 two generals are listed. Whether 
or not there was double representation in this year depends on the 
^ 	^ ) 	38 meaning of TO au-ro eviau -ro . 	If Evicarri; means "campaign year the 
list could refer to both 461/0 and 460/59, Hippodamas being a general 
in the former year and Ph(ryni)chos in the latter. But if it means 
"archon year II there is certainly double representation in 460/59, for 
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the only evidence against it is the double assumption that there 
could only be one general per tribe, and that Ph(ryni)chos replaced 
Hippodamas. Either interpretation is compatible with Thucydides' 
account of the events attested to by the inscription where fighting 
39 occurred. 	However, as Fornara has pointed out, a campaign year 
is actually a season and EA/Ulu -WS is not a season but a year. 40 The 
possibility cannot be discounted that double representation occurred 
in 460/59. 41 
. 440/39, 431/0, 430/29 Phormio and Hagnon. 
There is good evidence that Phormio belonged to the deme 
Paiania and therefore to the tribe Pandionis. In Pausanias 1.23.10 
Phormio retired to Paiania after his inability to pay a fine. Some 
scholars have held rigidly to the notion that Pausanias proves only 
that Phormio had property in Paiania. 42 However, Phormio's retire-
ment to Paiania supports the hypothesis that this was his deme. 
Secondly, many Athenians still lived in their native demes and he may 
simply have been one of them. This is more likely, for men who lived 
away from their demes surely moved to a more fashionable residential 
area, not away from it, for Paiania was not a fashionable district. 
Thirdly, as Fornara notes, Pausanias' source either inferred from the 
deme name of Phormio the place of his withdrawal or omitted the deme 
name because he considered it sufficiently obvious from his mention 
of Paiania, 43 for otherwise Pausanias would have noted in some way 
that Paiania was not Phormio's deme. 	Fourthly, before the theory 
of the er-Tra.-nii(\o5 	ac irciVrost became widely accepted, it was generally 
thought that Paiania was the deme of Phormio - to preserve intact 
this theory it is necessary to allocate Phormio to another tribe 
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because in 431/0 both Akamantis and Pandionis would have two represent-
atives. 
Of the other pieces of evidence the strongest is a fragment 
containing the list of generals who swore to observe the peace terms 
with Samos in 439/8. 44 The difficulty of Wade-Gery's restoration ,45 
accepted for example by Ehrenberg and Seeley, 46  is that it relies on 
the strategia of a Demokleides from Aigeis in this year. The relevant 
part of the fragment is :- 
ZIEp[ 	• .... Tra 
v/siovtOs 
In the first place, names beginning with AF/4 are common, so that if 
Demokleides is not the correct restoration Phormio may not fit. 
Secondly, it is possible though . less likely, that Aigeis is not the 
tribe here represented, and that Pandionis is doubly represented. 
Thirdly, Hagnon, the other general apart from Phormio most regularly 
from Pandionis during the 430's, may have been strategos in 439/8. 
Fourthly, if Demokleides is correct, there are many seven-letter names 
instead of Phormio's which can provide fitting restorations, but the 
problem still remains one of proving that such a general belonged to 
Pandioais. All these objections have much less merit than Wade-Gery's 
original restoration, for they make the gaps much more difficult 
to complete. 
We know that .Phormio was strategos in 440/39 and also in 
432/1, the next attested incidence of.a general from Pandionis. 	If 
we are to judge from PhOrmio'S later record it is probable that he was 
general fairly regularly between 440 and 432. •Phormio's Acarnanian 
operations could have occurred as early as 439/8, but the more likely • 
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date, and that generally accepted, is 432. In short, there is no 
other general of the 430's besides Pericles who is more likely to 
have held a nearly continuous strategia. If we had supplementary 
evidence for a generalship of Phormio in 439/8, the restoration 
would be virtually certain. 	The possibility of a Demokleides being 
general in 439/8 is strengthened by the fact that a man of this name 
was the proposer of the Brea Decree, 47 which is usually dated between 
49 445 and 438. 48 If we assume that he proposed the decree as strategos, 
then there was a Demokleides prominent enough in Athenian affairs in 
the late 440's and early 430's to perhaps be general on several 
occasions. 
Another indication of the deme of Phormio is IC i2 296 where 
in lines, 13, 17 and 23 a (c04 ,/i 11cuavrE7 would provide a fitting 
restoration. This is not conclusive. However, the evidence of 
Pausanias and IC i2 50, when taken together, add up to more than mere 
coincidence. Phormio's deme is not unsafe, especially considering that 
scholars who reject the evidence do so simply out of the wish to pre-
serve the currently held theory of election. The tribal affiliation 
of Hagnon is beyond doubt. 
433/2 Archestratus and Proteas  
Thucydides 1.57.6 names an Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, 
in command of a mission to Potidaea. We cannot identify this 
Archestratus with any of the others known, although it is conceivable 
that he proposed a rider to the Chalcis Decree in 446/5. 51 More 
likely he was Traasurer to Athena in 429/8, and restoration of the 
deme-name Pug.in to IG i 2 237 is as possible as any six-lettered 
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alternatives. However, the name Lycomedes present more attractive 
possibilities. Firstly, a Lycomedes from Kekropis is named in a 
casualty list of about 425. 52  Secondly, a Cleomedes, son of Lyco-
medes, who was strategos in 416/5, 53 almost certainly belonged to 
Phlya. 54 Thirdly, Herodotus mentions a Lycomedes who fought at 
Artemisium, and who is connected with Phlya by Plutarch. 55 Fourthly, 
a restoration of IG ii2 1446 at line three reveals a possible 
Archestratus Lycomedous of Phlya of the fourth century. 
Hignett thinks we need more proof that the important family 
from Phlya which used the name Lycomedes, also Used the name Arche-
stratus. 56 But if we assume that Archestratus did not belong to 
this family, which is the alternative, we must assume another promin- 
ent family which also used the name Lycomedes. This is not impossible 
but lacking in supporting evidence because during the fifth century 
prominent men of the name Lycomedes all came from the deme Phlya. 
We are not justified in dismissing the very probable tribal affiliation 
of Archestratus on the grounds that it is not absolutely certain 
and because it upsets the currently prevailing theory of the Trirgres 
( gairt.t4riOsi. Arches tratus may easily have been the son of the Lyco-
nedes who fought at Artemisium and the brother of the general of 
416/5. 	combination of Thucydide6 1.45.2, which lists the generals 
Lacedaimonius, Proteas and Diotimus on a mission to Corcyra, and 
IG i2 295 line nine, places the tribe of Proteas beyond doubt. 
432/1 Proteas, Eucrates and Callias. 
2 The .evidence for a strategia of Eucrates is IC . 296 line 
five. His identification with the demagogue places him in the tribe 
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Kekropis. This is safer than the Eucrates, father. of Diodotus, 
mentioned by Thucydides, and whomHignett tentatively sugges ts58 - 
unless the father of Diodotus can be identified with the demagogue. 59 
/ 	60 Aristophanes refers to the demagogue Eucrates as MEAtTiuS Mfrs. 
Eucrates either lived away from his native deme or the demotic is 
correct. However, if Eucrates lived in Melite but it was not his deme, 
why did Aristophanes use the demotic to describe him? There is no 
evidence that people were identified by the deme in which they lived 
rather than to the deme to which they belonged, and it needs to be 
demonstrated, as Fornara points out, that Themistocles Phrearrios, 
for example, who lived in Melite, could be called Themistocles 
Meliteus. 61 
who was strategos in 412/1, was also general in 432/1, in which case 
there would havebeendouble representation of Aigeis., as Socrates 
Halaieus was general in 432/1. 62 
/ Thucydides 1.61.1 names KaAiglv 'i ■/ kitXXiSou Trepirrov 
aurov 4'riAT1W on a mission to Potidaea. The combination of PA 7827 
/ and 7849 gives Callias the demotic A )14.,ivsus of the tribe Kekropis . 63 
Lewis, attempting to refute the ascription of Phormio to Pandionis, 
It is also possible that the Eucrates, brother of Nicias, 
substitutes Callias for him as the seven-letter alternative in 
IG i2 50. He argues that this Callias, as the likely proposer of the 
financial decree IG i 2 91-92, and the renewals 
Rhegion and Leontini, (IC i 2 51 and 52) was no 
therefore have been strategos in 439/8. 64 His 
of a manumission list of about 320 which names 
/ 65 MItc.tviSOS . 	However, PA 7848 and 7849 are 
Lewis' only reason for not accepting iciJ A) -,/e05  
of alliances with 
non-entity, and could 
evidence is a fragment 
a Wijus Ka/0
equally suitable and 
as Callias' demotic 
.t 	4 
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in the first place is that Proteas, his colleague in 432/1, belonged 
to the same deme. 66 
As Phormio's tribe is more likely to be Pandionis, it little 
matters if Callias came from Pandionis, Kekropis or neither. If he 
belonged to Pandionis there is double representation of three tribes 
in 432/1; 67 if he came from Kekropis there is double representation 
of Akamantis and triple representation of Kekropis, and if he belonged 
to neither there is still double representation of Akamantis and 
/ Kekropis. But the theory of the eTiralyos 	kactvmau cannot be 
used in determining probability of demotics. 
426/5 Hipponicus and Aristoteles. 
Thucydides 3.91.4 names Hipponicus, son of Callias, on a 
missionagainstTanagra. There does not seem any doubt that the deme 
of the Callias - Hipponicus family is Alopece, of the tribe Antiochis, 
as three separate inscriptions testify to the affiliation. 68 Further- 
•-• more, Plutarch makes reference to a Kow.los 0046606n who indulged 
in looting when Aristeides and his tribe, Antiochis, remained to guate, 
the prisoners and spoils after the battle at Marathon. 69 
It is generally accepted that Aristoteles, the son of Timo-
crates, strategos in 426/5, 70 can be identified with the A1IdOTJtX1 
Golrab.S7 in iG i2 299, 71 and Aristoteles of the tribe Antiochis Who 
was hellenotamias in 421/0, 72 oligarchic strategos in 411 and one of 
the Thirty Tyrants. 73 It seems that PA 2055 and 2057 are the same 
person. However, even if they are not, Atistoteles' deme is safe 
- enough, as Lewis has noted. 74 The tribe Antiochis produced two 
generals in 426/5. 
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425/4 Sophocles and.Lamachus. 
Apart from the poet, Sophocles is the name of two other 
figures in late fifth-century Athenian history. A Sophocles was 
one of the Thirty in 404/3, and came from Oineis. 76 Sophocles, the 
son of Sostratides, who was strategos in 425/4, 77 has been identified 
as the oligarch by Fornara. 78 Lewis' objection that the identification 
must be rejected because he is colleague of Lamachus, who certainly 
belonged to Oineis, is not sufficient reason to dismiss the possibi-
lity. 80 
• 424/3 Thucydides and Nicostratus. 
Thucydides the historian belonged to the deme Halimus and 
therefore to the phyle Leontis. 81 It has always been considered highly 
likely that Nicostratus, the son of Dieitrephes, is the same as 
Nicostratus Scambonides, mentioned in Aristophanes' Wasps. Wade-Gery's 
argument that NicOstratus was a general in the years when Alcibiades 
Scambonides was not 82 has been accepted without question by Sealey 
and Mattingly, 83 but is not conclusive proof that Nicostratus belonged 
to the same tribe as Alcibiades. 
According to MacDowell, at the performance of the Wasps in 
422 Nicostratusr 	Scambonides was present in the front row of the 
audience. He bases this conclusion on consideration of the manner of 
performance of Wasps 71-85. 84 The front seats of the theatre were 
reserved for holders Of certain offices, including generals, and 
Nicostratus, the son of Dieitrephes, was a strategos in 424/3. 85 
Although Nicostratus is a common name and another office-holder of 
this name may have had the privilege of occupying a front seat at the 
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performance of the play in 422, nevertheless the identification of 
the general with the Scambonides is strengthened. An argument by 
Fornara86 further increasing the possibility has been prompted by 
the discovery by Vanderpool that the grandfather of Nicostratus the 
general was Euthoinos. 87 The proposition that Aristophanes is 
thinking of Nicostratus' grandfather when he puts the words 4o80.ri1 i 
and qiNo/sevcv into the mouth of Nicostratus is not too forced an 
association for the playwright, but not so probable that the identifi-
cation of the two Nicostratoi with each other is certain, as Fornara 
thinks. 88 However, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Nico-
stratus the general most likely belonged to Leontis. A good reason, 
at least, is necessary to reject the identification. 89 
423/2.Cleon and Unknown.- 
If Cleon was a general in this year, there is double represent-
ation of Pandionis, but some scholars have expressed doubt that he 
held office in 423/2." 'According to Thucydides Cleon left Athens 
for the Chalcidiceeelkliv EKEXt4rav . 91 The usual view is that 
Cleon did not leave until after the Pythian Games which were held in 
Metageitnion (August) 422 and that he was therefore a general in 
422/1, but not in 423/2. This view is based on Thucydides' phrase 
at 5.1.1 airy EVICL06101 6-71-044 11EX /AWT-Op£Xpl 1TUeit.,JV , meaning 
that the truce continued until Metageitnion. 92 But Thucydides does 
not give a date for when Cleon left Athens and the Scholia on Aristo-
phanes' Peace, 48, reveals that Cleon was killed eight months before 
the production of the play at the Dionysia of 421. The play was 
performed in Elaphebolion or April. The death of Clean, according 
to this, was therefore in Metageitnion, the same month that the Pythian 
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Games were being held. 
However, it is generally agreed that Thucydides 5.1.1 
is corrupt or some words have dropped out. 93 McGregor believes 
that the phrase means "the year's truce had been broken and remained 
so until the time of the Pythian Games" rather than "the truce for 
the year ended, after lasting until the Pythian Games". 94 McGregor's 
translation obviates the necessity to extend the truce past the 
logical date for expiry, April 422, for the truce, to last for a year, 
began in Elaphebolion 423. 95 Even if we ignore the possibility of 
corruption in Thucydides' text, and accept the expiry date as April, 
the whole matter becomes much simpler. Cleon left Athens tkillnx Ttp/ 
EKEKCAretv , that is, in early summer 422, and WAS killed shortly 
after the Pythian Games were held. Even if the battle at Amphipolis 
took place in September, it is still late enough in the summer to be 
compatible with Thucydides' chronology. 96 The appearance of 
Murrioic‘toi- in IG i2 324, line 38, dated 423/2, means there was 
another general from Pandionis in this year. 97  
423/2 Nicias and Sophocles. 
One case of double representation, apart from that of 
Pericles' tribe, which has been used to support the theory of the 
3 C 
07pcuyos zcxrcoorrt..Jv involves the statesman Nicias and the poet 
Sophocles, and is based on the following anecdote in Plutarch. 
;or, è Nucinu Ka :31a Ta 
 
Syst "1"2, 77X007-0) 
. 	. 
   
KCI1 (3 La 1:1.• Scit;av 	5,-peos.. 4 :V7e-rat a' eV 	0-7.parintv 
1 130uxevop.Jvco, TG K011.1) Tc7n, auvapxOwrcov, KeXevo-Oeic irrr' 
7rpi.;)T0s. El 77 EI,U 7110')/41111 1.7.000:CX1.3S 0 vac/iris. ein rpeo-,86TaT0r 
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ell' V T 	cry .c7paT7irov, "'E.-"c5," 95civat, -rraX. aiciTaToc 	az) 	li-pecri?irraTos." 98 
. 
It is certainly beyond doubt that Nicias and Sophocles both belonged 
to Aigeis. 99 Westlake considers that the TrrEtpu -ttxrcs accorded to 
C / Nicias by Sophocles can be explained by his election Ec an-nvrt,3V , 
the point of the original story being n reference to Nicias' special - 
position on theboard, and not as Plutarch has naturally assumed, a 
reference • to his wealth and fame. 100   Jameson concluded that the post 
c / of firaTlros 	amlutrA0V could be filled by some other than Pericles, 
that it involved merely chairmanship of the board's discussions and 
was occupied only by men who were experienced strategoi. 101 Dover 
\ 	c concedes that Nicias was Crrtrips qs aar.wiruiv but is inclined to 
the view that Plutarch is right in ascribing orEljrftros to Nicias' 
personal achievements rather than constitutional position, that the 
story is not incompatible with rotation of chairmanship among all 
the generals, rather than Jameson's suggestion, and the incident 
occurred when Nicias was taking his turn in the chair. 102 Woodbury 
takes the point a little further. Although he is non-committal about 
whether Nicias' precedence was due to Plutarch's reasons or to his 
3 c / election ectOW-ruiV, he suggests that the customary prestige he was 
accorded by his colleagues was on this day inhibited because he was 
103 in the chair and he adopted this procedure to overcome the inhibition. 
-However, Woodbury is basically concerned with confining a 
generalship of Sophocles to 441/0 by casting doubt on the authenticity 
of the anecdote, 104 but his argument is not Conclusive enough to 
. warrant rejection of Plutarch, especially since the tone of the story 
conforms with the tradition which contrasts the abilities of Sophocles • 
as a poet with his lack of military acumen. Woodbury suggests that 
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the anecdote is a conflation of two events, namely the strategia of 
Sophocles in 441/0 when he was involved in the expedition against 
Samos, and operations against some Samian exiles at Anaea in 428 or 
427, which Nicias may have commanded. 105. Woodbury uses an hypothesis 
106 advanced by G. Perrotta to show how such conflation may have occurred. 
Perrotta took a statement in the Vita 9 that Sophocles, when sixty 
nine years old, was a general in the war against the Anaeans seven 
years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, altered the text 
to read reeloial 1i-AurroVVISmictl(cmo43 thus dating his generalship 
to 428/7 rather than 439/8, named the poet and Nicias as colleagues 
in the campaign as well as for 428 /7, and allowed the age of Sophocles 
as reported to remain unchanged if his birth - according to the 
Parian marble - occurred in 497/6. 
The weakness of the whole reconstruction is the assumption 
that Nicias was involved. 107 The Athenian forces were Vi-3s  
/, 108 41.14-rov t..11"\c>v (if ctt , lwo v. 	There is certainly room 
for Nicias here, but may we not be sure that Thucydides would have 
named the man whom he later calls the foremost man in Athens, 109 if 
he was a partner in this command? There is no other reason to assume 
that Nicias held office in 428/7. However, it is not impossible, as 
he was certainly generalin 427/6, 110 and according to Plutarch Nicias 
was often the colleague of Pericles. 111 Apart from this, there is 
no other evidence for a generalship of Sophocles in 428/7. 	The 
Vita 9 probably refers to a strategia of Sophocles during the Samian 
revolt or to a further campaign, with Sophocles as general, in 439/81) 
against the Samians who settled in Anaea in 439• 112 It is not 
necessary to dismiss entirely the evidence of the Vita for a generalship 
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of Sophocles in a year other than 441/0. He may indeed at some 
time have been the colleague of Pericles and Thucydides the son of 
Melesias. 113 But the attempt to link Plutarch's anecdote with Vita 9 
and Woodbury's hypothesis that events involving the Anaeans in the 
early part of the Peloponnesian War became confused with the Samian 
revolt of a decade earlier with regard to Sophocles' generalship, 
are invalidated by the assumption that Nicias was general in 428/7. 114  
Furthermore, the frfsspoi -ctros is not appropriate if the 
dating of the anecdote is to be 428/7. If the incident took place at 
all, it probably occurred after Nicias already had considerable achieve-
ments to his credit, that is, between 421 and 415, after the Peace 
115 of Nicias. 	The view that Sophocles was elected general in 423/2, 
when diplomatic rather than military abilities may have been required 
for negotiations with Sparta, cannot be dismissed. 116 Certainly Nicias, 
was entitled to Sophocles'cparpjraTo by this time. He had already 
served as general in 427/6, 426/5, 425/4 and 424/3. 	It is no less 
reasonable to consider that Sophocles, who was in his seventies, if a 
date in the 490's is accepted for his birth, may by 423 safely refer 
to himself as ffaXaloraros in the real meaning of the word. If the 
story came from Ion, 423/2 would seem to be the terminus ante quem 
for the incident, because Ion died in 422/1. 117 On such a date Thucy-
dides and Plutarch are complementary for it is during the summer of 
422 that Thucydides refers to Nicias as the foremost statesman in 
Athens. 118 Thucydides lends support to the natural interpretation of 
Plutarch, that Nicias' precedence was due to his personal authority, 
and Sophocles' remarks are a compliment and an acknowledgement of 
his political prestige and influence in the state rather than deference 
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to any official rank which set Nicias apart. In short, Plutarch's 
source may just as easily have described Nicias as itrccpurctrGs as 
a result of his wealth and fame than for another reason which has 
been lost or unmentioned. 	If Nicias and Sophocles were both generals 
for 423/2 there is double representation of both Aigeis and Pandionis 
for this year. 
418/7 Alcibiades and Nicostratus. 
Alcibiades belonged to the deme Scambonides. 119  The restor-
ation of his name and demotic in IC i 2 302, line 18, fits perfectly 
the available space and means Alcibiades was a strategos in 418/7. 120 
Thucydides' phrase 1.(C: gXEXCV 	Aeld 01 	 T9)c.puro3 
lainovTos , 121 does not prove that Alcibiades was not a general at the 
time of Mantinea, 122 not because he may have been elected at a by-
election, although that is possible, 123 but because there is no reason 
to suppose that the Athenians could not use a general as an ambassador. 
The diplomatic abilities of Alcibiades were put to use. Alcibiades 
was general in 420k 419/8, 417/6, 416/5 and 415/4. Why omit him 
from 418/7 and break the continuity simply because he plays the role 
of diplomat, and when there is evidence to the contrary? Nicostratus 
held a joint command with Laches in the summer of 418. 124 
414/3 Lamachus and Charicles. 
Charicles, the son of Apollodorus, general in 414/3, 125can 
be identified as one of the Thirty, and belonged to Oineis. 126 
Lamachus was killed in Sicily during this year. 127 
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In summary, the theory of the cr-rro.T .T4)s 	CL,JV 
3S seriously weakened by the many cases of double representation 
which are apparent from 441/0 onwards. 128 The theory is virtually 
destroyed by the almost certain incidence of more than one case of 
double representation in certain years, and the triple representatiou 
of Kekropis in 432/1. The instances of at least two tribes doubly 
represented are as follows: 
Year 	Generals 	Tribe  
.433/2 	Pericles, Glaucon 	Akamantis 
Archestratus, Proteas 	Kekropis 
432/1 	Pericles, Carcinus 	Akamantis 
• Proteas, Eucrates, 
Callias 	Kekropis 
431/0 	PhorMio,H.agnon Pandionis 
Pericles, Carcinus-- 	Akamantis 
426/5 	Lamachus, Sophocles 	Oineis 
Hipponicus, Aristoteles Antiochis 
424/3 	Nicostratus, Thucydides Leontis 
• Lamachus, Sophocles 	Oineis 
423/2 	Nicias, Sophocles 	Aigeis 
Cleon, Unknown Pandionis 
If Arehestratus was also strategos in 432/1 there was 
quadruple representation of Kekropis in this year. 129 Furthermore, 
the problems for those scholars who believein the existence of a 
k / cicalOs•Cc curctv-rwv are not alleviated by proposing alternative 
tribal affiliations for such strategoi as Eucrates and Callias. From 
their viewpoint the situation worsens, if that is possible. If 
Eucrates was Nicias' brother and belonged to Aigeis he was a colleague 
of his fellow-tribesman Socrates Halaieus, thereby producing a 
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third double representation in 432/1. If he is not to be affiliated 
with either Aigeis or Kekropis there is still the problem of double 
representation of Kekropis by Proteas and Callias. But alternative 
demes for Callias are even more difficult. If this Callias was 
general in 439/8 on the basis that his name be restored in IC i 2 50 
instead of Phormio's, as a general from Pandionis, the problem then 
involves disproving Phormio's affiliation with Pandionis for he was 
also general in 432/1. However, Callias' restoration depends on the 
identification of Callias with the proposer of the decrees IG i 2 51 
and 52, for quite obviously if he was not as predominant in Athenian 
affairs as Phormio during the late 440's and early 430's Phormio's 
2 name must be preferred in IG i 50. The proposer of the decrees could 
quite easily have been Callias Hipponicou Alopecethen of the tribe 
Leontis, 130 father of Hipponicus, strazegos in 426/5. Therefore, the 
generalship of a Callias Calliades Paianieus in 439/8 is very question-
able. Callias, the son of Calliades, general in 432/1, cannot be 
assigned to Leontis because there is no known link between his family 
and the Callias-Hipponicus family. 	In short, double representation 
of at least two tribesin 432/1 cannot be satisfactorily explained 
away. 
CHAPTER 6 
The Size of the Board. 
If the numerical strength of the strategia varied from 
year to year and in fact fluctuated even during the time space of a 
year, quite obviously the theory of the trTicerercsE CUMAf truiV 
is totally destroyed. The theory, after all, is based on the assumption 
that tribal representation was a firm constitutional requirement only 
partially loosened in some years to allow the electica of two generals 
from a single tribe, and which resulted in just one tribe failing 
to gain representation. 	It would indeed seem a little perverse to 
argue that instances of double-doubles merely necessitate a modifi-
cation of the theory to fit the new evidence, a modification, for 
example, which permitted two chairmen or which allowed more than one 
man to be honoured by election EantkVIA.J./. Major difficulties 
would follow. Once it be admitted that double-doubles occurred, 
3 e there are no good reasons to impose a limit on two 611ATIVO\i Vc 
/ aircomAiv per year as there are if the evidence firmly suggested only 
single double representations. Evidence of triple representations 
add, of course, further complications. It is not possible, however, 
to determine with any exactitude fluctuations in the size of the 
strategia within a given year, because of the nature of our sources. 
The death or deposition of strategoi does not necessarily mean that 
replacements were immediately elected or co-opted in some way. We 
must assume for example that generals who are named by Thucydides 
on operations towards the end of an archon year (May-June), but who 
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are not mentioned as holding office earlier in the year, were in 
fact strategoi for the whole year unless Thucydides says otherwise. 
There are in fact certain years where evidence for the existence of 
a board of generals comprising more than ten generals is difficult 
to dismiss even by postulating by-elections to replace generals killed 
or disgraced. An attempt, first of all, shall be made to demonstrate 
the extraordinary size of the strategi,m'in the years 441/0, 433/2, 
426/5, 425/4, 424/3 and 414/3. Secondly, the difficulties of reducing 
the numbers to ten at any one time in some of these years will then 
be considered. 
441/0  
In 1941 F.W. Lenz found that the Venice manuscript of the 
Scholia on Aelius Aristeides contained the names of eleven generals 
for the year 441/0, 1  The list is as follows: 
Zz.v K p civr 	)Avayu c1.41-10$ 
2c.ftokx:1 204 ■xs,ou 	KoXwilo-a 
'AvoK 	AF:-.SVOIOU 	tC1.01 Vat Us 
2k-C9AP tAi V 
TkrikXc=civet/n-1(0u X o X.ckp ys 
R ck.t/iewv. A dap 0 	KEr t ILO V 
/ 
KA/ \ A rf ccro5 'Axel VE 
.11:e1/0•FS v 3E9% art W) 0 ritAirvA) s 
ap,Tr itS 	.11-£ I ro 
rXclu kryts )Aerivaos 
b1/4Eit0 	kl 00peLte05 
About 1875 Wilamowitz inspected the Venice manuscript but 
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had found only ten names, overlooking that of Lampides Peiraieus. 2 
Wilamowitz suggested replacing the incorrect or corrupt demotic 
-)44D1Vaos with 'AchivisoS, thus preserving the official tribal order 
by allocating Glauketes to the eighth tribe, Hippothontis. 	This 
correction was accepted until the discovery of the eleventh name. 
A When Lenz added LampidesPeiraieus to the list he replaced )AetiVittos 
 with ttc0W A.:tes in place of WilamowitesASqvitti , thus solving the 
problem as he saw it, of the missing ninth tribe and double represent-
ation of tribe eight by Lampides and Glauketes. 
For the purpose of discussion, it is convenient to divide 
modern opinion into two broad groups. One group accepts eleven generals 
\ on the grounds that it offers evidence for the position of (-Fru-11(0S 
r 	/ 	3 
	
arip,v1144.. 	On this view ten of the generals occupy positions of 
TrpckTib 	(tok:'t while Pericles, whose tribe is doubly represented, 
\ 	c is (TreirlYols z_s comNerwv. The other group has rejected the possibility 
of more than ten generals being elected in any year and has sought to 
remove one of the names from the list. Most have followed Wade-Gery's 
solution to a greater or lesser degree, that Lempides Peiraieus is 
31w A_ 	4 an "alternative suggestion for the corrupt word 	ii ■Axtvs u  . 	Jacoby 
took this a step further by suggesting that the scholiast, proving 
that )AenvAs was corrupt, looked up Glauketes and found that he could 
be a member of either of two families which belonged to the demes 
Peiraieus and Lamptrai. 5 The scholiast reproduced both demes in the 
list, Atrols being a corruption ofdNaprpros. Fornara has pointed 
out the weakness of these arguments by noting that "the scholiast, 
in that cose, would not have reproduced the problematical word 
'A el vac 5 " . He goes on to suggest that Glauketes is a doublet of • ' 
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Glaucon, that the scholiast found the name in the list without a 
demotic and addedU1viA7C5 as an afterthought. 	ifkal volcs to 
Fornara is not a corruption. 
If Fornara is right, we would expect Glauketes to appear 
in the list after Glaucon, not between Lampides and Cleitophon, where, 
conveniently, there is a space for a general from tribe nine. The 
fact that the names and demotics are in the official tribal order 
suggests authenticity. 	The heading in the scholion ) ThsV 3EgA, 
TIATIKuii/, suggests that the list should be emended to ten names, 
; k / but a much simpler explanation is to emend oEKet. to cvazico, However, 
7 as Hammond points out the bsiczt is referring to the generals who went 
to Samos, and the names are the list of generals for 441/0 from the 
Atthis of Androtion. Thucydides informs us that ten generals were in 
command of operations against Samos in 440; the scholiast may simply 
have been unaware of the discrepancy.- This explanation is much more 
acceptable than the hypothetical attempts to remove a name made by 
Wade-Gery, Jacoby, Fornara and others. 
If we accept that this list represents a board of eleven 
generals for 441/0, the problem of the deme and tribe of Glauketes 
remains unsolved. On the one hand if the scholiast had no demotic for 
Glauketes, there is another explanation worth considering; that he 
came from the deme Peiraieus of the phyle Hippothontis. This would 
mean Glauketes and Lampides belonged to the same deme. Because they 
shared the same demotic, that of Glauketes could have dropped, the 
demotic of Lampides referring to both - this occurring some time before 
the text reached the scholiast. Final.ly, in further transmission, 
Glauketes' name appeared independent of Lampides', and without a 
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demotic. On this hypothesis the list would therefore contain double 
representation of two tribes, Akamantis and Hipponthontis. On the . 
other hand if we accept OirRxios )tk 	as a corruption of -X0ve0S, (Lenz.'s 
correction being more plausible than that of Wilamowitz) all the 
tribes are thereby represented. 
For those who find it necessary to reduce the board to ten 
by removing -a name and demotic, the onus of proof rests with a con-
clusive argument by them that the position of Lampides Peiraieus and 
Glauketes Athenaios in consecutive Order of tribes is merely accidental 
- that is, it is not enough that there is no other reference to a 
Glauketes from Aiantis, for there is certainly evidence for a Glauketes 
from Hippothontis. 
433/2 
Thucydides 1.57.6 states :- A-tWov 
.TpicixoeTa vauc ci7r. ocrTANovTec 	xiX.i,ous. O-irXiTac e:nti 	,y>jv.  auTou 
, 	. 
:ApxcarpaTou TOU Avicoli,:g;‘ouc yeT. c7,XXcov 	aTparrioLvTos 
This army of 1,000 hoplites was sent to Potidaea in 
anticipation of the revolt, but Thucydides 1.59.1 notes 
that by the time of its arrival Potidaea was already in 
revolt, According to Thucydides 1.61.1, when news of the 
revolt reached the Athenians they sent a second army, 
Kca ifav v knAl AN0 u 	TrE/jurrrov ce.'Z'yr-Ov or-Pa-v. 1r° v. Thus, if 
the text of Thucydides is to be trusted, sixteen generals 
were involved in the siege of Potidaea at the same time. 
/ But most scholars have rejected the number de..Ka except 
8 Lenz. 	The accuracy of the text cannot be questioned on 
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the grounds that at least as many generals would have 
accompanied Callias and 2,000 hoplites 9 as accompanied 
Archestratus and 1,000 hoplites. Apart from the fact that 
Callias was to reinforce Archestratus 1 °rather than to 
operate independently, the evidence in Thucydides suggests 
that an inconsistent relationship exists between the 
number of generals sent on campaign and the size of the 
forces they commanded. 11 Nevertheless, the problem of 
-\ 	0 / 	12 Thucydides' unusual expression, ivarct)\X ,wv 	iCi , 	still 
remains. Could it be that Thucydides has here departed 
/ from his customary use of the CWTOS formula? If that is 
/ the case, emendation of the W<a_ to T26-CCTWV or boo is 
difficult to accept, thereby strengthening the likelihood 
that there were more than ten generals in 433/2. However, 
if the expression is corrupt all that can be said is that 1 
we do not know .if Archestratus had . 	command with two, 
four or ten colleagues. 
An attempt by Thompson to solve the problem is based on his 
restoration of the financial document IG i 2 296, line 5, which reports 
that a loan was made during the second prytany (August 432/1) to a 
general Eucrates and his colleagues. 14 Thompson argues that Eucrates 
was a colleague of Callias, 15 that the name and demotic of Callias can 
be conveniently restored in IC i2 296 and that Archestratus and his 
two colleagues 16 were the remaining three of Callias' four collnues. 
If Thompson is right Archestratus and his colleagues were strategoi 
for 432/1 as well as 433/2. 17 Such a conclusion presents the possi-
bility of quadruple representation of Kekropis in the strategia for 
432/1. 18 
The weaknesses of the argument are of course the assumption 
that Archestratus had two colleagues and the fact that there remains 
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some conflict with Thucydides. The natural meaning of Thucydides 
1.61.1 is that five generals in command of 2,000 hoplites and forty 
ships left Athens together. There is evidence that Thucydides means 
exactly this. If the five included Archestratus and.two others who 
were already in the north, logically the details about the size of 
the force sent with Callias should also include the forces of Arche-
stratus. But after the siege of Pydna, which involved the forces of 
-both Archestratus and Callias, the combined forces marched towards 
Potidaea 	7 /9 ") .X6'- 	lav 671-XiTGCS 	X(Opic 	TC;;1, 
etwitcixcev irOAXei, i T1TCUO 	g!7a.,coo-tocc "MarceeVnic7, Tnis yerir, SIVA14771-ov 
- llaup-avtow ,'ciga 	viit-c 7TapEITAEOP 	t'13'iokojrcov-ra . 19 The forces. mentioned • 
in Thucydides 1.61.1 do not include the army of Archestratus. Attract-
ive as is Thompson's argument, his restoration is not conclusive 
enough to override the natural meaning of Thucydides 1.61.1, that 
2,000 hoplites and forty ships left Athens with K i /ctv .1-0V 
/,  r\a"nictoO 11-91 crow aro v ccçcri 1 r4V. 
None of the attempts to explain away the ten colleagues of 
Archestratus have been successful. 20 The strongest reason for reject- 
ing the number is Thucydides' phrase, but without wishing to exagger-
ate the possibility, I do not believe any argument is strong enough 
to prevent a stalemate. 	The question remains open despite almost, 
unanimous agreement that the text is unsound. 
426/5 
The generally accepted opinion is that Demosthenes and 
Procies were generals for 427/6 and not for 426/5, and that Demos-
thenes was general in 425/4. 21 If we are. to judge from Thucydides' 
narrative, the expedition of Demosthenes and Procles around the 
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Peloponnese left Athens about the same time or - a little earlier than 
that of Nicias against Melos. 21 Nicias had a force of sixty Ships and 
2,000 hoplites, surely adequate to subdue Melos in a relatively short 
space of - time. 22 But Nicias had to leave Melos, after devastation 
of the land had failed to reduce it, to meet Hipponicus and Eurymedon 
at Tanagra. Now that it is more likely that the battle of Tanagra 
occurred in 426/5, rather than in 427/6 as has been previously thought, 
Nicias probably left Athens towards the end of the old archon year. 
Demosthenes and Procles were besieging Leucas at about the same time 
that Nicias was detained in Melos. 23 
Before the Aetolian expedition of the Athenians, the Aetolians 
sent to Corinth and Sparta for reinforcements to attack Naupactus. 
When the reinforcements assembled at Delphi in the autumn of 426/5 
under EurylOchus they contained 500 hoplites from Heraclea Trachinia, 
a colony which had been founded at about the same time that the Athen-
ian expedition against Tanagra was completed. Operations against 
Tanagra must have occurred very early in the archon year of 426/5- 
to enable the Spartans to establish their colony and draw on its man-
power for a campaign before winter. 	Clearly the appeal from the 
Aetolians arrived too late for the Peloponnesians to assist them 
against Demosthenes and Procles, but the arrival of Eurylochus so late 
in the year means either his force was delayed for some time, about 
which Thucydides is silent, or more likely, that the Aetolian debacle 
occurred later than has been thought and not in 427/6 as Sealey would 
have us believe. 24 
On the strength of Thucydides 3.94 and the inference that 
Nicias' Conquest of Melos was cut short by plans to meet with another 
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Athenian force at Tanagra, the Aetolian expedition of Demosthenes 
and Procles must have occurred about the same time, if not later. 
Uwe allow only three months for the attack on Leucas and the 
Aetolian campaign, knowing that Demosthenes remained near Naupactus 
for some time before late September 426 when the Spartans assembled 
at Delphi, the expedition against Melos probably left Athens some time 
in May. Allowing for some delay at Melos the Athenian blockade at 
Leucas could then be dated about mid-summer. From all this it would 
seem that the Aetolian expedition occurred about early August or July. 
This date explains more satisfactorily the late arrival of Eurylochus 
on the scene. Demosthenes and Procles were Athenian strategoi in 
the Aetolian campaign25 and were therefore in office for the year 
426/5. 26 As Gomme says it is still in the summer of 426, though 
near autumn. 
\ 3 
It is difficult to accept that Thucydides' phrase, loV FS 
I Ty
trw 	aPl"lAtilkh/ Creck-cyppirctv‘rtl, 28 as interpreted by Fornara A' 
and Sealexo means that Demosthenes was no longer general in the winter 
of 426/5, or the view that his generalship expired after his failure 
In Aetolia. 29 t would seem from Thucydides 3.104.4 that Demosthenes 
had command of some Athenian ships in the autumn of 426. Earlier he 
had left Leucas to invade Aetolia against Acarnanian wishes, so it 
Is unlikely that he had the use of an Acarnanian fleet at this time. 
It is possible, as Gomme notes, 30  that the original thirty Athenian 
ships had returned or that some of these had remained with Demosthenes 
when the main body sailed home in Thucydides 3.98.5. If these ships 
were Athen:lan, Demosthenes must have been strategos to use them to 
obtain Acarnanian reinforcements to defend Naupactus. 
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Clearly) some Athenians had remained with Demosthenes 
when the rest went back to Athens after the Aetolian campaign, for 
he commanded a detachment of Athenian archers at Olpae in the-winter 
of 426. Unless he was still in office it is difficult to see haw he 
could retain command of Athenian troops, especially now that two 
other generals were on the scene. 31  That Aristoteles and Hierophon 
had been sent out to supersede Demosthenes cannot be correct for they 
made no effect to interfere wiih his command, and after they had co- 
operated with him at Olpae sailed on to Naupactus. These two generals 
having gone on to Naupactus, Demosthenes must have had command of 
some Athenian ships to return to Athens immediately after the battles 
of Olpae and Idomene, 32 with both the booty the Acarnanians and 
Amphilochians had given him as a personal gift, and the sixty Athenian 
archers he had commanded. 
In the spring of 425 Thucydides tells us that Anpoo-Nvet 
ISe 	181Z77.1 /.1.ETa 	aVarLp770"111 	er AKapvav(as. 
airre5 Se71061-1. Ei7rov xpi)o-Oat Tat' vavai rairrats, 	gotAq-rat, 
?relic T'?71, IleXo7r6vvyo-ov 	. 	It will not do for the word ofu.trzi to 
describe the position of a strategos-elect, as Gomme, Mayor and 
Fornara have pointed out. 34 Furthermore, if by this sentence Thucy-
dides' intention was to inform us that Demosthenes was given a 
/ commission while being IlLoTis , we could reasonably expect further 
comment from the historian on such an unusual situation. The meaning 
cannot be that Demosthenes as a private citizen was allowed to make 
use of the fleet around the Peloponnese. The words ovri ialwrq 
refer to the first half of the sentence and not the second. 
,/ 	3t 	 k The natural meaning of Aros0Evv_i /ss...cVrt itowrq j4sroLliv- 
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/ 
avc9cuirls-tv+/ ›ikkarvaviccs is that Demosthenes was a private 
citizen after his return from Acarnania. It could be that Thucydides 
means to tell us that Demosthenes had remained in Athens ''without 
a command" until now, (as Gomme) and was therefore still a general, 
but this is avoiding the issue. If we accept the natural meaning and 
the more likely interpretation that Demosthenes was a private citizen, 
Thucydides' intention must be to inform us that Demosthenes was not 
a general after he returned from Acarnania. 
Sealey has used the inference implied as evidence that Demos-
thenes was not general for 426/5. 35 But the description of Demosthenes 
is unique in Thucydides. He refers to no one else in the same terms. 
An equally valid interpretation is that Demosthenes had been deposed 
from office in the winter of 426 and had afterwards perhaps been re-
instated. We know that he was afraid to returnhome after his failure 
in Aetolia and he probably expected to be deposed. He could easily 
have been deprived of office, without knowing it, at a regular 
3 	/ 36 ErrixElo.roVID, , 	this taking place after the generals Aristoteles 
and Hierophon had left on their mission around the Peloponnese. 37  The 
arrival of these two strategoi would certainly end Demosthenes' 
authority over the Messenians and the Athenian archers if he was not 
recognized by them as a colleague, even if the independent Acarnanians 
kept him as one of their leaders. It is unlikely that the Athenians 
would have heard of Demosthenes' winter victories until he arrived 
himself, the spoils allocated to the Athenians and which he sent on 
before him having been captured on the way. 38 Thus,when he arrived 
towards the end of winter he wasiseLN:s but he was quickly restored 
to favour. He was acquitted by the dikasteria of the charges brought 
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against him at the P-77Ixororcvi 	(for his failure in Aetolia), 
because of his winter successes, and therefore resumed office. He 
was elected general for the next year, 425/4, and granted a commission 
in April to use the fleet, as it sailed to Sicily, on the coast of the 
Peloponnese. It is difficult to see how Demosthenes could be impow-
ered to use the fleet around the Peloponnese, to be in a position 
of command where two other generals were present, unless he was 
strategos himself. Secondly, he was left at Pylos with five ships 
to garrison the place. 39 Thirdly, he was able to summon the ships 
of Eurymedon from Zacynthus, and Eurymedon acted according to his 
message. 40 Fourthly, when the armistice was agreed on in Thucydides 
4.16 it is "with the consent of the Athenian generals". The only 
general Thucydides names as being present at Pylos at this time is 
Eurymedon. 	Sophocles undoubtedly was present also. 41  But Demos- 
thenes as the instigator of the events at Pylos and the commander of 
the garrison there, must be included among the decision-makers. 
Fifthly,in Thucyd ■dec' 4.29.1 Demosthenes is 	TE /V nay_ 
c/ crpox1r3v tV0.. This is by now in August of 425 and therefore in 
the archon year of 425/4. Demosthenes was certainly strategos in 
425/4 as Sealey and Fornara have been quick to point out. 42 But 
Demosthenes had already been authorised to command troops in April 
425 and had been at Pylos for more than two months in this capacity 
before Thucydides mentions, in passing, that he was a general. His 
position was now no different than before midsummer. If Thucydides 
had failed to mention Cleon's desire to share the command at Pylos 
with Demosthenes and to add the additional scrap of information, 
the prevailing opinion would be that Demosthenes was neither general 
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for 426/5 nor for 425/4. 
Between 4.105.2 and 4.29 Thucydides does not specifically 
refer to Demosthenes as strategos. But when the historian names 
a general on campaign he does not find it necessary to always des-
cribe him as general. Taking all the evidence into consideration we 
cannot dismiss Demosthenes from the board of 426/5 purely on this 
/ basis. I suggest that the use of the word016,91 by Thucydides means 
that Demosthenes was dismissed from office during the winter of 426 
but reinstated when his victories at Olpae and Idomene were confirmed, 
Thucydides' information being that Demosthenes was not a general 
(as Fornara) after his return from Acarnania, but was when he left 
for Pylos in April 425. He had also been elected strategos for 425/4 
by this time. 
Aristophanes' Acharnians, lines 593 to 619, (produced in 
February 425) attests a generalship of Lamachus in 426/5. This is 
usually discounted in view of a later passage in the play which suggests 
that Lamachus was not a strategos. 43 The belief which maintains 
• that lines 593 to 619 were last minute additions certainly helps, as 
Lewis has noted. 44 Lamachus may have been chosen at a by-election, 
possibly as a replacement for Procles who was killed earlier in 426. 45 
If Demosthenes, Procles and Lamachus be considered as 
strategoi in 426/5 there are thirteen generals in this year. 
425/4  
Cleon is significant in Thucydides' History as the only 
major political figure whom the historian condemns for his conduct 
and his character. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the second 
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debate on Pylos, 46 and Thucydides' primary motive in giving a 
detailed account of this scene is undoubtedly to expose the personal 
failings of Cleon. But there is no reason to doubt that Thucydides 
has here given a factual account of what happened during the debate, 
if we ignore the unfavourable motives and feelings which he attri-
butes to Cleon throughout. 	It is indeed very possible that Thucy- 
dides himself was present on this occasion. The episode is certainly 
significant in the attention it draws to the conduct of the assembly 
and the picture it portrays of Nicias, but the ultimate significance 
from Cleon's point of view is that he gets the opportunity to lead 
troops in the field, as far as we know for the first time. 	He is in 
fact embarked on a military career, including membership of the 
strategia for successive years until his death in 422. 	Surprisingly 
there has been no attempt to interpret this scene from the point of 
view of the possible motives of Cleon. 47 
The whole debate on Pylos is dominated by Cleon, and all 
his arguments are those which are acted upon from the outset. It was 
Cleon who wasinstrumental in rejecting the peace overtures of Sparta 
in the first debate. 48 He was later successful in accusing the 
messengers from Pylos of making a false report, for he was chosen •as 
a commissioner to find out the true facts. 49  Cleon's next step was: 
: es Nwt 741, Nocnpcirou crrpar7776v öwra area 75putrev, 	p- 	to' v 
teal 	jilgcov eival Trapaa-Kevij, 	iiv8p6s eLev oc 
tripaT71701, 7rXt; av-ras XaRelv Tow; cv r v ?la 	atirjn _ • _ • • 
05 
voiMcrai TOLITO , 	This passage demonstrates that Cleon 
was not a general and that only generals had the authority to lead 
and command troops. 
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The remaining part of the debate can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The Athenians clamoured for Cleon to go to Pylos and Nicias 
offered him the command on behalf of the generals. Cleon accepted. 51 
2. Cleon withdrew from the command stating that Nicias was general 
but he was not. 52 
3. When the assembly and also Nicias became more insistent Cleon 
finally reaccepted the appointment. 53 
Are we to believe with Gomme that Nicias revealed "light-
hearted derelIction of duty"? 54 We have already seen how Cleon has 
dominated the proceedings throughout and that it is his recommendation 
that the ecclesia approves and adopts. 	It is interesting that Cleon 
twice alludes to the fact that he was not a general whereas Nicias 
was. An equally valid interpretation is that Nicias was forced by 
popular demand to give his support to Cleon. Let us assume that Cleon 
wanted the command but could not see his way clear to obtain it 
because he was not general, and moreover there were strategoi in the 
city who were available to command. It is useful at this point to 
remember that Cleon was a demagogue, he owed his political prominence 
to his ability to assess correctly changes in the political climate 
from moment to moment, from day to day, to his skilful manipulation 
of popular opinion, to his ability to control the ecclesia. 
When he stated that if he were general he would go to Pylos, 
popular demand was so strong that Nicias could do nothing in opposition. 
By again protesting to lack of official rank, Cleon ensured that he 
had overwhelming support and that Nicias as a general had virtually 
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none. It is thus plausible that Cleon was in full control of the 
situation throughout the debate, that he gained his first military 
command in the best way he knew how, through his skill as a demagogue. 
By appearing reluctant to assume the command Cleon's purpose may have 
been to make certain there was no last minute reaction to deprive him 
of it. As Westlake has pointed out, Cleon's political opponents, 
reluctant to support Nicias, would probably vote against his appoint-
ment unless he was being jockeyed into it against his will. 55 
A successful campaign at Pylos would be the beginning of 
a military career, and Cleon, adept at the role of the opportunists 
had no reason to be orthodox in his methods. It is quite possible and 
indeed probable, that Demosthenes had asked for more troops, 56 and 
Cleon chose Demosthenes as his colleague, relying on his experience 
and his eagerness for victory. The whole Pylos affair had developed 
as a brainchild of Demosthenes and failure would undoubtedly destroy 
his military career. In view of Cleon's references to his lack of 
official rank prohibiting him from command it follows that he was 
elected strategos. It is clear that Nicias did not resign from the 
strategia to make way for him for he was in joint command of an 
operation with two colleagues into Corinthian territory 57 soon after 
the Athenian victory at Pylos. 	Cleon's use of allied troops does not 
prove that he had no authority to command Athenian hop lites. The 
situation at Pylos called for light-armed troops. Moreover, Cleon 
is seen to be acting as an equal partner with Demosthenes at Pylos 
which would surely be unlikely if their authority was not identical, 
if Demosthenes was the senior both in military experience and rank. 
The possibility that Cleon was strategos in 425/4 cannot be dismissed 
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easily. If Thucydides had mentioned the entire episode in a single 
sentence, merely noting that Cleon was appointed to command reinforce-
ments sent to Pylos, this would be viewed as evidence adequate for 
placing a strategia of Cleon in 425/4. If Cleon was a general there 
were eleven strategoi in this year. 
424/3 
There are thirteen generals named by Thucydides as strategoi 
during 424/3. If the possibility of Cleon is also added the list 
is fourteen. Nicias, Nicostratus and Autocles swore to the armistice 
in the spring of 423. 58  Demosthenes and Hippocrates fought in the 
Megarid during August 424. 59 Thucydides and Eucles were engaged in 
the Thraceward region against Brasidas in December 424. 60  Demodocus, 
Aristeides and Lamachus were collecting tribute in the summer of 424. 61 
Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon were generals in Sicily during 
the summer of 424. 62 There have been no lack of suggestions to 
explain the extraordinary size of the board, but all of these have been 
concerned with the objective of reducing the number to ten. Of these 
suggestions three will be considered in detail. 
Sealey postulates three alternative compositions, firmly 
• believing in the necessity to reduce the numbers but equally firmly 
undecided as to the names to remove from the list. 63 He eliminates 
Eurymeaon Immediately on the basis that Eurymedon and Cleon could not 
be on the board in the same year because they both belong to Pandionis. 
From two of his reconstructions he omits Thucydides on the basis of 
Wade-Gery's suggestion64 that because Nicostratus and Thucydides both 
came from Leontis, Thucydides may have had a special command. On 
the two lists where Thucydides is omitted, Demodocus, Aristeides and 
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Lamachus are removed from the first, thus leaving nine names, and 
Sophocles and Pythodorus are removed from the second, leaving ten 
names. On the third list where Thucydides is added, Demodocus, 
Aristeides and Lamachus are again left off. The names common to all 
three lists are Nicias, Nicostratus, Cleon, Hippocrates, Demosthenes, 
Autocles and Eucles. 	Sophocles and Pythodorus are included on two 
lists, Demodocus, Aristeides and Lamachus on one and Thucydides on 
one. If any of these lists is as equally viable as the others then 
we must assume Sophocles and Pythodorus were more probable candidates 
than those on only one list - but this situation exists only because 
Eurymedon has already been eliminated. 
It is by no means certainthatEurymedon belonged to Pandionis, 
yet this assumption is the foundation of Sealey's reconstruction. 
Further, if Eurymeden was not strategos in Sicily, if he held a 
position of lesser responsibility,65  why was he fined on his return to 
c 	^  Athens? 	The phrase Ws vscv cLOTOIS -1-Q. EV ZIKEeklil: ket-Msfirtfarectl 
/ 	 3 	/ 	66 okriS riFicre0EVTES ciSr0xuiMS-EVW applies to all three men, Sophocles, 
Pythodorus and Eurymedon. 	In this context the banishment of Sophocles 
and Pythodorus and the relative leniency to Eurymedon, while implying 
lesser responsibility to the latter, suggests that the responsibility 
be considered in terms of "degree" rather than "position". It could 
easily have come about :- the opinion of Pythodorus and Sophocles 
concurred to outvote their colleague, the degree of responsibility 
thereby accruing to Eurymedon being less. This is reflected in the 
sentences. Eurymedon convinced the ecclesia. There are other possi-
bilities but Sealey's suggestion is not compatible with the narrativt 
67 of Thucydides which certainly implies, as Gomme says, 	that the three 
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stand and full together. Finally, Thucydides refers to them collect-
ively as Toos rrcals'eus, surely evidence enough by itself 68. 
The fatal weakness of Sealey's reconstruction Is that it is 
> c / based on the theory of the crrtTlYs E nuxtvn,V. If Thucydides was 
not a regular general, what criterion do we use to determine who was, 
/ 	69 or who was not, a general? The phrase Terarcv TIA,V eir2AIS 
must mean that Thucydides was an elected general, otherwise we must 
regard the History as unreliable source material for reconstructing 
lists of the strategoi. The weakness of Sealey's argument is further 
demonstrated if we suppose for a moment that Aristeides' deme was 
known, and he belonged to the tribe of Nicias, or Demosthenes. In 
such a situation would Aristeides be dealt with in the manner of Thucy-
dides or Eurymedon? 
Fornara lists nine generals for 424/3 70 , expressing doubts 
about Demodocus, Aristeides, Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon. 
All these men are assigned to the preceding year 425/4. Fornara's 
main objection to assigning them to 424/3 is that "we do not know 
whether they were re-elected or not". 71 In the case of the generals 
in Sicily, "if there were not prosecution but we heard nothing of them 
in the year 424/3 would we still presume they were generals?" In 
the case of Aristeides and Demodocus, Fornara thinks this will not 
have been the first time a general failed to return at the expected 
time, because of delay or exceptional circumstances. Thucydides 
4.75.2 indicates a strategia for Lamachus, a colleague of these two 
in 424/3. 
The case against the generals who were collecting tribute 
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c 3A 1 	" is Thucydides 4.50.1 which names 3iApis-yEl 	o ./ApAirrtrco, fts r/ v 
,\).' / 4surc.Ac‘s-b,,,/ 	Trrvitr'e.•,„ cu qc- rizilevaa arcs' TCcS 
411.14.Xos in the winter of 425. 	If the only reference to these 
generals was 4.75, they would be strategoi for 424/3. 	If Aristeides' 
unnamed colleagues of 4.50.1 were Demodocus and Lamachus, then all 
three were certainly in office during 425/4. But there may have been 
two separate operations with Aristeides engaged in both. His collea-
gues may have been different. Thucydides describes the attack on the 
Megarid, which occurred in 424/3, 72  immediately before detailing the 
activities of the tribute collectors. Unless.we ignore the chrono-
logical sequence of the narrative, these three generals were actively 
engaged during 424/3. 	If this is a different mission to 4.50.1, 
then these men were in office for 424/3. 
However the possibility, and the accepted view, that the 
operation lasted from the winter of 425 until the autumn of 424, cannot 
be overlooked. It is reasonable.to believe that commands were extended 
into the next Attic year for reasons such as delay, but can we assume 
that the length of this mission is the consequence of delays or special 
circumstances, that the Athenians expected this operation to be 
completed before the beginning of the new official year, or thereabouts? 
73 The further attested activities of the generals may have 
been part and parcel of their sailing orders. Their main objective 
was to collect tribute, but of nearly equal importance they were 
required, as the only Athenian force in the area, to maintain stability 
and meet any threats. It is not usual for Thucydides to give details 
• of routine operations. The tribute collecting forces only rate a 
mention in 4.50 and 4.75 because they became involved in activities 
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of greater significance, yet these activities in the Hellespont, 
at Antandros and in the Black Sea, suggest that the operation involved 
something more than the collection of tribute. Furthermore, could 
Athens afford the luxury of sending out three strategoi merely to 
collect debts? Collecting tribute must have been a fairly lengthy 
procedure in itself, and the further operations undertaken, even if 
begun in the early summer, cannot have been expected to be completed 
(by the ecclesia) before the beginning of Hekatombaion. 
The excursion of Lamachus into the Black Sea confirms his 
strategia for 424/3. It also increased the likelihood that Demodocus 
and Aristeides were also elected. The separation of Lamachus from 
his colleagues only proves that they were now acting independently, 
not that Aristeides and Demodocus sailed home because their term 
of office had expired. For all we know the collection of the tribute 
was not completed and the generals worked separately for this purpose. 
The onus of proof rests with those who would remove Aristeides and 
Demodocus from the list because Thucydides 4.75.1 indicates that they 
were strategoi in the ,suennitc of 424/3. The possibility of Fornara's 
argument cannot be denied, but what is needed is refutation of 
Thucydides' chronology, not a discussion designed to conveniently 
reduce the board to ten. 
In the case of the generals in Sicily the narrative of 
Thucydides would appear to provide the answer. Pythodorus and Sophocles 
were banished and Eurymedon was fined for having taken bribes to 
depart when they might have subdued Sicily. 74 Although it is not 
significant that there is no indication that the Athenians intended 
to supersede the three strategoi, 75 as Fornara has shown, 76 nevertheless 
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Thucydides implies that the Athenians were not expecting the return 
of their army from Sicily during the summer of 424. To the criticism 
that the Athenians expected victory and that the only thing they did 
not expect was a peace without victory, the answer is the further 
implication in Thucydides that the generals should have remained in 
Sicily until victory was achieved. The clear indications from this 
are that the Athenians were not going to supersede the generals at the 
end of 425/4 and that the three men had the authority to command during 
424/3. 	If they were not prosecuted and we heard nothing of them in 
424/3, there would be no case for their strategia, but if they remained 
in Sicily we would have to presume they were strategoi. 
MacDowell believes 77 that the fourteen generals (at least) 
did hold office during 424/3, but never more than ten at a time. The 
larger number is due to by-elections. He postulates that the generals 
in office at the beginning of the official year were Aristeides, 
Demodocus, Demosthenes, Eurymedon, Hippocrates, Cleon, Lamachus, 
Pythodorus, Sophocles and another whose name is not known. At the end 
of the year the list comprised Aristeides, Autocles, Demosthenes, 
Demodocus, Eucles or an unknown, Cleon, Lamachus, Nicias, Nicostratus 
and another unknown. The generals on the first list but missing from 
the second were certainly either killed or dismissed before the end of 
the year. Pythodorus and Sophocles were both dismissed and probably 
Eurymedon also. 78 Thucydides and Eucles may have been elected to 
replace two of these unless either of them is the unknown of the first 
list. Thucydides was exiled before the end of the year. 79 Eucles 
may well have shared his fate, and Hippocrates was killed at Delium 
80 during the winter of 424. 	Autocles, Nicias, Nicostratus and two 
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others were elected at by-elections to replace any of those removeL -: 
during the year, again under the proviso that one of them may have 
been the unknown of the first list. 	According to this reconstruction 
six generals were replaced at by-elections (five if Eucles was not 
dismissed). One of the seven possible replacements was also the 
unknown on the first list, and of the five strategoi whose names 
have, he could have been any one of Thucydides, Eucles, Nicias, 
Nicostratus or Autocles. 
This elaborate reconstruction is based solely on the aszsump-
tion that all strategoi who are not mentioned by Thucydides on 
campaign during the summer of 424, but who held commands after the 
summer, had been, with the one unidentifiable exception, elected 
by-elections. The weaknesses of such an argument are obvious and 7J:here 
is no other year where the number of strategoi and their military 
activities during summer, winter and spring are so fully documen.teci 
as to create a parallel situation. Shall we assume for example that 
Nicias, who was strategos in all the years from 427/6 until 423/2, 
and that Nicostratus, who was general in 427/6, 425/4, 423/2, were 
both elected at by-elections in 424/3? The likelihood is that neither 
were, yet if these two were both regular strategoi at the beginning 
of the new official year, one could fill the vacancy in MacDoweli'l-i 
first list, but the other would bolster the list to eleven names. 
The list of generals for 424/3 may have included fourtee= 
men. 
414/3  
Some conclusions that may be drawn from Thucydides' account 
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of the events of the year 414/3 pose direct contradictions to the 
orthodox viewpoints about the appointments of strategoi and the 
number that could be elected in any one year. 	According to the 
narrative of Thucydides there is the possibility of thirteen generals 
for this year, who are as follows:- Nicias, Pythodorus, Dieitrephes, 
Lamachus, Charicles, Demosthenes, Conon, Eurymedon, Euthydemus, Menander, 
Demaratus, Laispodias and Euetion. 
A scholium on Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazusae 841 dates the 
death of Lamachus81 a few years before the play, that is, in the year 
415/4. The dating of the events of Thucydides 6.96-105 cannot be 
calculated precisely except from the Aristophanes scholiast. On such 
a calculation, Thucydides 6.96-102 occurred before Hekatombaion (July). 
Thucydides' chronology is consistent with the view that the Athenian 
reinforcements arrived in Sicily in late spring. In Thucydides 6.94 
and 6.95 it is still "spring; but it was not until "summer" that the 
Syracusans learnt of the arrival of the reinfortements. 82 The return 
of the Athenian forces to Catana 83 cannot have been much earlier than 
late April, if we are to judge from the several activities which they 
undertook, and it may well have been later. If the Syracusans did not 
learn of the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements until the first 
or second week in May, the first battle of Syracuse and the-death of 
Lamachus occurred not many days before the beginning of the new official 
year, allowing several weeks for the series of events which culminated 
in the capture of the second Syracusan wall. 
The activities of Gylippus 84 occurred very soon after he 
heard of the Athenian circumvallation of Syracuse. 85 If we date 
Thucydides 6.104 as close as possible to the Syracusan defeat, the 
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movements of Gylippus can be confined to the first weeks in July, 
but no earlier. 	It follows from this that the Spartan invasion 
of the Argolid 86 occurred at the turn of the Attic year or later, 
for it is clear that 6.104 is roughly contemporaneous with Thucydides 
6.105. On such a calculation the Athenian raid into Laconia 87 belongs 
to the Attic year of 414/3, towards the end of July or early August. 
Even if the Spartan expedition can be dated to June the Athenian 
response can hardly be confined to 415/4. 88  Pythodorus, Laispodias 
and Demaratus were generals for 414/3. Therefore, if the scholium 
on Aristophanes is to be used as a guideline, the events of 6.94 - 
6.105 are to be confined between April and August. Such an interpre-
tation fits neatly with Thucydides' chronology of the rest of the 
events in Sicily during the remainder of the summer of 414. 89 
It is possible however that the Athenian raid into Laconia90 
should be dated to September 414. 	Thucydides states at 6.105.1 
A QsTrZr 'MS cubvaas everkratilo... Tets 	1DOS naK40Cti,UOVIoUS 
91 aoiDis cAtkfctV . 	If the truce began in November 421 and ended as 
a consequence of the Athenian raid, it is necessary to date the mission 
of Pythodorus after the beginning of September. 92 
The imprecise nature of the chronology of Thucydides is no 
help, but does not invalidate such a late date. If the death of 
Lamachus is kept in the archon year 415/4, the events of Thucydides 
6.103-104 must be spread over a longer period of time than Thucydides' 
narrative suggests, and the events of Thucydides 7.1-7 must be corres-
pondingly compressed. Even if the scholium on Aristophanes is ignored 
and the death of Lamachus is placed in the new official year, the 
chronology of Thucydides, imprecise as it is, must be subjected to 
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some distortion, Certainly, Lamachus was killed after the elections 
of spring 414 and we may be sure he was re-elected. The only 
objection that can be raised is that Lamachus was not on active duty 
in 414/3, but even this is uncertain. All that can be said is that 
his death was accidental and very close to the turn of the Attic year. 
On this basis he must be included on the board of strategoi for 
414/3. 
The only other general whose strategia for 414/3 may possib-
ly be questioned is Conon. His stay at Naupactus may have continued 
into the next year, 93 but the twenty Athenian ships confronting the 
twenty-five Corinthian vessels at Naupactus during the spring of 413,9 4 
• which were initially dispatched from Athens during the winter of 
414/3, 95 were undoubtedly the same force which Conon sought to rein-
force in case of attack by the Corinthian squadron. Presumably he ' 
had already lost two of his twenty ships by this time, which may explain 
his call for reinforcements. 
The problem of the large size of the board has been neatly 
skirted by Fornara, 95awho divides the generals into two categories. 
The first category consists of the generals in Sicily, including 
Demosthenes, Eurymedon, Menander and Euthydemus as well as Nicias and 
Lamachus. According to Fornara these men occupied specially created 
positions not fixed by •the time limit imposed on the ,regular office 
by the annual spring elections. Thus from 415/4 until 413/2 the 
generals in Sicily were not subject to the procedure of annual re-
election, nor were they members of the regular strategia, for their 
office was not that of crpalvos but of rfroycS ctorcKrartcr. At 
the elections in the spring of 414 the Athenians elected a board of 
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ten regular generals, of whom we know seven, and these fall into 
Fornara's second category. By this reasoning, in 414/3 there were 
sixteen generals in all, but six occupied the extraordinary office 
of eTeccrlyc 
The weakness of Fornara's argument lies in his assumption 
that the Athenians created the new position of isrparlfc6 (WroKreruir. 
There is by no means unanimous agreement that such an office existed. 
The usual view is that an official was gurokrwp by virtue of special 
powers conferred on him by the ecclesia, not by virtue of powers 
pertaining to an office. It means that officials were empowered to 
make decisions without receiving instructions from the ecclesia, 
decisions which were binding on the state, but which were designed to 
gain a particular end which had already been determined. 96 Such a 
view is consistent with every instance in Thucydides where an official, 
or group of officials, is designated as cwrckra.111. 
In Thucydides 1.126.8, when Cylon was beAged on the 
Acropolis, rots . 
Kat TO irav 	.a .itroKp,7-ft ba0eivat 
_Ivvja cipxova-t T;11) 	ClIttX.a/cyjv T 
9 	 • -- .y av apt) Kwo-tv. • 	It 
is the archons who are entrusted with extraordinary powers in the 
methods adopted to blockade Cylon. In Thucydides 5.45.2 Spartan 
■ 	/ envoys arrived at Athens kqi Altrostrts ;_:,/ 1 pouvj Ver 1 re 7-00TWV I- 
N c 	, 	1 	V 	 % / 	c 	rt iccu LJ5 cto-rocrevropcs ti k-oun -tart Travtrup/ s-upplvai r-1.3 V hictrtgpw v. 
The Spartan envoys had power to negotiate with Athens without reference 
back to Sparta, although it is not clear whether they were empowered 
merely to swear to certain proposals if Athens accepted them, or use 
their own 2iudgement. 97 In Thucydides 8.67.1, just prior to the 
establishment of the Four Hundred in 411, Kai- 7rpc7)Tov 11111 
EIVOV 	 SEKa clv8pas. 4VcrOat v-i7paqijac aitroKhulTopa, To6-rous. Se 	try-fp:'!Ifavras 
ryvc61.1, 71 1) 	o-eve-ymeiv 
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.es 	Zi"illot , es iip..jpav 	iccar 5 	Tt tIpto-Ta 	7raXec 01 Kij(TETa 	Constitut- 
ional niceties were adhered to even at this late date, the commission-
ers being given a mandate to frame a new constitution. They were 
elected to perform a particular task but the grant of extraordinary 
powers ensured that their decisions would be binding on the state. 
In Thucydides 6.8.2 the Athenians ;:lk;),,t,irravro vai3v 
K 0 vra 7r: p.77E !!' 	.t4:eAlaP Ka? 0- rparri0i, 0:1701( pG.TO pas. 	'AAKti3c-i..8 ?IP re. 76v 
Kil(wtot., Kai N Lk Cal) T61.) 	0 U.7-02) Kai Aciptaxov 	Ecrockcivovs, PollOni)s _ . 	......_. 
pay 'EyEarat.ots .rp6s 	 EvyKaroucia-at ;?) Ka AEovrtvovs, 
7)VTL 7repc'ytyvqrat an-dig raj rroX4tov, Kai TWA rav rfi 3:LxeX4 
*Eat 57R Ay rypc6o-Kwo-w 5p:gra 
The three generals had complete power to decide without reference to 
Athens when the objectives, here detailed, were accomplished and what 
military or other means were to be used. The inference is clear that 
specific and detailed instructions from the ecclesia would be inappro-
priate in this case, if LS only because the strategoi were in a much 
better position to evaluate the situation and because the leadership 
of the ecclesia was effectively invalidated by the communications 
problem. 
In Thucydides 6.26.1 at the second Athenian assembly ... 
:ot 	ei;OZ, s. aZroKpifropa,. fivat 
iTepl arpartar 10.0ovs K .(21 vepi. ray 77avrOs.. 7:Xo0 rain o-rparliyobs. 
irpacrcrew 
	 l'ipcara Eivatj'AOlirctiocs] . If indeed Thucydides 6.8.2 
can be cited as evidence for the existence of the office of elp 
cecroKraTtop , Thucydides' phraseology in 6.26.1 clearly belies that 
interpretation. If in 6.8.2 the Athenians created that position, may 
we assume that Fornara would have us believe that at the time the 
designated ovrt>krtretts , Thucydides makes clear the extent and nature 
' of the powers conferred. Thucydides surely cannot be used as evidence 
\ for the existence of the extraordinary position of crrpcalYos 
ct ;) ic parrui • In the only case we know where the officials 
/ 	98 were elected and appointedcw-robvtors at the same time, Thucydides 
provides us with the information. Here he does not. The natural 
inference is that these men had been elected to the strategia of 41514 
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Athenians failed to fully specify the powers of the office, and that 
subsequently in the second assembly those powers were increased? But 
in 6.26.1 it is to the position of ol-perorros that Thucydides is referr-
ing. His meaning is not that the generals as TTponlYci ctvroicpctrcr-S 
thereby had the power to decide the size of the forces and the conduct 
of the whole expedition, but that the ecclesia delegated this power 
to the strategoi, specifically defining in what further respects the 
3 three generals were aurcw_rcrors . It follows that the grant made 
in the first assembly was limited, the second grant covering powers 
which the ecclesia had initially preserved for itself. The only 
essential difference between the grant in 6.8.2 to "help the Egestaeans 
..., to restore Leontini ..." and that in 6.26.1 to decide "the numbers 
of the army and of the expedition generally ..." is merely that in 
6.8.2 Thucydides does not specify the powers delegated by the ecclesia, 
the context clearly indicating that the strategoi were auregrexcrs by 
virtue of receiving no detailed instructions about the methods and 
means they would employ to obtain the determined goals. They were 
p --op 	because they were given freedom of action in deciding 
if the aims of the state had been achieved and by what means they were 
to be accomplished. As in the other instances where officials are 
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in the spring elections of 415. Even if Thucydides' use of the word 
cturokr-rwp in 1.126.8 is anachronistic, as Gomme thinks, neverthe-
less his belief, that .office-holders could be appointed o_vrcKparorEs 
is certainly a reflection of late fifth-century practice. 99 	It 
follows that Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus did not occupy specially 
created positions, although endowed with extraordinary powers, and 
that they were regular strategoi for 414/3 as well as for 415/4. 
There is no other indication in Thucydides that these men occupied 
special positions. In subsequent comment on their activities the terms 
of reference used by the historian are by no means unusual and no diff-
erent to those describing the activities of other generals on active 
1 duty. For example at 6.31.5 they are TCUS Srmays; at 6.42.1 and 
- / 6.47.1 01 d 	I and at 6.62.1 	V jv/ drlye I * 
There has also been some discussion about whether Demosthenes 
and Eurymedon were strategoi in 414/3. Fornara thinks that the mere 
fact of their appointment in 7.16.2 to lead the reinforcements sent to 
Sicily is evidence enough. 100  It is difficult to understand how 
Fornara reconciles this view with his belief that Demosthenes and 
3 	/ Eurymedon were also c.tv -rcsIckters in 414/3. It seems a logical conclu-
sion from his statement that the auicKpccrercs were separate from the 
regular annual strategoi that these men were not regular generals in 
this year. Or perhaps they were elected in the spring of 414, but 
later appointed as cLoTokpoxofts and removed from the board? Such a 
conclusion is suggested from his list of generals for 414/3. 101 But 
he gives no clue. However, Thucydides nowhere indicates that Demos-
thenes and Eurymedon were granted extraordinary powers similar to those 
made to Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus, although the possibility 
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cannot be discounted. 
Dover is Undecided but inclined to believe that Demosthenes 
and Eurymedon were not generals for 414/3 but pre—elected for 413/2 
and given immediate authority to act as normal strategoi, the Athenians 
waiving constitutional procedure to enable the best equipped men to  
handle a matter of such-importance. On first view such an interpret- 
ation has its attractions. 102 This is the first appearance of Eury- 
103 medon in a command since he was disgraced and fined in 424. 	He 
also had knowledge of Sicily, having gained experience as one of the 
generals with the expedition of the Archidamian War. As for Demosthenes 
the last known occasion he held office was in 418/7, 104 but he had not 
been entrusted with any major command since 424. As Westlake has 
suggested, this may have been an occasion for emergency measures, the 
situation compelling the ecclesia to resort to its experienced milit-
ary leadership. 105  But such an argument can go no further. In the 
first place the lists of generals for the years between 424 and 414 
are by no means complete. There is no way of knowing how Many times, 
between these years, Demosthenes and Eurymedon were members of. the 
strategia. For all we know they were generals for 414/3. In the 
second place, as has already been demonstrated with reference to Cleon 
and the Pylos affair of 425, the ecclesia probably had the power to 
elect and appoint new strategoi during the year, a power most likely 
N used only in exceptional circumstances. Thucydidet' phrase, kat 
r 	/ -.... 	'A ' / \ 34 1 	/ 	\ SuVarXottretS cury 'El Aovro Alfw-feEv.ii- ii-rov nAincevous a:cti 
1 
gryAbuNtrocrv(90‘.*Xci 	106 .cuis3 	may indeed refer to such a procedure. 
I .do not b?..lieve we can assume with Dover that the Athenians may have 
107 waived "constitutional procedure" 	Surely it is safer and easier 
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to believe that they may have resorted merely to "unusual procedure". 
Our lack of knowledge of the strategia must be our only firm guide-
line. 
However, it is not until Thucydides 7.47.1 in the archon 
year of 413/2, that the historian describes Demosthenes and Eurymedon 
(11 as of c TIAJV toliCift4v Tirxerait As has already been noted, Thucydides 
7.16.2 is usually cited as evidence for a strategia of these men in 
414/3.
108 Thucydides 7.16.1-2 is as follows 	FI pit , -oi3 Nuctou 
17rta- ,A37 Too-aDTa 184Xou. Oi& 'AOqvaioi (1Kot;aavres 
at, ."16* 	V Nuctav.TrapgX'tit;av -77-is-- 
-• 	0 . 	- 	- ceps ay eTepot vivapxovres aloe ev-res a uccov-rat, _7ran , avTov KE1, 0110 
irpoo-ctXop-ro AilvarEpov zcai 	Ei.00877,tor, 	 elo-ficveta, 
Ta7tat7rc4,olly TpaTcav Ee ctXUivj -tp-qc5toavTo - 17- 
'..2107parwli . TE E IC a 77  tX67011 K '(Ol' 	CLX- 0)- 	a 	 aiiri? _ 
.5.7XO• VTO 	 TE T671 AXIC1.0-0 VOZN 	 1.';:dp1"1.1.Ea0:17 1.I. 
'001PCXEOLic 	'-lfhe'Athenians-sent -reinforcements as a result of the 
-communique from Nicias. On this-understanding-the-natural-inference 
from the passage is that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were strategoi. 
Such a supposition is reasonable but the question is decided if the 
/ meaning of the word yitearXoVras in this context can be determined. 
7.43:1 we are told that when Demosthenes had resolved to attack 
Epipolae he had first to obtain the approval of the other commanders 
for his plan - , 	/ 	\ 	 k 
	
ri-e4d'ctS TcV TZ Nt(100.1 fct.t itie\AcoS 
t.)veltrx0VT115. 	Although Thucydides' chronology of Demosthenes' voyage 
to Sicily is not clear, it is not safe to date the arrival of the 
second expeditionary force, and therefore the battle for Epipolae, 
before the start of 413/2. At the end of 414 Eurymedon was sent to 
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Sicily with ten ships, 109 Demosthenes remaining at Athens to organize 
the force which was to sail in spring. By about the beginning of 
April Demosthenes was at Aegina with part of his force. 110 After 
leaving Aegina he ravaged the Laconian coast111 and arrived at Corcyra 
about mid-May. 112 It was about the turn of the Attic year when Demos-
thenesandEurymedon were engaged in attempting to levy forces at 
Thurii, 113 for about this time the Athenian commander at Naupactus, 
114 was replaced by Diphilus. 115 Conon, The natural explanation, as 
Dover has noted, 116 is that Conon was strategos for 414/3 and Diphilus 
for 413/2. Demosthenes and Eurymedon reached Sicily towards the end 
of July, 117 the battle of Epipolae taking place, according to Busolt, 
in the second week in August. 118 The events of Thucydides 7.43 occurr- 
ed in 413/2. Demosthenes and Eurymedon were certainly strategoi in 
this year, 119 and Thucydides phrase f6ZIS WCOS t./VCip•XCVrtif. is a 
reference in part to the general Eurymedon. The use of the word in 
Thucydides 7.16.2 is no different, the natural meaning of k41 
c  
SOVa
/ 
Tx0VTAS crt2) aotro, Alposchrol 	aril-AU/TO. . .. being 
"and they elected Demosthenes and Eurymedon to be co-commanders with 
him (Nicias)". 	The implication, difficult to dismiss, is that Demos- 
thenes and Eurymedon had the same official status as Nicias in 414/3, 
and were in fact strategoi. 
It is generally accepted that Menander and Euthydemus were 
elected to help Nicias during the winter of 414/3 but were given only 
temporary office and temporary command. 120 Thucydides 7.16.1-2 
supports the view that they were given temporary command. It is clear 
the historian means thatMenander and Euthydemus were elected to 
share the command with Nicias until the arrival of Demosthenes and 
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Eurymedon. But it is also clear from the narrative that this did not 
eventuate. It seems that Menander and Euthydemus did not assume 
their former rank after the arrival of the second expeditionary force. 
At 7.45.1 it is with Nicias and TOUS 4kos t.)./(filxoVrctS that Demos-
thenes obtains approval, indicating there were others apart from 
Eurymedon who had to be consulted. At 7.43.2 Demosthenes and ... 
/t 
VINUktE D a./ 4/ 14.1) PlirwApos CLI CI, FAO\ if A V tIrlraV tilX13113, V 41.1.3 	111.15 
kintroxas . This suggests that Menander had a share in the command. 
But at the debate which followed the failure at Epipolae, 121 
neither Menander nor Euthydemus is mentioned. This does not necessar-
ily reinforce the view that these men were by now inferior in status. 
It seems that Nicias and Demosthenes were the only active participants 
in the debate, but after Eurymedon finally sided with Demosthenes still 
no decision was taken. 122 Presumably, if Demosthenes and Eurymedon 
comprised a majority, Nicias would have been outvoted as he was by 
Alcibiades and Lamachus at Rhegium. 123 Although the possibility 
remains that no decision was made because Nicias was suspected of con-
cealing further information, it would be surprising. 	It would be 
stranger if Nicias did not attempt to use either Menander or Euthydemus 
for support. If one of these two, being entitled to vote, had sided 
with Nicias, the failure to reach a decision may reflect unwillingness 
by Demosthenes and Eurymedon to put the issue to a vote. 124 If 
Menander is the source of Thucydides' abundant information, which is 
possible, the attractions of such an interpretation are obvious. 125 
The three generals mentioned by Thucydides did not escape from Sicily 
and Menander, in view of the consequences resulting from the Athenians 
remaining in Sicily, may have been reluctant to reveal his own part 
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in the debate. Furthermore,if Menander and Euthydemus were strategoi 
at this time and theoretically entitled to equality in decision-
making, nevertheless they were in prestigious company. The main 
aim of Thucydides in his account of this vital debate is to compare 
the two senior strategoi and in no small way to allocate responsibil-
ity for the final disaster of the expedition. He has no use for the 
125a opinions of Menander and Euthydemus. 	Aside from the avowed aim 
of Thucydides' account, which may however explain his failure to define 
the status of Menander and Euthydemus, it must surely be close to the 
reality of the situation that what counted, first and foremost, were 
the opinions of Nicias and Demosthenes. Eurymedon took a background 
seat. It is reasonable to suppose that Menander and Euthydemus would 
be more inclined, if not forced, to do so ., leaving the decisions, as 
far as possible, with their senior and more experienced colleagues. 
Use of Thucydides 7.47-49 as evidence that Menander and Euthydemus 
cannot be regarded as strategoi is far from conclusive, and on the 
interpretation above must be regarded with scepticism. 
The further evidence of Thucydides 7.69.4 where Menander and 
■ > Euthydemus, as well as Demosthenes, are described as cum Ern Tos 
\ 3 
VS Ii2v 'Acativtvwv crfalvz i E IIEJ  11111V, cannot be dismissed, as Fornara 
suggests, by assuming that they were temporarily given that role by 
the other generals. 126 The whole question rests on whether or not 
Fornara's reasoning that there is a basic contradiction between Thucy-
dides' words of 7.16.1 and his narrative of the events in Sicily in 
the next year, is correct. It has already been admitted that while 
7.16.1 indlcates that Menander and Euthydemus were to be u‘l4X0V -rE5 
with Nicias until the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon, 7.43.1 
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suggests that after their arrival Menander and Euthydemus were still . 
/ SU.AVOVITS. Could it be that the distinction Thucydides makes 
in 7.16.1 is finer than has hitherto been supposed? That the respons-
ibilities of Menander and Euthydemus asc;ovapyok/rEl with Nicias 
would be largely eliminated by the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon, 
but that in practice, by virtue of being strategoi, they remained, if 
e only perfunctorily, suvqpxoNtres . 
In other words, they were essentially no longer ().1k.trxeq,ervs 
in 7.43.1. Demosthenes merely acted according to form, treating them 
as such in recognition of their official position. The silence of 
Thucydides about the status of Menander and Euthydemus in his account 
of the conference of 7.47-49 is perhaps best explained by this hypo- 
/ thesis,that they were no longer t./1/eINAOVTES but still strategoi, they 
were no longer concerned with the questions of operational planning 
and strategy but still retained the authority vested in their office 
as field commanders, Menander acting in this capacity in partnership 
with Demosthenes and Eurymedon at Epipolae, and both he and Euthydemus 
with Demosthenes at the last battle in the harbour. On this interpre-
tation there is no need to suppose with Dover that Menander and Euthy- 
demus were involved in command of field operations only at the discretion 
of the other generals, 127 or to believe with Fornara that an apparent 
contradiction between Thucydides 7.16.1 and the later narrative 
necessitates the assumption that at 7.69.4, where Menander and Euthy-
demus are described as TTQT1K6, the other generals had simply tempor-
arily given them that status. 
Although it cannot be asserted with certainty when Menander 
and Euthydemus (and indeed, when Demosthenes and Eurymedon) were 
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elected strategoi, whether at the assembly of 7.16.1, as is probable, 
or at some other time, the advantage of the argument here presented, 
or so it seems to me, is that the inconsistencies of Thucydides' 
account which are created by the standard viewpoint that Menander and 
Euthydemus were given both temporary office and temporary command, are 
appreciably eliminated. There is nothing to suggest that the ecclesia 
could not elect strategoi to assume temporary commands. But Thucydides' 
narrative of the events in Sicily during the archon year of 413/2 
indicate that once the temporary command of Menander and Euthydemus 
had expired, they still retained their official rank. 	They were 
temporarily sUVet.pxottES with Nicias but not temporarily Crfa -91(01 . 
It is very difficult to reduce the number of generals to 
ten in all these years, with the possible exception of 433/2, for which 
year our list of strategoi is incomplete. If my conclusions about 
the list for 441/0 are accepted there was certainly a minimum of eleven 
generals in office at the same time. Of the thirteen generals in 
office during 426/5'Procles was killed and perhaps replaced. That still 
leaves twelve strategoi. It is possible that a by-election was held 
after Demosthenes' failure in Aetolia,but this is speculation. There 
is no other evidence to indicate that any other generals were killed 
or deposed. All of them except for Hierophon and Simonides definitely 
held office in later years. Pythodorus' succession to Laches' Sicil-
ian command does not prove that Laches was cashiered. 128 Laches was 
again strategos in 418/7 and for all we know may well have been in 
most of the years of the late 420's. 	The list of eleven for 425/4 
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is more easily explained - Cleon was elected •at a by-election. 
424/3 is more complicated. Of the fourteen generals it is hard to 
know which ten comprised the board initially elected in the spring 
of 424. Indeed, if there was some reason to suppose that the Athenians 
envisaged the necessity of employing more than ten strategoi on active 
duty at the same time during the coming archon year, it would not 
seem unreasonable to conclude that more than ten were initially elected. 
As it is, ten of the fourteen, namely Demodocus, Nicias, Nicostratus, 
Hippocrates, Lamachus, Sophocles, Pythodorus, Demosthenes, Eurymedon 
and Aristeides, must be considered virtually certainties. 129 It is 
just as likely that the other four (Cleon, Thucydides, Autocles and 
Eucles) were added to the board as need arose rather than to fill 
vacancies which occurred when Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon lost 
office. Not much more can be said. It is oi course possible, but not 
inevitable, that replacements were elected for the three strategoi 
deposed after the Sicilian debacle, for Thucydides when he was dismissed 
(late 424 or early 423) and for Hippocrates after his death in the 
winter of 424. But we simply have no evidence to support the hypothesis 
that by-elections were held to replace individual strategoi who lost 
office or were killed. 
However, our information for 414/3 makes it clear that the 
Athenians did appoint extra generals as the need arose. The general-
ships of Menander and Euthydemus in Sicily cannot be explained in any 
other way. Even if the view that Menander and Euthydemus were only 
temporarily strategoi be accepted - which is as I have argued, very 
improbable due to Thucydides' reference to these men as generals after 
the arrival in Sicily of Demosthenes and Eurymedon 130 - nevertheless 
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the mere fact of their appointment demonstrates that the Athenians 
could and did increase the numerical strength of the strategia beyond 
ten in certain circumstances. Furthermore, if Thucydides 7.16.2 
means that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were also appointed at a by-
election and were therefore not already strategoi for 414/3 - which 
view of course is by no means certain - the only worthwhile conclusion 
is to suppose that, generally speaking, extra generals were elected in 
exceptional circumstances. On the one hand it cannot be categorically 
asserted that the same sort of situation, resulting in extra appoint- 
ments, existed earlier in the Peloponnesian War, but the large size 
of the board in 426/5 and 424/3 may easily be explained in this way. 
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that whenever by-elections are 
suggested in our sources they are to be explained ds the result of 
decisions reached by the Athenians to meet particular military, needs 
rather than to fill vacancies which have occurred on the board. 
By way of conclusion, in the final analysis I would suggest 
that attempts by modern scholars to explain both double representation 
and the large size of the board in some years, particularly during 
the Peloponnesian War, by postulating either by-elections when generals 
were deposed or killed, or by supposing that the ecclesia granted 
special commands to individuals, such as Cleon in 425/4 or Thucydides 
in 424/3, 132 may be misleading. In the first place many cases of 
double representation are clearly not to be explained as the result of 
one general losing office during the year and being replaced by a 
fellow-tribesman. Secondly, Thucydides nowhere specifically tells us 
that any Athenians in command of military operations held special 
positions outside the strategia, and that includes Cleon's command at 
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Pylos in 425. 	In the case of Thucydides own generalship in 424/3, 
we need to label the historian as a self-glorifying liar to dispute 
it. 	If Thucydides calls a man a general very good reasons are needed 
to doubt it. Thirdly, as I have continually emphasized, there is 
no supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the ecclesia held 
regular by-elections whenever individual strategoi lost office. 
Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the almost universal belief in 
c / the existence of a single frrpcalICCS 	airctVr-6.1V has successfully 
inhibited the development of alternative lines of enquiry into the 
phenomenon of double representation. All attention has been directed 
away from a consideration of the possibility of a fifth-century reform 
which eliminated the need for tribal representation, a reform, after 
all, of which Aristotle makes particular note in Ath Pol 61.1. Yet 
if this reform did take place in the fifth century, not only does it 
explain satisfactorily the numerous cases of double representation 
and double-doubles which are becoming increasingly nore appanant ith 
time, but it also enables the proposal of a much less ccmpacated 
solution to the problem of the size of the strategia in some years than 
those alternatives which have been constructed in recent times. Ten 
is not a magic number unless tribal representation was a constitutional 
requirement. It is not unreasonable to consider that once tribal 
representation had been done away with, presumably out of a desire to 
ensure that all the most capable Athenians would have a chance of 
election, there were no legal restrictions preventing a larger board. 
Even if the ecclesia never departed from the procedure of electing 
just ten strategoi at the annual electoral assembly and also adhered 
fairly closely to the practice of maintaining tribal representation, 
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whether as a result of tribal loyalties or a fairly even distribution 
of talent throughout the ten tribes, this does not mean that extra 
generals were not appointed in military emergencies or when leader-
ship resources were utilized to the limit. Support for such a 
practice can at least be found in Thucydides whereas the means used 
by those scholars who would attempt to limit the board to ten under 
all conditions are speculative, without foundations on direct evidence. 
CHAPTER 
Terminologies in the Sources.  
It is indeed unfortunate that Thucydides was not able to 
leave for posterity a detailed chronological history for the period 
between 477 and 441 similar to his account of the Peloponnesian War. 
As it is, his brief narration of the events of the Pentacontaetia is 
of primary importance, and our lists of strategoi from 477 to 441 are 
correspondingly very sparse and often non-existent. This has not pre-
vented some scholars from assuming that strategoi who are named by 
Thucydides (and in some instances, supplementary sources) in sole commanC. 
of Athenian forces or combined confederate forces, held a position of 
superiority within the strategia. Thus, Cimon succeeded Aristeides 
as commander-in-chief of the combined forces of the Athenian Alliance, 
/ 	 1 as arra-y•cs• TEA ,/ tAivio.4_”/ , in 477 	and such irinurFoeVrEs as T..eocrates, 
Myronides, Tolmides, Ephialtes, Pericles, Thucydides and Charitimides 
c / 
were &Tarr' s curatemiV and held the office of commander-in-chief 
of the combined forces at later dates. 2 
Again, the evidence available does demonstrate the premise 
of supremacy to be highly questionable. In 477/6 Byzantium was captur-
ed from Pausanias by the allies, /6fricove.s Tc3 iniXricik0 cfrro.iyeC,V .ics 
and in 476/5 the Athenians besiezed and captured Eion on the Strymon, 
p,,f 
qui.JV0S 	 TreCt-Til rantrOS . 4 At the battle of the Eurymedon 
River the Athenians and their allies defeated the Persians by land 
and by sea on the same day, Kip:WS 700 tvUriltSeu CrtarytOviros . 5 
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In the late 460's when Sparta appealed to Athens for help against the 
rebels at Ithome, C 41 e 4-ixo„ (the Athenians) Kiliw...% ,C5 TrpcirifVCO%/1-CS 
Tr ell OCK &I 4.  LU 
6 After the Athenians defeated the Aeginetan fleet 
in 460/59 they invested the island, AELJK.p4TvOSi35:T4A100 
/k 
TrratilYec."V1-OS : 7- and in the same year they invaded the Megarid s .1vilu.i6.10‘") 
WirftTlyivreS. . 8 Two months after the battle at Tanagra, in one of 
the early years of the 450's, Athens defeated a Boeotian army at 
i k Oenophyta, rivrividoo alTartis-ClOw-roci, 9 and some time after the surrender 
of Aegina, kik! ifiXoa-Zvvisov TrEfdirAzudesav 3A491,Zol 10,1)./Osou Toa 
TajActico rarvr03vr-cs 10 In 454/3 the Athenians reduced Sicyon, cfi . 
" 
MeiKASCLIS TGU .7..ciieurrreti C-IrrirOuvrOs ,
11 and in 451/0, in conjunction 
, . with their allies, launched a large expedition against Cyielus, kip.k.:Vcs 
crrpea-pcDOV ICS . 	In 450/49 Athens Was again involved in conflict 
/k 	 t 	/ in Boeotia,ToArOco Te3 TrriroArros, 13 and in 447/6 quelled 
the revolt of Euboea,Diraf_DOS (ircl.T1/0vTv5. 14 This is a complete 
list of Thucydides' phraseology used in reference to Athenian strategoi 
from 477 until (but not including) the revolt of Samos in 441/0. There 
is nothing here to indicate different levels of authority within the 
strategia or to suggest that a single Athenian officer (rather than 
all Athenian generals) filled the position left vacant by the Spartan 
commander-in-chief when Sparta lost the inveViix. of the Greek League 
forces. 
It should be noted that the historian mentions several import-
ant military expeditions without naming Athenian generals. We do 
not know from Thucydides who commanded the Athenian forces which reduced 
Carystus and Naxos in the 470's and Thasos in the 460's. 	Nor do we 
know if any generals were involved in attempting the settlement at 
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Ennea Hodoi in 465, or which strategoi led the Athenian army at the 
battle of Tanagra, or who commanded the large forces committed to 
Egypt in the 450's. Some names are provided by other sources. 
According to Plutarch, Cimon was a general in the war against Thasos, 15 
and Herodotus associates two otherwise unknown strategoi, Sophanes 
and Leagros, with the same war. 16 Pericles may have been a general 
at Tanagra, although this is not inevitable from Plutarch, Pericles 
10.2. 17 There is evidence that a Charitimides-was a general with 
the Athenian expedition to Egypt. 18 It is not insignificant that 
Thucydides only names the five strategoi, Cimon, Leocrates, Myronides, 
Tolmides and Pericles, in his account of the earlier years (down to 
441) of the Pentacontaetia and that he never names more than one 
general in command of a particular mission. But without supporting 
evidence it is certainly not safe to assume that these generals were 
superior in powers to their colleagues or occupied special positions 
as a result of Athens succeeding Sparta as rituveof the Greek allies. 
A more satisfactory explanation follows if, as is very possible, 
Thucydides relied to some extent on oral tradition as a means of deter-
mining who were the Athenian generals involved in the various military 
operations of the early Pentacontaetia. As Dover has noted, 19  popular 
tradition magnifies the impressive individual. CiniOn was the fore-
most politician it Athens during the 470's and 460's. 	In exactly 
the same way and for exactly the same reason that Herodotus neglected 
to mention the participation of generals other than Themistocles, 
Aristeides and Xanthippus during the Persian invasion of 480, -.they 
were *politically predominant at Athens and the men most responsible 
for the strategy adopted to defeat Xerxes - only Cimon's involvement 
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as a general in the military operations during the 470's and at 
the battle of the Eurymedon are preserved. 
If any conclusions are to be drawn about generals named 
by Thucydides on several occasions as active during the mid-fifth 
century, such as Myronides and Tolmides, we should perhaps consider 
the possibility that tradition preserved their connection with particu-
lar military campaigns because of their political importance rather 
than as the result of their possession of superior authority within 
the strategia. The participation of other strategoi, less distinguish-
ed or not significant politically, was forgotten. °tic may of course 
object to this interpretation on the grounds of the chance that the 
Athenians appointed only one general for all the missions mentioned 
by Thucydides forwhich he also names a commander. However, as 
already noted, without exception during the early Pentacontaetia 
either just one strategos is named by the historian or no names are 
provided, and although there are numerous instances beginning in the 
430's in which one strategos commanded Athenian troops, this was by 
no means the rule either in the years immediately before or during 
the Peloponnesian War. Furthermore, whereas there are isolated 
instances where Thucydides details Athenian forces on campaign during 
the Peloponnesian War without mentioning their commanders, such cases 
are rare20 and by no stretch of the imagination constitute a similar 
sizeable proportion of all missions described, as during the Penta-
contaetia. It is in fact very unusual for Thucydides not to name 
all the generals or to indicate how ma are involved with each mission. 
In view of the considerations outlined above, I would suggest 
that we cannot conclude, for example, that Cimon was the sole 
184. 
Athenian general at the battle of the Eurymedon .21 Thucydides' 
information for the early Pentacontaetia was restricted by factors 
beyond his control and he was unable to maintain the strict attention 
to detail for this period which is so typical of the rest of the 
History. 	It would indeed seem unlikely that Thucydides would delib- 
erately omit the names of the generals who fought, for example, at 
Tanagra in about 457. It was certainly not a battle for which Athenian 
generals who took part would later wish to be associated. 	If, as is 
possible, (but not probable), Pericles was a strategos at Tanagra, it 
is just as likely that Pericles himself was responsible for suppress-
ing his connection with the defeat rather than Thucydides. If it be 
accepted tha Thucydides' information about individual strategoi of the 
mid-fifth century is in all likelihood limited to the more eminent 
and better known politicians, it is nevertheless still necessary to 
stress that a certain amount of caution is required. Unavoidably, 
any judgment is based on subjective criteria and does permit a 
variety of opinion. Hammond, for example, would have us believe that 
when Herodotus or Thucydides says that one general was appointed we 
should assume this to be correct, even for the period of the early 
Pentacontaetia. Dover, on the other hand, suggests that when Thucy-
dides describes military actions even as late as 431 which involved 
a single strategos but which were on a large scale, this merits 
seriously questioning whether only one general was appointed. It is 
impossible to accept, for example, ' from Thucydides' phrase, 'Aoa i va./..1)/ 
•
, 
ircu4v.tsi . *E6-2 patA0V 	1ipIKXOLYc Tb0 =cot f trtrcu 
22 srpunicoovrcs , that all the other generals were left in Athens in 
23 the autumn of 431 with nothing to do. 	The problem does not therefore 
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allow a conclusive solution. However, if it be considered within 
the terms I have suggested, the answer would seem to be a compromise 
between the opposite views of Hammond and Dover. The weakness in the • 
viewpoint expressed by Hammond is the possibility that Thucydides' 
information for the mid-fifth century was limited, and the fact that 
Thucydides selects particular incidents of the Pentacontaetia to indi-
cate the progress of Athens towards imperialism and does not narrate 
any of them in full detail. On the other hand, precisely because 
of Thucydides' scrupulous attention to detail, where he names only 
one general in command of larger forces during the years of his adult 
life, (including the 430's) the probability that we are dealing with 
first-hand information cannot be overlooked. Pericles may well have 
had sole command of the mission to the Megarid in 431. 24 
For the period of Pericles' political supremacy and the 
Peloponnesian War, roughly the last forty years of the fifth century, 
literary and epigraphic evidence for the Athenian strategia is much 
more plentiful than for earlier years. But the abundance of evidence 
after 440 is only relative to the lack of evidence prior to 440. 
Certain evidence, particularly modes of expression and terminologies 
used by Thucydides in reference to generals has, in the past, been 
thought to demonstrate the existence of positions of superiority on 
the board. 25 It is certainly true that it is not unusual in both 
literary and epigraphic sources. for expressions to emphasize one 
'general more than his colleagues. However, both Dover and Fornara 
have convincingly refuted the orthodox viewpoint by challenging' the 
. assumption on which it is based, the supposed technical precision con- , 
.tained in the expressions,..and.have explained the emphasis given to 
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individuals at the expense of others as the product of entirely 
different considerations • 26 
The problem is simply this. Although there are many instances 
where no one strategos among a group listed is given any kind of 
emphasis, 27 there are nevertheless particular deviations of sufficient 
number and consistent construction in terms of types of words used, 
where a single general is emphasized, to warrant explanation. As far 
as Thucydides is concerned, his usual mode of expression when more 
than one strategos was appointed to a command is to name the generals 
without special emphasis to any, 28 as in 1.45.2 - iCr T par7hICL 
611' A Ci K 	6 Kuiwros ;Cal .11671120i 6 
'Ka), Ifpwreac 6 'E71- 1 ,:),,:noc; 	in 3.86.1 - 	'AerivdEot erKocrt pai3s- o-TeiXav 
>21KeXtav Kal 
Timt E ticb iX tjTo u 
AariToToll MeXalm;vct, trrpa-rrriim alt-ri-ov teal XapotOqv 
a ; and in 3.91.1 - 	oi 'tkthiltlot 
Tptcbcorra 12E11 Yarn Lfcr-reaait Trepi 
IleX07r6vvqcov, jiv a-i-pa-r4-yeL 1.177two-flevi1c -re Li 
'AXIcta0Jvou; tad, 	lIpotc;\.7);.6 _ .(Deacipoo. A variant of this is at 
1.117.2 _ 	etc Tc7nt 'A07)..4;tv 	repo:" 'Fr a:: 017E 07 11 9 riCal, 
Teo-crapcbcom-a ply al ,ae-ra 13 ,)Lvoitt,Sou Kai "A7vwv05 Kai; (Do /v./unto; 
V riES• ErliOat 	al pera ito77roX4t02l Ka& /-,vrtmAcovs., 
Thucydides also sometimes names just one strategos but indicates the 
presence of others by mentioning the numbers involved and using the 
3 / 	 > pronoun curros , as at 3.19.1 - 	AarrieXjci. fr /varroV co.i .rov 
.N I . Apart from the use of the auros formula there is another crrrlx+DY. 
common terminology found not only in ThucydideS but In epigraphic 
sources as well which again provides the name of just one general and 
refers to the others generically, with or without making mention of 
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the number, as at 1.62.4 - Kft,\X(t 'xs 	l<2 ./  
c 	 c/ srp.rvir&s ize,A et v va rxov•Es ..., 	4.54.2 - 	06-repcV 
guv4e1s-cly irpCs Aliktictv KoCI irC‘OS i.:%(Cf.prX0V1T4.3 	, and IC i2 296, line 
e 	/ , 39 -ZoKpecr]Li hc.:X(titi K4t k.i/Vd.rx0Ti. 28a0ther less common and some-
times unique expressions fall loosely, 29 within this category, for 
c example at 2.58.1 - 	Niocic1/43 Kcti 10■Eorroprits. 	PcXeiviccs, 
/ 	t / t).r .r-i5ctraVe t K1E-5 IrErfeAfe CS , 1.57.6 - . . . jAr xssTpc/L-rc ti ro2, 
, AvKiy-iti6LJoC pE -C ) (1.1■1■4-iy. AE4,-1:1. inparlita/3i'm j Xenophon , Hellenica, 1. 5.20 
1.1EA, rt,OV'clA),(JV Tircurit.i.)%1 , and IC i2 105, - K-(co.,:v ...4(Kero ... 
■ 	‘ 	t 	, / line 5, - crra.3rEicg, f[0].spi-x-- 4.. UTETI•AEcs . 
It is no longer safe to consider that terminologies which 
emphasize one strategos indicate his legal superiority over the others 
referred to by an ordinal number or generically, because, as has been 
shown by Dover and Fornara, not only are these various terminologies 
used interchangeably with each other, but are also used interchangeably 
with the expressions which list the names of all the generals without 
any emphasis being placed on one of them. In short, these terminologies 
are not used consistently or carefully, which is the basic prerequisite 
necessary for concluding that they were meant to be technically pre-
cise when used either in literary or epigraphic sources. 10  There are 
several conspicuous examples. At Thucydides 1.61.1, for example - 
16:14\\ (kV WV16.-Ai(600 /1'p/it/Jr-re Ce0T\O 5- 1-rctry4/ ... 	The 
same generals on the same mission are again described at 1.62.4 as 
\ 	\ < c / keki‘,X 143 	7,/ /k-earit60,/ err curc kik( got soltvovrE5. As Fornara 
notes, 31  the two formulaki expressions are interchangeable and hence 
no different in meaning, technically. At Thucydides 4.54.2, as 
previously noted, the historian names Nicias, and his colleagues are 
188. 
/ 
1CO5 	 . Earlier in the narrative the commanders of this 
same expedition are listed in the following way - t(rrckTilmi 
/ 	• 	A , 
d.,r3v 	k' I/Qs 	At ioircure Kai IN1 iee rpck ros 	4i'zirr.tqc•t. , 5 	gr-C41; 
:E3 ToX,p(40. 32 Therefore these two types of usage (at 4.53.1 and 
4.54.2) are equivalent. 	Fornara Concludes from thi s , and I think 
rightly, that all three categories of terminology here mentioned are 
interchangeable. 33 If this is so the phraseology used by Thucydides 
at 1.61.1, 1.62.4 and 4.54.2 cannot mean that either Callias or Nicias 
were superior to their respective colleagues, because 4.53.1 clearly 
indicates exactly the opposite, except if the assumption be accepted 
that the first named in a list is always the legal superior of the 
rest, which assumption is easily refuted. 	At Thucydides 2.23.2 the 
historian lists some generals employed on a mission around the Pelo- 
ponnese - isri)c, n(yEA 	Vetridvcc 	C Elo/c-4/u 
) 	
/ 	 / 	C
Ert1KAE,Cuc1.:;1<iptcris 0 • 	£1,10 	The order of names is diff- 
erent in IC i2 296, lines 30 and 31 - STrtiriVelS 20K lekrEci halkuuT 
TrinTLI A'I ssc-vcs.7 kcyNo/vci 	 . 	Furthermore, these generals 
I .- 
i<Ecti xTuv 11)pSri and 2ck rc(rjil kOoldix KCt[ X44evetpx011 , 34 which 
reinforces the interpretation above expressed in relation to the 
variety of reference in Thucydides. 
One does not have to look far in Thucydides to discover more 
examples involving the &tyros formula and the verb cruval)x4.4 or noun 
crokti)Kuvi . 	To deal with the former category first, at 2.79.1 - 
p n/ cv, e 	/its 	 / tb-yir,"-1 E --r c i tov 0 Tr' co ifrcS savrcS. At 2.79.7 Thucy- 
- dides reccrds the death of Xenophon and his colleagues but merely 
/ 	 c 	 / states, airebaticv 	avTLOst ... K(11 01 crrrectri Mcv/T-Cs 	Prior to 
/ 	c 
CU icc.11 itrierZas 0 
are referred to later in the inscription as Kai l kivc 	(pc 
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this disaster in the Chalcidice the three generals Xenophon, 
Phanomachos and Nestiodoros accepted the surrender of Potidaea - 
• • • OUT ilq; 	74-1)00440 '-'0.1 
 •;,* e.7 p L 	 1/..., a (T Can '70 	T paT717 0 
.T W 	qi'CliCer -roiscry,' it:J.1 Te -ratfitz..m,, 	 T E Tij 
i-cd `Ea- 7Loaowr7, 1.Apto- Tox.XEreou Ka). (i)a.nucixrp 	 oi 
Irpo r_3;u1,7%) . . 	hint here of the superiority of Xenophon, yet 
there is no reason to believe that these three strategoi were not the 
\ c 
same as those at Thucydides 2.79.1. 36 At 3.3.2 - $0, Evna(ii s 
dt:ivioc rpircs cto.rcs vi/rxrflaTI. Thucydides makes it quite clear that 
these generals made decisions collectively and shared equally in the 
command. This much is at least obvious in his sentence : 
0:1va7ot ot) rcai: i'o-repov KaTa-,TX€t".o- avTts. 	pov, cisT;IivXav . „1.1.ev oc , 
t I 	T Tv0: T A T - _ 	. _ 
-.76Xepol , Kat) a. (111T 	36a • and when the Mytilenians offered terms, of 
k 
 
I. 	A 	/ Offa,-r•IY01 114h/ /vmsocipratt-ov cuts E 	. 37 
There is still some debate and disagreement about the exact 
meaning of the autos formula, or to be more specific, there are diff-
ering views as to a precise translation', even among scholars who agree 
• that the terminology implies nothing more than collegiality. 38  Accord-
/ ing to Dover the cw-tos formula contains within itself a concessive 
implication. He maintains that when Pericles, for example, is'des-
Cribed as 45%.-KaTLS cluros by Thucydides, this is not to indicate that ...? 
Pericles had superior authority but "intended to remind us that he 
did not". 39 Thucydides, therefore, is stating that Pericles was only 
one of ten. Dover suggests that a passage in Aeschines 2.178 and in 
Herodotus 6.103.1 reinforces his interpretation. 40  Thus, the 
/ 	 ■ 	 . / sentence in Aeschines, Oticaros cturos Tr.113Ei)dra.SijOVOS T45 
190. 
Evauvas VI LIA,i, he translates : "although there were nine others with 
me on the embassy, I am the only one .,.," and at the other example 
in. Herodotus , Irc./ a.-_ I-4 scts srpa.TiVsOt\ ccr0 S qv 
1 	., 
, the historian is emphasizing that Niltiades was only one 
of ten generals. Fornara argues that the formula CI V'(X (ordinal) 
ai.:1-05 indicates that the person named is in some sense more notable 
than his colleagues, but that it neither makes no statement about 
legal authority or the lack of it, nor defines the nature of the pre-
dominance of O-E.7101-. 41 Therefore, according to Fornara, Herodotus 
6.103.1 is emphasizing that of the ten generals Miltiades was one, 
rather than that Miltiades was only one of ten. 42 On this interpre- 
tation the phrase is not concessive, and in Aeschines 2.178 the con-
cessive force in the sentence is supplied by the word poVes rather 
than the phrase bEcarcz cj!iris . 43 
- Fornara's interpretation does in fact seem the more prefer- 
, A 	 > able on the general grounds that 0 bi4vc:ipunDs. (or nEpatres. )a.oros is 
more adequately explained as a result of NE's, v c: being in some way or 
for some reason distinctive, (but not legally so), rather than, alter-
natively, because Thucydides wished to remind us that 0 trZ0/0... had no 
superiority. Why would the historian do this when everyone knew 
anyway that strategoi always shared equally in command of missions 
for which more than one general was appointed? 	Moreover, even if 
we assume for a moment that this is Thucydides' intention, and •the 
phrase in question is concessive, there is nevertheless a certain 
ambiguity_ in stressing (by naming) the participation of 	2i./(.7„ which 
ambiguity disappears if we consider that the phrase is not in itself 
concessive. The objection to Dover's interpretation 44 gains in force 
191. 
upon examination of his statement that "there is a difference between 
> I 
4-1-0(Lnlyv Tres ea,:rcs used of a man in joint command of an expedition, 
when the writer is informing us how many generals were in command, 
/ 	> i and 6srpccriv•i.0V haiect7ros: cwrcs. when the reference is to a man's relation-
ship to a whole board for its whole year of office. u45 The phrase 
.1Lit .roS aTA is used twice by Thucydides and both times in reference 
to Pericles. 	At Thucydides 1.116.1, rsi"firKOVra. aE th-Wel 	N 
TECCqrSi TirucAo0S kKaroc) ct:■/r00 TiTaniratros eVavimvelicco/... rt 
There is no reason to believe that Thucydides is here using the termin-
ology any differently than in the other instances which involved 
fewer generals unless it can be shown that as many as ten generals 
did not participate in this action against Samos. However I there is 
supplementary evidence which indicates that ten Athenian strategoi 
were involved in the same campaign. 46 The idea that Thucydides' 
phraseology is meant to indicate that Pericles was one of the ten 
generals employed against Samos has support and Dover's argument that 
3 / there are two distinct usages of the curros formula, that the phrase 
/ &carobs ourcS is to be distinguished from the other phrases where 
/ the number with eturos is smaller than ten, is weakened. In brief, 
if, as in all likelihood, ten strategoi participated in the war against 
Samos, Thucydides 1.116.1 is not describing the relationship of 
Perieles to the whole board for the whole 'year. 
The other example of Veed-csaZ45 is at Thucydides 2.13.1. 
›N 	/ 	/ Pericles is described as 67-pokTivres 	AoisictioV ofolvoSnAmos, but in 
this instance not as a general on campaign with nine colleagues. The 
context within which the phrase is used is as follows. The Spartans 
were preparing to invade Attica and Pericles considered it possible 
192. 
that Archidamus might bypass his estate without ravaging it, either 
for the purpose of creating prejudice in Athens against him and his 
strategy and thereby to the detriment of Athens' war effort, or for 
reasons of personal friendship. Pericles therefore publicly relinquish-
ed ownership of his property and urged preparations for war. Has 
Thucydides merely taken the opportunity to inform us that Pericles was 
one of the ten generals or is this a reference to Pericles' relation-
ship to the other generals for the whole year and a reminder that 
Pericles was not superior? Either idea is compatible with the context. 
However, if it is the latter idea we must accept that there is a 
/ single instance where the use of the aorcS formula is to be isolated 
from others of the same type, for it has already been shown that the 
/ use of e#Elcoros aorcS in Thucydides 1.116.1 is unlikely to be a reminder 
that Pericles was not superior, a'definitiou of his "relationship" to 
/ the whole board. 47 Another example of 6EkarcS ctoros , although not 
In Thucydides and not in reference to strategoi, certainly fits 
Fornara's interpretation much more satisfactorily than it does Dover's. 
Xenophon 2.2.17 s tates , 	ire/ (Theramenes) 	4- 13 cure( 
)/ Us /Mk E ),QiittOVQ. au-royal-Ler Vkitils OWS . If 62katos is used con-
cessively to emphasize the collegiality of the ambassadors it was 
unnecessary for Xenophon to do so at this point for he later says that 
3 	 > 
all of them were ctOrOgraiCTES Trer Tr/T. 48 It is more likely 
that the historian has simply emphasized the participation of the 
most significant member of the delegation, Theramenes. 49 
Dover. and Fornana arrive at the same conclusions, both argu-
ing for strict collegiality in the strategia. Their difference over 
the precise translation of the GLOTO/S formula is a fine one, but in 
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favour of Fornara is the fact that on his interpretation all instances 
of the formula conform in meaning. Furthermore, the fact that the 
formula is used in the same way as other terminologies which contain 
an eponym and generic reference to other strategoi (such terms are 
interchangeable) 50 suggests that the same conclusions should apply to 
/ theauros formula that apply to the other terminologies. According 
to Dover the eponym in these terminologies is the man who for any 
reason is uppermost in the mind of the writer at the time of writing, 
whether the reason be that the man denominated is more impressive than 
the others, or because the writer recorded habitually in the same terms 
as his predecessor in secretarial office or in the terms which he 
had often heard a particular group of officials referred to, or because 
1 the writer himself considered one man more noteworthy than the rest? 
I would suggest that Dover's remarks are equally applicable to strategoi 
N  who are the eponym in i)e?,/cx (ordinal)culTo/s . I do not think we 
can safely conclude, as does Fornara, 52 that all strategoi so described, 
such as Cleippides and Lysicles, were emphasized because they were 
the most significant of the three or five appointed. It is possible 
that Thucydides had recourse to inscriptional evidence which named 
only one of several generals in some of these instances, or, as may 
well have been the case in Thucydides 1.116.1, that he copied (or 
rephrased to suit his purposes) the generic references rather than 
the complete list or used verbal descriptions he often heard. This 
is not to say that Thucydides used eponyms carelessly, but that he 
emphasized certain strategoi because they were for some reason upper- 
rs„ 
most in his mind at the time he wrote. Naturally enough, generals 
such as Pericles and Nicias were often so emphasized: But the fact 
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that eponyms in terminologies were often indeed the more significant 
men does not prove that all of them were. It merely proves that 
these strategoi were the more important to Thucydides, surely differ-
ent to assuming that the historian wished to emphasize the partici-
pation in events of particular generals "because they were the more 
significant men, the natural leaders". 53 A good example in point is 
the different eponym used by Xenophon and Lysias in reference to the 
\ same election of strategoi in 406. According to Xenophon, Criruorp..15 
! / ak0Vilb 4A0OS KCIALA/4..., but LYsias emphasizes Thrasyllus 
rather than Conon - ro\.!s liEJAE,7- pcs,s(./AXcu N/Ka MEI-a: 54 Therefore, 
emphasis given by Thucydides to Cleippides and Lysicles, for example, 
only proves that they were for some reason foremost in Thucyclides' 
mind, not that they were necessarily the more eminent of the strategoi 
appointed. 
/ 	3 / In conclusion, the difference between tirPwreVC4-Jv Tres twits 
1 
and criTo.-ov‘Z./ as<ans aoros, , as expressed by Dover, is more apparent 
c than real. Furthermore, the only difference between c 	irrirc5.1 
./ aticaf6.5 qtrs and, for example, 8 5i■kv/0. K ,Cti 07 1.1Vil/ ov-rvs or ff) 
! c V i N 
KOA 0( CO1/41■0( , - is that the additional information about the number of 
generals involved is provided within the former usage but not within 
the latter. It is certainly abundantly clear that the verb 6uv4x,..-) 
and the noun 4.0■44))041/ are used in our sources as a reference to 
officials who shared equally in command or authority with the eponym. 55 
However, the discovery by D.W. Bradeen of the hitherto unknown title 
ckfx0V TO vcw1ruct3 on an Athenian casualty list of the late fifth 
century, and his conclusion that the term is not equivalent to 
arTeros or Vctuctrkos, but was most likely used to refer to commanders 
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elected by the fleet at Samos_ in the last decade of the fifth century, 
has prompted the recent attempt by B. Jordan to identify a military 
office which ranked immediately below the strategia. 56 His contention 
is that some Athenian commanders mentioned by Thucydides who have 
hitherto been regarded as strategoi occupied a position he calls "a 
military grade of archon", which was a subordinate rank. 
Jordan considers that the only difference between the term 
vetockcxos used by Xenophon and the title of aNycoV ro %Atonic:0 is one 
of nomenclature and not of fact. 57 Although it is primarily my pur- 
pose here to comment on the examples Jordan draws from Thucydides, 
it should be noted that of the evidence he uses, one terminology, that 
), of 01)(0.1-reS, is drawn from Thucydides and inscriptional evidence but 
not from Xenophon, and the alternative term Vaucvcs is drawn from 
Xenophon but not from Thucydides. The question is of some importance 
for if the vaoorxel of Xenophon and the atKorrE5 of Thucydides all belong 
), 	A 	A to the same military office of gpev ro %Atonic° , Xenophon may con-
ceivably be used to support the proposition that some commanders 
mentioned by Thucydides are not strategoi. It is certainly clear from 
Xenophon 1.6.29 that the three nauarchs at the battle of Arginusae 
were distinct from the strategoi. Even if vatkr-cs and af.xov TO 
vaorico cannotbe accepted as identical, this merely means, on Jol:daa's 
view, that there were two subordinate ranks instead of one. Neverthe-
less, Thucydides alone cannot be used as conclusive evidence for the 
existence of one of these subordinateoffices. Without the support 
of Xenophon Jordan's whole hypothesis is seriously weakened. 
Jordan claims that as the esszntial element in the titles 
under discussion is arxwv, whenever this word appears in some form 
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or other in defining the command of an officer, here is evidence 
attesting one of the alternative terminologies used (apxoVrts), 
whether the title consists of the participial nouni.ipv or its 
verbal equivalent coupled with a prepositional phrase or a word in 
the genitive. Thus statements in Thucydides 7.31:4, 	iff 
and 7.34. . i pxc AlaU rrQKr0  
1:1■1}T-C3v A(41}.10. , and 7. 
• 	/ 
3, c 	3Aen1vaict eic 
20.1 , 	)■col kcti 
TiS 	trcier-o 
/ XclriK WZrt. Ivy 
Ti-c)3ALIco evetmz, all mean that the commanders mentioned were not 
strategoi but held a subordinate rank. Similarly Aristoteles and 
Hierophon can no longer be regarded as strategoi for 426/5, 58 nor 
Dieitrephes for 414/3, 59 nor the ten colleagues of Archetratus sent 
with him to Potidaea in 433/2. 60 Jordan considers that evidence of 
a more positive character is provided by the careers of the two command-
ers Diomedon and Leon. During the summer of 4.12,diYtrrikcl) v9E.-S 
Ac/.10v; Ct../ 	ALV ktit 4,(0i.lAti..1V. 61 Diomedon and 
Leon were apKovms at this time. Later in the winter of 412/1, 
TE &a,8aX67..-roi- Kai cl)p&txoz , Tozi 
.11cIfyriv(Spou .-rrapb.uo-av Tc px5).7 
:s../Ctptill,187,W, C'Ll, 7E'77E10frall 	o-TpaTvoi)s 
pri....rasvaLs 	iottg8orTa 	ica. AjovTa • 62 -Upon the deposition from office 
of Phrynichos and Scironides, Leon and Diomedon were elected strategoi 
not only to fill the vacancies on the board of generals but to relieve 
the cashiered generals of their command. Similarly, Strombichides 
began his career as ancp ireAt in the spring of 413, 63 but had been 
. elected strategos by the winter of 412/1. 64, 
However, Jordan does not isolate all the cases in Thucydides 
where the same terminology is applied to other Athenian commanders - 
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that is es fInVC ttAit , _ ne, Tqc 1.1,Jvvv. Thucydides 1.51.4 states, 
Keptcupatoic 	 o- i 2. •c ai 
" 	• - 
TWV 	 7)pye Mai/K(0v TE 6 A.ewypou Kat. . 	. 
_ 	z;a9 	(.) A CW76 p0 • • • .2 IG 	295, although naming Glaucon with 
-two colleagues, Metagenes and Dracontides, verifies that Glaucon was 
strategos on this mission to Corcyra. 65 	In the winter of 430/29, 
eirtitoi ve,os: ETT'Et ■ •:70/ elice (i I jk‘Es/ -trErki 1TEXon- / 	 rev kg‘t 43011,t 
cirp Xr-12(0 
ck 	c 
Os oppAottz vCS E.K NO.0 rc 	 66 Later in the summer 
of 429, Phormio is still at Naupactus. 
6 ; Phormio as the man 03 lrxe. 'Tay 
_ cluttex.roV 7z4 67 - 	r r 
Thucydides' phrase, describing 
v Tr k-u-V CcrEp /N. F_A KTM VEL:s 
surely cannot mean that Phormio was no longer 
strategos. The historian is merely reminding us that Phormio was 
"in command of the twenty Athenian ships stationed off Naupactus". 
Similarly, in Thucydides 4.66.2, Demosthenes and Hippocrates are 
described as 'loos T4‘..t." 'AGt1 vq(L4jv.(70:7-12045, and later when the two 
:generals -split 'their forces, VjaKocriots, (7.) triroxpcir7jc 
. 	 . 
• • 	 -A -yy..toa-Gevotn - o - -4-7- jpou -o- rpaTwoD -"II XaTati`r 
• .7TE *LX01 ical frepot -68 •;repi7roXot • . • 	Thucydides does in fact use the 
terminology Jordan would have us believe is used to describe a sub-
ordinate rank, in reference to strategoi on campaign. 
Can we safely assume, in contradiction to Jordan's hypothesis, 
that Thucydides only uses the terminology in describing strategoi? 
The assumption would be unnecessary if there was supplementary evidence 
for generalships of those commanders who are not called strategoi by 
Thucydides and referred to only by the terms under discussion. The 
fact that these terms are used to describe generals on campaign makes 
nearly inevitable the inference that when the same terminology is 
9 
xcv 
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applied to commanders who are not specifically named as strategoi, 
these commanders are also generals. It is an entirely different 
matter to assert that when terminologies, which are applied to known 
strategoi, are applied to commanders who are not explicitly named as - 
strategoi, this is an indication that such commanders were not generals 
but occupied a subordinate rank. 
5/ In many cases where Thucydides uses the words cipxu.) or 
3/ e.rxicv in their various derivative forms he is describing the "command" 
of a general officer rather than the "office" of a commander. After 
the death of the general Charoiades in Sicily in the summer of 426, 
KcNeo 16 co k () 4Si -r-c2 3Aeivit(Lov r-rrya I- EP/ iaaes awe zocticc-si,-,-4/ 
c, 	), 	 \ 	69 acAtil) Laches is described as (trtActtv Exwv c3v VEWV 9 V(Txrpt 
The whole sentence, in fact, would make little sense unless Laches 
was general. Indeed, Laches was certainly a strategos, 70  the historian 
merely emphasizing that Laches now had sole command of the fleet. 
\ In the winter of 426/5 the general Pythodorus arrived in Sicily, till 
■ / 	c 	CU / 
TqS VQ35 Oli XV. WV koC0 	0 PictprIrxEv. 71 lie had come to succeed Laches 
in command of the fleet. 6 	irvetulos 3/iS1 . ..)04.)v Tie To2 AAiroS  
A. 	es 	/ 72 
11,h/ Vv' Nea V . 	Laches had by now been relieved of the command 
and Pythodorus had sole command. 72a In Thucydides 4.28.3, when 
), Nicias offers ESifTcATO rc .;271-1LIAki AFO, he is not resigning from 
office, but relinquishing his claim to a command, as strategos, at 
Pylos. 73 Again, in Thucydides 7.16.1, when the Athenians read the 
dispatch of Nicias and his request to be removed from command, the 
A Demos 	agpaoset.v Tic eve's. Nicias is not requesting to be 
removed from office but from the command in Sicily. 
In this context, the generalships of Leon and Diomedon 
199. 
during the summer of 412/1 cannot be disputed, as Jordan asserts, 
by maintaining that the terminology , used to describe them,cui 	, 
precludes the possibility. It has already been demonstrated that such 
terminology is used of strategoi, the only difference in this case 
being that they are not named as strategoi by Thucydides until later 
in the year. If they were in fact elected as strategoi after Phryn-
ichUs and Scironides were relieved of command, Thucydides makes no 
reference to it. Furthermore, it is not inevitable that Phrynichus 
and Scironides were removed from office. Perhaps in this case the 
phrase,InkrAusEv 0 eittos Is 11.0(9s , 74 has this meaning, but the same 
words, used in Thucydides 7.16.1, do not. It has been suggested that 
Phrynicos held a special position at Samos, implied by the words 
T 75 EXTrilrEl S 14.13,1 19)105 ep/ , 	that Leon and Diomedon, when sent to 
76 assume this command, were sent as airrispt Ez-- 1 TGS VuuS , meaning 
a particular command granted to strategoi by a special vote of the 
ecclesia. 77 If special competencies of strategoi had become regular-
ized by this time and if this instance is an indication of such a 
practice, Leon and Diomedon were certainly not elected to office to 
replace PhrynichLs and Scironides, but as strategoi were assigned a 
special competency. Irrespective of whether this was the case or not, 
the clear implication of Thucydides 8.54.3 is that Leon and Diomedon 
were sent to Samos because they were strategoi, not because it had 
been necessary to elect them to office first and subsequently appoint 
them to this command. Similarly, the description of Strombichides as 
a general 78 is less an indication that he had been elected to office 
some time before the winter of 412/1, than that he was already strategos 
when in command (x€) of eight ships earlier in the year. 79 In 
or TrpqrlscovTDS 
n ? EA.11,CL.5.15 TrTti 
1. c0 , at 6. 
LS O'grErciV 	 irx£ 410IXOT41S c/ 
105.2; 714-E N\E. 1106cAiL.froo 	&II MCA re L.! KVI 
, which warrant some comment. 	At 5.116.3; 104,1 
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short, we have two further instances where Thucydides uses the words 
uov gro to describe strategoi, but with the difference that they 
can be verified as generals in military commands later, rather , than 
earlier, in the year. 
There are several other examples where Thucydides uses terms 
h h 
C such as Low ?To_ or rrx€ 	rather than 	'T-pccris'elli 
3 / 
61104NOTOO CIyOVIAAA(..., and at 7.20.1; ...ci )AGT/Luoi 	vilv5 
TrilLic0Oret, iliTEAQV k114\ Xeipttact TCV "Arre,X)%e&41:,reo 	 Jordan 
has made no mention either about the position occupied by Philocrates 
in his command at Melos, or about the official status of Pythodorus, 
Laispodias and Demaratus. Philocrates was in command of reinforce-
ments to Melos, although Thucydides does not say whether he was the 
replacement for the generals Cleomedes and Teisias, 80  or supplemented 
them. Clearly he was sent to command Athenian hoplites rather than 
 a naval squadron and cannot be classified as an ctpxwv 11.4.1 ■/ 	81 
The combination of Thucydides 6.105.2 and Aristophanes, Birds, 1569, 
is evidence enough for a strategia of Laispodias in 414/3. Although 
the inference is not inevitable that Aristophanes is mocking Laispodias 
both as a general and as an example of lack of elegance, the reference, 
in the context, would make less sense if Laispodias was not a general 
in the year of the performance of the play, 414. 82 It follows that 
Pythodorus and Demaratus were also strategoi. Diodorus 13.9.2 states: 
el 	 / 
ell/Q.101, ..11)(cWotiveL TroTEiS CtTre
/
(reActv ked 	kXc‘. 	Irc V 
This is a reference to the same mission as Thmcydides 7.20.1. If a 
A p. 
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mistake was made it was that of Diodorus, but taking into account a 
degree of unreliability does not alter the fact that Charicles was, 
more likely than not, a strategos.' According to Thucydides 3.7.1 
.• • 4.V !imam ••• yak (7;:ecr—Te1Xai, rptdec- ov-Ta- Icift Ao-c;.nrcov TV 
(Pop litcovos- c- T paTlo 6v, reXeva-civ-rwv Atcapvcivcov Tclw (i)oppiannis afa  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • 
I take this to translate as 	"The Athen- 
ians sent thirty ships and Asopius the son of Phormib as general, 
the Acarnanians asking that a son or relative of Phormio be sent in 
• command to them". At ThucydideS 7.20.1 the meaning of gpxovre, is - 
•identical - "the Athenians sent thirty ships and Charicles the son of 
Apollodorus in command." 
A 	./1 • ; e Several examples of the terminology (To, wv rpe ) used 
by Jordan in support of his hypothesis refer to Athenian commanders 
at Naupactus. Athenian forces were regularly stationed at such 
strategic localities as Naupactus, 83  (and possibly at Pylos and in 
Thrace) and it was general practice to assign strategoi to a base of 
this significance - for example, Phormio, Asopius, Nicostratus and 
Demosthenes during various years of the Peloponnesian War. 84 In all 
likelihood Athens appointed officialsother than strategoi to govern 
some of the subject states, but at the strategically more important 
localities where Athenian hoplites and naval squadrons could become 
involved in combat at any time and where commanders' decisions may be 
of some importance, the prerogatives of command enjoyed by strategoi 
would seem to be required. In this context Fornara's view that 
specialized duties became regularized and distributed among ttrategoi 
has some attraction with respect to Conon's position at Naupactus 
in 414/3. As a result of the regular-practice to assign strategoi 
orTa.- • 	 • • 
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85 to this base, finally we hear that Conon ifIxE hicLuTra,K1 -00 . Presumably 
for Fotnara, Diphilos' command (i11.0.)-'at Naupactus" in 414/3 should 
be explained iii the same way. But, as has been noted, Thucydides 
also describes Phormio's command there, in the summer of 429, in the 
same terms, as well as that of Aristoteles and Hierophon in the winter 
of 426. It seems unlikely, that as early as 429 the command at Naupactus 
was regarded as a regularized duty, allocated to certain strategoi as 
a consequence of apportionment of special competencies. However, 
Naupactus was certainly one of the most important Athenian bases through-
out the war, perhaps increasing in strategical significance as the war 
progressed. On this consideration, together with the fact that it 
was common practice to send strategoi to Naupactus, and bearing in mind 
that Thucydides often referred to generals by using the word Ciricwv 
and its derivatives, it is more probable thqn not that Aristoteles, 
Hierophon, Conon and Diphilos were strategoi. 
I suggest that Thucydides, in describing Athenian commanders, 
only uses the terminology Jordan believes is indicative of a subord-
inate rank, to describe strategoi. At Thucydides 1.57.6: 	UTuxop 
7ap rpuix-ovra 	ro.,Crs- t'irroo-rgX\OUTET 	A: al x:Xiotis 	677-V7 ar • • • A p 	T pCIT 01.1 
Tot; 	Aulcop.4c.r'ou; per' cXXwi 	 07. pa,n7. 	) j77Ltc-TX. Xoz.., o-c 
I cipxova-tr&v rec7:v 	• • • 	Jordan considers that as only one of the eleven 
commanders is a general Thucydides refers to the entire contingent as 
N/ 
CI) 
/ )coV. Two; 	rather than rrrccrci . 87 ms A more satisfactory 
• interpretation is that Thucydides means what he says. Archestratus 
was strategos but he was also one of -I-cis gpx.ceri 	VEC4‘.3%./ , this 
meaning "the commanders of the fleet". The eleven men are referred to 
collectively in this way because they are all generals. The inference 
203. 
• 
from the phrase 3Ar)(E svurco .142-e (UXL.JV&•/110.1..SirtrlYCIDVWS is not 
■ that the Athenians gave instructions riP:SIrrti2Cu2KCU rcts (teXCUS-1 . 
A Ti VfLiV..., but that there were ten other generals as well as 
, Archestratus. 	Whether the 	 Q. be emended or not, Jordan' s hypothesis 
is rendered invalid by Thucydides 1.59.1-2. 	Clearly at ‘ ■ 
U.ktvilac. 11VS 	A&ZTIttiu.h> are the ships that were sent under Arches- 
tratus, but they are now commanded by eDt alpctiliKe I . 	Manifestly, 
, 88 these men are Tots cl%)(COS'i TGIV VE-Lthl of 1.57.1). 
›, The appearance of the title cTKoV r vatiTmg at the top 
of an Athenian casualty list of the tribe Leontis, referring to two 
men named Theoros and Pasiphon, followed by the names of two taxiarchs 
and four trierarchs, is less of a problem with the knowledge that 
Thucydides used the word in reference to Athenian strategoi. Bradeen's 
explanation is that the title applies to the men elected by the fleet 
at Samos to command them in the last decade of the fifth century. 89 
Pasiphon Phrearrios, of the tribe Leontis, is one of ol s-c -rocriy'ci 
/ ES 2Attcv in 410/9. 90 Bradeen's argument that the casualty list can 
be more satisfactorily dated to 409 than to any of the other years from 
409 to 404 is attractive but not conclusi ve. 91 However, if correct, 
here is strong evidence for the identification of Oi cte -KOV'TES TCO 
■ _N c-, VatirIKDU with 01 4-TiC■Tiffi SC 2:cl/ucv. The only difficulty with the 
view that Athens refused to officially designate the strategoi of 
the fleet as strategoi on a casualty list is the indication in IC i 2 
304, line 35, independently supported by Thucydides 3.97.3, that the 
city recognized the authority of the generals at Samos. The oli-
garchic general Thymochares certainly worked in conjunction with the 
strategoi elected by the fleet at the Hellespont in late 411, after .  
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the two factions joined forces. 92 However, the difference between 
• the two sets of generals may be illustrated by the heading on the 
casualty list. Although Athens may have recognized the authority 
of the generals at Samos, they had not been elected by the Demos, and 
officially could not be designated as strategoi on a casualty list. 93 
Bradeen's solution is a neat explanation of the otherwise unknown 
title, irrespective of whether the entire monument should be dated 
to 409 or later. 
Furthermore, Jordan's hypothesis that the title describes a 
rank higher than taxiarch but lower than strategos is not supported 
by any of the passages he cites from Xenophon where the word 
is used of Athenian commanders, Hellenica 1.6.29 and 1.5.18. The 
3 / 	 C relevant section in Hellenica 1.6.29 is as follows: CKoi..LE vat 	al 
"N. 	 / 	 ). k 	\ 	)\ ,\ 	 c 
('S ) T(4; V ret, I ckf)(t4..V USka. KOLI CW1-0,1 tin fi 1 CIS • tril zf€. rct Urals .cti 
lloV Vi".09,xwv Tr E75... If anything, Xenophon's report of three 
Athenian ViktY1)(01 participating in the battle of Arginusae behind 
the ships of the taxiarchs is an indication that they were equal or 
inferior in rank to the taxiarchs, rather than superior. At Hellenica 
. 1.5.18 Xenophon notes that Phanosthenes was sent to Andros to replace 
Conon who had been sent from Andros to Samos. The historian's phrase, 
Go,t1 	id;WVCS eis %Spey eiTe/Act v 4hNortve1 y; 74.1-T4ra. 1/(6)S 
s)(ovut, is not evidence that Phanosthenes is more likely to be a 
nauarch rather than a taxiarch or strateges. Jordan's argument that 
Xenophon has just listed the ten strategoi of the year is no indi-
cation that Phanosthenes was a nauarch. 94 It fellows from the fact 
that the Athenians sent Phanosthenes to replace Conon that the two 
men were colleagues, that they held the same rank. 95 - 
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I do not believe that we can identify with any precision 
the position in the chain of command of Xenophon's vauctpxo . The 
historian's description of the line of Athenian forces just prior to 
the battle of Arginusae96 suggests that the Vcwu,rxol were subordinate 
officers. 	They were incorporated into the left wing of the fleet 
which comprised detachments led by four strategoi, a detachment of 
Samian ships and the ships of the taxiarchs. While each of the 
strategoi was in command of fifteen ships, the nauarchs appear, like 
the taxiarchs, to have had control of only a single ship each. This 
suggests that they were officers in charge of special contingents, 
perhaps similar in function to the taxiarchs, but in command of a 
section of the Athenian forces outside the jurisdiction of the taxi-
archs. The fact that vetccrcs seems to be the official title of a 
subordinate officer, together with the indication that they were not 
superior in rank to the taxiarchs, makes it hardly possible that they 
could be the equivalent of the ctrxcV TO Vatinkrd of Bradeen's casualty 
list. 
In conclusion, I think it should be stressed that if Thucy-
dides had consistently used the same phraseology in his references 
to individual Athenian generals and groups of generals there may be 
some grounds for concluding that his vocabulary is technical and meant 
to indicate different levels of authority among the strategoi, or the 
existence of a board of military officials, apart from the board of 
taxiarchs, which ranked immediately below the strategia. 	However, 
the opposite is the case. Thucydides' word usage with regard to 
strategoi is not consistent, and the variety of terminologies and 
sentence constructions are such as to allow only a very general 
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categorization and virtually preclude a meaningful classification. 97 
In fact if Thucydides can be claimed to be consistent in his rigorous 
attention to detail he can also be claimed to be consistent in his 
variety of phraseology in presentation of detail. The various theories 
which have been advanced about the Athenian system of command based 
on the belief of Thucydides' technical precision in his word usage all 
founder because they inadequately explain or fail to take into account 
exceptions and contradictions. 
If it be accepted that Thucydides did not deliberately imply 
that certain strategoi were superior to their colleagues, there is 
no need to assume that the Athenians sometimes resorted to the practice 
of allocating supreme authority to one strategos over his colleagues 
but at other times appointed several strategoi withjoint command and 
equal authority. The assumption which maintains that collegiality 
was occasionally dispensed with is seriously threatened by the indi-
cation in Thucydides 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 that the general Cleippides and 
3 / his colleagues (ITITos k)rOt) shared equally in authority. 98 If 
this is not enough there are numerous other instances in Thucydides 
testifying to collegiality of generals on campaign. 99 For example, 
when the generals Diotimus, Proteas and Lacedaimonius were sent to 
Corcyra in 433/2 they received specific instructions and collectively 
decided not to help the Corcyraeans in the sea battle against Corinth 
■ 	 o. 
)51 115KOV El■ i/7"E.,S CI StptxTr
.'el Tir 77-pciff)16-W 13V I'teiv(14 n .01/. 
Similarly, when the Athenian-fleet on route to Sicily in 414 put in 
c at Rhegium, 01 	irrec%Trt apes TEA. marcivitiL 4 	i 0oe % XlLovn 101he 
three generals each voiced a different opinion, 102 but when Lamachus 
sided with Alcibiades 103 the course of action proposed by the latter 
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was adopted. 104 
Although there is ample evidence attesting collegiality, 
without the support of the argument from terminology there is no 
evidence which attests positively to the superiority of a general over 
his colleagues. Thucydides' phraseology at 2.22.1 and 2.65.4 in 
reference to Pericles has been thought by some scholars to mean possess-
ion of supreme authority by Pericles in 431 and 429. 105 At 2.22.1 
S Thucydides states that Pericles sicidorricui rs oolc tWeiEt (“31-421/ 
els, 	N‘ 
cuNNC‘V cvsEva. There is no reason to assume that this passage 
means that Pericles suspended or prevented a normal meeting of the 
ecclesia. As a general Pericles had the power to ask the npuTooilEtS 
to convene the ecclesia. 106 Pericles may have refused to summon a 
special meeting107 and prevailed upon the other generals not to convene 
an assembly, 108 being able to do this because of the prestige he 
enjoyed as a statesman rather than because of any extraordinary powers 
vested in him as strategos. 109 The other passage, at 2.65.4, is as 
c, 	 , follows : krl-rsrov y aciths co TroW/7.) 	CTLTIVO NCl/TO kat 
/ 
Tr( trixo'frtarct VIE irstav 	According to Hignett this may mean that 
the ecclesia conferred plenary powers on Pericles when they elected 
him. 110 	 \ However, Thucydides does not say that Pericles was cfriarlYoS 
e, / cto-rokrui(s or that he was elected an-QV rw flyttuov cuiroicr.rwr, which 
words we could reasonably expect if Hignett is right. It is more likely 
that Thucydides means that the Athenians "entrusted him with everything" 
in the sense that they put all their confidence in his advice; they 
^ > / restored him to his previous position of o -arms avir in the state, 
quite apart from restoring him to office as general. 111 There are 
other examples, 	For instance, when a force of Athenian ships was 
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sent around the Peloponnese in 427/6 under the command of the two 
generals Demosthenes and Procles, all subsequent action seems to have 
been taken on the decision of Demosthenes along. According to Thucy- 
) 	i / 	\ 	\ 	....  dides, r-jcs N'Aksti) \IZVES 9 cIC 0 V (14.0.rdc VI rot/ srpctre)oV Tuit/ eivillittic:_h/ 
, 	4 	) / 	112 CurorElxi)EIV CIVTG US . 	The Acarnanians sought out Demosthenes as 
/ if he was the sole Athenian commander. Similarly, Aiv•AccfeE3/15 
V ?AVettIv(Ocr11- (14 iCCITe.k 1-0‘ 1/ xr,‘,"„, ro:Irrol t;Tri?.) Mi011ii/I.W • • • Ar-wxois 
• 
Vlitets&ai • 
113 Again, Procles is missing. Are we to believe that 
Demosthenes was superior in authority to Procles? The indication at 
3.91.1 is that they were jointly in command - oiv 
A / 
	
	•c -)J t oves'edevip 	.AAKI(bi€ veus 	 c effc6LICO, and when Procies 
C ti • tit  was killed in action he is o ETIos GrrnlY0siircluvr. 114  The 
emphasis on Demosthenes proves that he was the more importantof the 
two generals but does not prove that Procles was not his equal collea-
gue in the legal sense. We cannot assume that .Demosthenes possessed 
anything more than natural authority over Procles. Procles acquiesced 
in Demosthenes' decisions. 
The main difficulties associated with the theories that the 
board of strategoi had a chairman or president who was legally 
superior to his colleagues or that one of a group of generals on 
campaign was given some authority over the others, are the evidence 
in our sources testifying to the existence of a collegiate system of 
command and the contradictions to such theories in the evidence thought 
to support them, whether it be the existence of more than one case of 
double representation in particular years or the fact that terminologies 
thought to be technically precise are u7ed inconsistently and careless-
ly. 115 For the same reasons it is becoming increasingly difficult 
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to accept the compromise solutions which maintain that the principle 
of strict collegiality was violated as early as Xerxes' invasion of 
Greece and thereafter operated in practice in some instances but not 
in others. 116 On the other hand, if it be accepted that collegiality 
was not violated, but remained in force throughout the fifth century 
until at least 407, 117 the difficulties which arise, for example, from 
Thucydides' description of the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Procles 
between 3.91.1 and 3.98.5 disappear, or to be more precise, can be 
explained much more simply and satisfactorily and in exactly the same 
way as can all the other instances, without exception, where a parti-
cular general is emphasized in relation to his colleagues in our 
literary and epigraphic sources. I agree with Dover and Fornara that 
whenever special emphasis is given to one strategos it is a reflection 
of his eminence, an acknowledgment of the realities of influence and 
prestige and importance, at least in the mind of the writer. 118 As 
far as Thucydides is concerned, it is not his primary purpose to 
provide us with lists of officials and we should perhaps be grateful 
that he has described the military activities of Athens during the 
Peloponnesian War in such detail and often taken care to explicitly 
name strategoi. 	In this context it is understandable that the 
historian does not always name the commanders or that when he does he 
employs no consistent phraseology, interchanging complete enunciation 
c , .., 	/ 	s with such expressions as 0 Oswalti/  ros,TIVA-T-Cs 11411-C/-S and cci ,e70:A. 
L) -./ latt 0" 1 vurpItTcs , and interchanging the descriptive nouns and verbs 
/ 3 	/1/ > 	3/ crp aT1 S'0 3 ECTI5ccrip-E i , ere (11-1 re 3 	 n Vro 	with a rxt,:> v., qr xs, c4N x 0 Vrot . 
Evidence in epigraphic records permit the same conclusions. 	It should 
be noted that the expression 0 0EiA  voiLiccu 01c  t>t/gi%)(0V-rES is very common I 
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in epigraphic sources, not only in reference to groups of strategoil 
but to other officials as well, and while IG i 2 296 virtually proves 
c that c dctva cannot be regarded as superior, a suitable explanation 
(although the eponym may simply be explained in the same terms as in 
c A literary sources) may be that bPo/t.t is the original proposer of the 
mission or the receiver (as the representative of all the generals 
involved) of money paid by the disbursing board. 119 
PART III 
APPENDIX I 
List of Generals  
For each year of the fifth century down to 405/4, I 
list the name and where possible, the patronymic and tribal 
affiliation of each general, and I cite the evidence which fixes 
his tenure of office. Only those years for which there is 
evidence of at least one general are listed. Thus the list begins 
with the strategia of Melanthius in 499/8 for there is no evidence 
for 501/0 or 500/499. 	I only give a commentary where there is 
some dispute, but in some cases where controversy does exist 
commentary has been given elsewhere, in the sections dealing with 
double representation and the size of the board. 1 
Generals whose tribal affiliations are known are listed 
first and in order of phyle, and the others are then listed in no 
particular sequence. The order of the ten Cleisthenic tribes is 
as follows :- 
Erechtheis 
Aigeis 	It 
Pandionis 	III 
Leontis 	IV 
Akamantis 	V 
Oineis VI 
Kekropis 	VII 
Hippothontis VIII 
Aiantis 	IX 
Antiochis 	X 
499/8 
Melanthius Phalanthou 	Hdt. 5.97.3 (9764) 2 
The patronymic is supplied by Hesperia, Supplement 8, 
pp. 400 f. 	See also Fornara, p. 41. There is no evidence for 
the names of strategoi in the years between 498/7 and 491/0 
inclusive. 
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490/89 
Miltiades cimonos Laciades VI 	Hdt. 6.104.1 (10212) 
Aristeides Lysimachou Alopecethen X 	Plut. Arist. 5.1 	(1695) 
Stesileos Thrasyleo 	 Hdt. 6.114 	(12906) 
Fornara is doubtful about a generalship of Aristeides, 
considering that his nime may have replaced that of Callimachus 
in Plutarch's account. 	Herodotus is silent but this does not 
mean that Plutarch is wrong in this instance. The story repeated 
by Plutarch that Aristeides was left behind with his tribe to guard 
the booty may be based on fact. 4 It is possible, but less likely, 
that Themistocles was also a general at Marathon. 5 Plutarch does 
not specifically refer to Themistocles as a strategos,although the 
inference has been drawn by some scholars. 8 Miltiades' expedition 
against Paros may have occurred in 489/8 but more likely in 490/89. 
How and Wells date it to the spring of 489 (therefore 490/89), some 
months after Marathon. 7 	Alternatively, it could have taken place 
immediately after the Persian defeat. 8 There are no known strategoi 
for the period 489/8 to 482/1. 
481/0 
Themistocles Neocleous Phrearrios IV 	Hdt. 7.173.2 (6669) 
Themistocles was probably strategos for several of the 
years in the 480's, and if / Thugdides' phrase,ini 	6calve0 
apois k:crrqvicto-r-cv -*iivwcts qge , 9 is a reference to the 
generalship rather than the archonship and means "in that position. 
of his that he held at Athens year by year" , 1° we should perhaps 
believe that Themistocles was a general for some years in succession 
prior to 48l/0.- 
480/79 
Themistocles Neocleous Phrearrios IV 	Hdt. 8.4.2. 
Xanthippus Ariphronos Cholargeus V 	Hdt. 8.131.3 (11169) 
It is possible that Aristeides was also a strategos in 
480/79, but he is not so called by Herodotus when the historian 
is describing his initiative at Psyttaleia. 12 The story about 
Aristeides crossing from Aegina to Salamis to inform Themistocles 
that the Persians had the Greek fleet trapped at Salamis is more 
an indication that Aristeides was not a strateoos. 13 We can 
reasonably assume that the Athenian stri,tegbi participated in the 
conference. 
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479/8 
Xanthippus Ariphronos Cholargeus V 	Mod. 11.34.2 
Leocrates Stroibou Hagnousios V Plut. Arist. 20.1 (9084) 
Aristeides Lysimachou Alopecethen X 	Hdt. 9.28.6 
Myronides Calliou 	Plut. Arist. 20.1 (10509) 
For Leocrates' deme see chapter 5, pp. 122-123. 
478/7 
Aristeides Lysimachou Alopecethen X 	Diod. 11.44.2 . 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades 	Plut. Cirnon 6.1 (8429) 
According to Plutarch, "E7r€1,öè 	 ./6v-ran; 
EA. X'68os‘e,;;-iiiI,O ,; a Tpct -ri;76:,-, Karr OaaTTIty or.nrco .. 	iiP,V1P' 
:AthivaLrer t;y6P-i-cov, 	Flaucavict 	_Te 
Pausanias was recalled by Sparta in 478. As Fornara notes, it is 
difficult to date Cimon's first generalship to 477/6 by dismissing 
this very explicit statement of Plutarch' s.14 
477/6 
Cion Miltiadou Laciades VI 	Ephorus F. 191 
The capture of Byzantium from Pausanias probably occurred 
in this year. 
476/5 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Thuc. 1.98.1 
Cratinos Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (3750) 
Lycourgos Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (9246) 
Lysistratos Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (9591) 
Fornara suggests that the operations at Eion were begun 
in 477 and that Cimon should therefore be regarded as a strategos 
for 477/6, as well as for 476/5, on this evidence alone. 15 Even 
if Plutarch, Cimon 7.4 implies a long siege it is perhaps not enough 
to date backwards to the previous year. 
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469/8 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI. 	Thuc. 1.100.1; Plut. Cimon 8.8 
Cimon was probably also a general in many (if not all) 
of the years from 476 to 469, but we do not have names for the 
strategoi who led Athenian forces against Na,cos and Carystus in 
these pars. The battle of the Eurymedon is usually dated to 
469/8, i° but if it occurred later Cimon was strategos at least 
once more between 469 and 466. 
466/5 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI 	Plut. Cimon 14.1 
Plutarch's report of Cimon's activities in the Chersonese 
in command of four Athenian ships, soon before the re7olt-of Thasos, 
is probably evidence enough for his generalship in this year. 17 
465/4 
Leagros Glauconos ek Kerameon V 	Hdt. 9.75 (9028) 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI Plut. Cimon 14.2 18 
Sophanes Eutychidou Deceleeus VIII 	Hdt. 9.75 (13409) 
463/2 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI 	Plut. Cimon 14.2 
According to Thucydides 1.101.3 the siege at Thasos 
lasted for more than two years. It is possible that Cimon did 
not return to Athens in the years from 466 till the suppression 
of Thasos19 If this is so he was strategos for 464/3 as well. 
462/1 
7 Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Plut. Cimon 13.4-(11811) 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI 	Thus. 1.102.1-2 
Ephialtes Sophonidou Plut. Cimon 13.4 (6157) 
Plutarch Cimon 15.1 notes that Cimon led an Athenian 
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naval force after being tried for accepting a bribe from 
Alexander of Macedon. This is either a reference to Cimon's 
expedition to Ithome in aid of Sparta or (less likely) to 
another mission which intervened between his trial and the 
expedition to the Peloponnese. 20 Both Ephialtes and Pericles 
were active as generals in at least one of the years of the 
late 460's, if we are to trust Plutarch, Cimon 13.4. 	Plutarch's 
reference may be to generalships before 462/1 21 but it is quite 
possible that Ephialtes' popularity ensured his election in the 
last two or three years of his life, which encouraged further 
his opposition to Cimon and his attacks on the Areopagus. He 
may well have been strategos in both 463/2 and 462/1. 
460/59 
Hippodamas Erechtheidos I 	IG i2 929.33 (7611) 
Phrynichos Erechtheidos I IC 12 929 . 6 (15009) 
Leocrates Stroibou Hagnousios V 	Thuc. 1.105.2 
Myronides Calliou 	 Thuc. 1.105.4 
Charitimides Fr.Gr.Hist. 688 F14 (15497) 
The dating of events of Thucydides 1.104 ff. is difficult. 
Myronides' apixance into the Megarid may belong to 459/8 rather 
than 460/59." Charitimides may well have remained as strategos 
in Egypt for several years, 24 as may Leocrates at Aegina. 25 
Myronides was a general in at least two of the years between 460 
and 456. Two months after the battle at Tanagra (458/7?) he was 
a strategos of the victorious Athenian army which defeated the 
Boeotians at Oenophyta (457/6?) •26  A tentative reconstruction 
may be :— 
459/8 : Myronides, Leocrates, Charitimides 
458/7 : Leocrates, Charitimides, Pericles ? 
457/6 : Myronides Leo crates. 
456/5 
Tolmides Tolmaiou 	 Thuc. 1.108.5 
Schol. Aesch. 2.75 (13879) 
22 
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455/4 
Myronides Calliou 	Thuc. 1.111.1; Diod. 11.83.3 
? Tolmides Tolmaiou Diod. 11.84 
Unless Diodorus is confused the expedition he describes 
of Tolmides around the Peloponnese may be different to that of 
Thucydides 1.108.5. According to Thucydides the places attacked 
by Tolmides were Chalcis and Sicyon, but in Diodorus they are 
Methone and Gytheium in Laconia. The only similarity in the two 
accounts is the destruction of a Spartan depot by fire. 
454/3 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Thuc. 1.111.2; Diod. 11.85 
Perhaps Tolmides should be considered as a general in 
this year on the basis of Diodorus 11.85. 28 According to Fornara 
this may well be the first generalship of Pericles. 29 He considep 
that Plutarch, Cimon 13.4 may be equated with Thucydides 1.116.3. 3u 
Staying as close as possible to Thucydides' chronology it is easier 
to date Pericles' expedition to the Corinthian Gulf in 454/3 rather 
than in 453/2. 31 If the expedition to Thessaly occurred in 454/3 
Myronides was a general in this year rather than in 455/4• 32 
451/0 
Cimon Miltiadou.Laciades VI 	Thuc. 1.112.2 
Anaxicrates 	 Diod. 12.3.4 (805) 
450/49 
Cimon Miltiadou Laciades VI 	Diod. 12.4.1 
Tolmides Tolmaiou 	 Diod. 11.88.3 
The expedition to Cyprus may have occurred in 450/49. 33 
It may however, have extended over cwo years. 3 	I follow Fornara 
here fu a generalship . of Tolmides'u although it may have been 
later." 
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447/6 
Epiteles Erechtheidos I •6a 	IG i 943.4 (4953) 
Andocides Leogorou Kydathenaieus III 	IG i2 1085.7 (827) 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 1.114.1 
Tolmides Tolmaiou 	Plut. Per 18.3; Thuc. 1.113.1 
Diod. 12.6.1 
I have followed Gomme's chronology for Thucydides 
1.111-114. 37 	Fornara assigns a generalship to Pericles for 
448/7 on the evidence of Plutarch, Pericles 21.2 that Pericles 
led the Athenian expedition to Delphi. 
446/5 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Thuc. 1.114.3 
Diod. 12.22.2 
The final conquest of Euboea and the measures taken 
against Histiaea probably occupied at least part of the year 
446/5. 38 
443 /2 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Plut. Per. 16.3 
) ) / 	n , According to Plutarch, Pericles ... OJK EA4TTL4.: -ru:v 
irrAer-E.Ke.iSiAat, eTZ.: Nil Vi.....41 ktit it tict.V etZtvz.v iv i'llit; IIVICI.;:riCIts 
StrtririctAs NNW ... This is the first of Pericles' uhbroken 
tenure of office for fiteen years. Fornara as§Uns a generalship 
to Thucydides, the son of Melesias, in 444/3.." 
442/1 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus 	Plut. Per. 16.3 
441/0 	(F. Gr. Hist. 324 F38) 
Socrates Al.agyrasios I 	 (13102) 
Sophocles Sophillou ek Colonou II 	(12834) 
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Andocides Leogorou Kydathenaieus III 
Creon Scambonides IV 	 (8785) 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 
Glaucon Leagrou ek Kerameon V 	(3027) 
Callistratos A4larne&VI (8148) _ 
Xenophon Euripidou Meliteus VII 	(11313) 
Lampides Peiraieus VIII 
Glauketes Peiraieus VIII (2951)  
. Cleitophon Thoraieus X 	 (8548) 
The problem with the eleven names is that in preamble 
the scholiast wrote of Pericles, 	 mtrZs 
)crruo.rleriv. 	141cit. crrparq env rt4),. 	2d/ilg -T*& 11.ev.1." arei_ Ka re. 
. 	It could easily have happened. Forty four of the 
sixty ships sent to Samos gave battle off the island of Tragia, 
licpireVou5 41,Karou avro0 arrceris'ci:N-ros •40 In other words, ten 
generals, including Pericles, took part in the engagement. The 
scholiast may have copied Thucydides' phraseology and failed to 
notice the discrepancy in the number. The sixteen ships detached 
from the sixty to watch out for the Phoenician fleet" may have 
been commanded by the eleventh strategos of Androtion's list, or 
alternatively, Athens may have appointed an extra general to commd 
the forty ships sent out to reinforce the sixty already at Samos. 4 
The only objection to this interpretation is the damage it does to 
the theory which maintains that only ten generals could hold office 
at the same time. 
440 / 39 
Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III Thuc. 1.117.2 (171) 
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III Thuc. 1.117.2 (14958) 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 1.117.2 
Anticles Thuc. 1.117.2 (1051) 43 Thucydides Pantainetou Gargettios II 	Thuc. 1.117.2 (7272) 
or Aristonos Archerdousios VIII (7271) 
Tlepolomos IX or X Thuc. 1.117.2 (13863) 
It is generally agreed that these generals belong to 
440/39 rather than 441/0- 4 The generalship of Epiteles is 
assigned by some scholars to 440/39.45 
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439/8 
Erechtheidos I 	 IG i2 50.28 
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III 	IG 12 50.28 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Plu. Per. 6;.3 
Glaucon Leagrou ek Kerameon V IG i2 50.30 
Oineidos VI 	 IC 12 50.30 
Xenophon Euripidou Meliteus VII 	IG i2 50.31 
Tlepolemos IX or X 	, IG i2 50.31 
Dem(ocleides) IG i2 50.28 
Socrates Anagyrasios Is generally accepted as the 
general from Erechtheis in IG i 50. 46 	Phormio is likely. 
Xenophon and Tlepolemos are virtually certain. The list in 
IC i 50 is in tribal order which means that Tlepolemos belongs 
to Aiantis or Antiochis: 
1. Aiantis if :- 
a) two generals 2were elected from this tribe and the relevant
section in IG i 50 is restored as TAE .TEL).9.10s ...Aiav-riNG 7S, 
or 
b) both AiantiL: and Antiochis were represented, nErrEavics 
> AlootriScs ...'Avricxio 7s. 
2. Antiochis if the inscription is restored as 7Afarce11/4cs 
38A% vr, •o)cio7S., thereby meaning double representation of Aritiochis. 
The general from Oineis may b2 Callistratos, strategos 
in 441/0. All scholars agree that IC i 50 contains generals for 
439/8 rather than 440/39 because the list does not include some 
of the generals for 440/39 known from Thucydides. 47 It is worthy 
of note that if Socrates and Callistratos are correct restorations, 
five of the generals of 441/0 were elected in 439/8. This raises 
the possibility that some generals remained at Samos from the 
beginning of the war until the treaty was drawn up, and that they 
should therefore be included on the list for 440/39 - a case in 
point is Xenophon, and perhaps Socrates and Callistratos as well. 
438/7 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Plut. Per. 16.3 
Phormio may have been a general in this year. 48 
437/6 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Plut. Per. 16.3 
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI Plut. Per. 20.1 (8981) 
A generalship of Lamachus in this year depends on the 
date of the Athenian expedition to the Pontus. It may have 
occurred in the previous year. 49 A Menippus was probably also 
a general in some of the years between 438/7 and 434/3, 50 as 
perhaps was Nicias. 51 
436/5 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V. 	Plut. Per. 16.3 
435 / 4 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Plut. Per. 16.3 
Glaucon Leagrou ek Kerameon V IG i2  365.13 
Proteas Epicleous Aixoneus VII 	IG i2 365.15 (12298) 
Generalships of Glaucon and Proteas are not certain. 52 
434/3 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Plut. Per. 16.3 
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433 /2 
Diotimus Strombichou Euonymeus I 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 
Glaucon Leagrou ek Kerameon V 
Lacedaimonius Cimonos Laciades VI 
Proteas Epicleous Aixoneus VII 
Archestratus Lycomedous Phlyeus VII 
Metagenes ek Coiles VIII 
Dracontides 
Archenautes 
IG i2 295.9 (4386) 
Plut. Per. 16.3 
IC i2 295. 19-20 
IG i2 295.8 
IC i2 295.9 
Thuc. 1.57.6 (2411) 
IG i2 295.20 (10088) 
IG i2 295.20-21 (4551) 
IG i2 367.5 
221. 
• 	 Phormio may also have been a general in this year. 53 
A problet2 is created by the conflict between Thucydides 1.51.4 
and IG i 295. Thucydides name2 MoKlbvis 0,11ic,(T00 as the 
colleague of Glaucon while IG i 295 names Metagenes and 
Dracontides. It is generally accepted that Andocides is an 
interpolation. 54 If both Andocides and Phormio were generals 
there are three sets of double representation. The generalship 
of Archenautes is not certain. 55 
4 32 /1 
Socrates Antigenous Halaieus II 
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 
Carcinus Xenotimou Thorikiosi V 
Proteas Epicleous Aixoneus VII 
Eucrates Meliteus VII 
Callias Calliadou Aixoneus VII 
Archestratus Lycomedous Phlyeus VII 
Thuc. 2.23.2 (13099) 
Thuc. 1.64.2 
Plut. Per. 16.3 
Thuc. 2.23.2 (8254) 
Thuc. 2.23.2 
IG i2 296.5 (5759) 
Thuc. 1.61.1 (7827) 
Thuc. 1.57.6 
There is no indication in Thucydides that Callias and 
his colleagues replaced Archestratus, although the inference has 
been drawn by some scholars. 	Even if Archestratus ar5Ived at 
Potidaea at the end of June o 8 r beginning of July, 434, 	and was therefore sent out about May, 5 the forces of Archestratus and 
Callias cannot have joined forces at Pydna59 before the turn of 
the Attic year. Callias t expedition was dispatched after the 
Athenians heard that Aristeus was sent with Corinthian reinforce- 
ments to Potidaea. 6° 	Aristeus arrived forty days after the revolt 
began, therefore about a month after Archestrapus. Callias cannot 
have left Athens before the beginning of 432/1, °1 and yet when he 
arrived in Macedonia he found the Athenian force previously sent 
out engaged in a siege of Pydna. This suggesp§ that Archestratus 
was a general for 432/1 as well as for 433/2. °4 On this chronology 
perhaps Callias should not therefore be considered a strategos for 
the previous year, 433/2. 63 If Archestratus was a general in 432/1 
there is a possibility of quadruple representation of Kekropis. 
431/0 
Socrates Antigenous Halaieus II 	Thuc. 2.23.2 
Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III Thuc. 2.58.1 
Phormio AE)piou Paianieus III 	Thuc. 2.29.6 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 2.31.1 
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Carcinus Xenotimou Thorikios V 	Thuc. 2.23.2 
Proteas Epicleous Aixoneus VII Thuc. 2.23.2 
Cleopompos Cleiniou 	 Thuc. 2.26.1 (8613) 
It is generally agreed that Socc4tes, Carcinus and Proteas 
were on active duty in the autumn of 431, 	an that Cleopompos 
was a general in this year rather than 432/1. 6J According to 
Gomme the expedition of Hagnon and Cleopompos left before the end 
of 431/0. 66 There is no need to doubt a generalship of Phormio. 
Even if Thucydides 2.29.6 is dated to 432/4 7 Thucydides 2.58.2 
makes little sense unless Phormio had remained for some time near 
Potidaea and was still on active duty with his 1,600 hoplites. 88 
430/29 
Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III Thuc. 2.58.1 
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III Thuc. 2.68.7 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V Thuc. 2.59.3 
Xenophon Euripidou Meliteus VII Thuc. 2.70.1 
Hestiodoros Aristocleidou Thuc. 2.70.1 (5207) 
Phanomachos Callimachou Thuc. 2.70.1 (14069) 
Cleopompos Cleiniou Thuc. 2.58.1 
Melesandros Thuc. 2.69.1 (9803) 
Hagnon and his troops returned to Athens, not because 
his term of office had expired, but because of the effect of 
the plague. Presumably he thought to prevent the disease spreading 
through the rgnks of the troops who preceded him (and Cleopompos) 
to Potidaea. 67 
429/8 
Phormio Asopiou Paianieus III 	Thuc. 2.88.1 
Hagnon Niciou Steirieus III Thuc. 2.95.3 
Pericles Xanthippou Cholargeus V 	Thuc. 2.65.4 
Cleippides Deiniou Acharneus VI Thuc. 3.3.2 (8521) 
Some scholars consider that Thucydides 2.65.4 refers to 
the election of Pericles for 429/8 rather than to his reinstatement 
in 430/29. 70 I have suggested elsewhereLL that it refers to his 
reinstatement. 72 However, there is no reason to doubt that he 
was re-elected and held office until he died. 
223. 
There is some dispute about Hagnon's strategia. Accord-
ing to Fornara he was not a strategos but commanded in Thrace 
as hegemon after the deaths of the generals there. 73 . However, 
Thucydides makes it quite clear that after the defeat of the 
Athenian force and the deaths of the three generals in Thrace the 
remnants of the Athenian army retired temporarily to Potidaea and 
then returned to Athens. 74 Hagnon had nO force to command. 
Nevertheless, Thucydides 2.95.3 may be an indication that he was 
a general. The context is as follows. Sitalces of Thrace began 
a campaign in the winter of 429/8 against Perdiccas of Macedon and 
the Chalcidians taking with him Amyntas . son of Philip, to replace 
Serdiccas, k a 1 .1- C3%; "ACI:viat'LL'v rr44z1 .4s, 	 vc4;ruiv , (on account of the campaign) k tVE4AcVt AyywVo.,* t.2IEA rce , 61-% rais Ktt.) fc,\os -).AC41., I sys 	'Ft sea (fp Actss 
Trc.kpcomv6fgui ." It is possible Tfiucydides means that Hagnon was 
hegemon of, the embassy but the last sentence of the passage, beginn-
ing with r'Llp , implies his hegemony had something to do with the expect-
ed Athenian forces. 76 Ehrenberg has suggested that Hagnon may 
have been destined to lead the common army of the Athenians and 
Thracians and like Demosthenes in Acarnania in 426/5 was a strategos 
and hegemon of the allied forces. 77 However, according to Thucydides' 
later narrative Athens did not send a force in support of Sitalces 
and probably never intended to. 78 Alternatively, but less likely, 
Hagnon, who was well known in Thrace (he was oikistes of Amphipolis) 
was not a general but as hegemon was advisor to Sitalces.and leader 
of his forces. 79 I say less likely because Thucydides' last sentence, 
interpreted naturally, does seem to be.a deliberate explanation of 
the words ilititiVit rAW(4.114, thus implying that Hagnon was a strategos. 
428/7 
Asopius Phormionos Paianieus III 	Thuc. 3.7.1 (2669) 
Axistoteles Timocratous Thoraieus X SEC x 226.6 (2055) 
Paches Epicourou 	 Thuc. 3.18.3 (11746) 
Lysicles 	 Thuc. 3.19.1 (9417) 
It is not certain that Aristoteles held a strategia 
in this year. ° It is possible that Nicias was general in the 
early 420's, including 428/7. 81 Beloch suggested that Nicostratus 
was at Naupactus during the early months of 427. 82 It is Rossible, 
.but perhaps his evidence, Thucydides 3.75, is not enough. 8.) 
427/6 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 	Thuc. 3,51.1; 91.1 (10808) 
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III) 	Thuc. 3.80.2 (5973) 
224. 
Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV Thuc. 3.75.1 (11011) 
Laches Melanopou Aixoneus VI • Thuc. 3.86.1 (9019) 
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios 	IX Thuc. 3.91.1 (3585) 
Charoiades Euphiletou Thuc. 3.86.1 (15529) 
Procles Theodorou Thuc. 3.91.1 (12214) 
See also the list of Fornara and Sealey. 84 
426/5 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 	Thuc. 3.91 Athen. V. 218b 
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III) 	Thuc. 3.91.4 
Hippocrates Ariphronos Cholargeus V IG i2 324.3 (7640) 
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI 	Aristoph. Ach. 593ff. 
Sophocles Sostratidou Oineus VI Thuc. 3.115.5 (12827) 
Laches Melanopou Aixoneus VII 	Thuc. 3.99; 103 
Pythodorus Isolochou Phlyeus VII Thuc. 3.115.2 (12399) 
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX 	• Thuc. 3.97 
Hipponicus Calliou Alopecethen X 	Thuc. 3.91.4 (7658) 
Aristoteles Timocratous Thoraieus X Thuc. 3.105.3 
Hierophon Antimnestou 	 Thuc. 3.105.3 (7515) 
Procles Theodorou Thuc. 3.98.5 
Simonides 	 Thuc. 4.7.1 (12713) 
Lewis also assigns generalships to Demosthenes, Procles 
and Lamachus in this year. 85 
425/4 
Demodocus Anagyrasios I 
- Nicias Niceratou Cydant ides II. 
Cleon Cleainetou Cydathenaieus III 
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III) 
Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV 
Lamachus Xanophanous Oethen VI 
SOphocles Sostratidou Oineus VI 
Thuc. 4.75.1 (3464) 
Thuc. 4.27.5 
• Thuc. 4.28 
Thuc. 4.65.3 
Thuc. 4.53.1 
Thuc. 4.75.1 
Thuc. 4.65.3 
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Pythodorus Isolochou Phlyeus VII 	Thuc. 4.65.3 
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX 	Thuc. 4.29.1 
Autocles Tolmaiou Anaphlystios X 	Thuc. 4.53.1 (2724) 
Aristeides Archippou 	 Thuc. 4.50.1 (1685) 
86 Sealey gives Cleon a special command in this year. 
Fornara leaves him out. 87 
424/3 
Demodocus Anagyrasios I Thuc. 4.75.1 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II Thuc. 4.11.9.2 
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III) Thuc. 4.65.3 
CleonCleainetouCydathenaieus III 	Aristoph. CZouds 581ff. (8674) 
Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV Thuc. 4.119.2 
Thucydides Olorou Halimousios IV Thuc. 4.104.4 (7267) 
Hippocrates Ariphronos Cholargeus V Thuc. 4.66.3 
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI Thuc. 4.75.2 
Sophocles Sostratidou Oineus VI Thuc. 4.65.3 
Pythodorus Isolochou Phlyeus VII Thuc. 4.65.3 
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX Thuc. 4.66.3 
Autocles Tolmaiou Anaphlystios X Thuc. 4.119.2 
Aristeides Archippou Thuc. 4.75.1 
Eucles Thuc. 4.104.4 (5704) 
Sealey is undecided about the composition of the board 
of 424/3 and has constructed three alternative lists in an attempt 
to restrict the numbers to ten, which in two cases involves allocat- 
ing a special command to Thucydides. 88 Fornara removes five generals 
from the list for the same reason. 89 
423/2 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II - 
Sophocles ek Colonou II 
Cleon Cleainetou Cydathenaieus III 
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III) 
Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV 
Sophocles the poet may have been 
Thuc. 4.129.2 
Plut. Nicias 15.2 
Thuc. 5.2.1 
IG i2 324.38 
Thuc. 4.129.2 
a strategos in this 
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year. 90 Cleon's strategia has been disputed by some scholars. 91  
422/1 
Cleon Cleainetou Cydathenaieus III 	Fr. Cr. Hist. 324 F40 
Schol. Aesch. 2.31 
Thucydides does not call Cleon a strategos in his 
account of the events up to and including the battle of Amphipolis. 
However his strategia cannot be doubted. 1" The seventeen signatories 
to the Peace of Nicias are interesting. 93 Nicias, Laches, Demos-
thenes and Lamachus were often generals during the Peloponnesian War. 
Pythodorus is probably not the general who was banished in 424 but 
he may well be the general of 4l4/3. 	may be the strategos 
of 418/7, 414/3, and 413/2. 95 liagnon is probably the general of 
the late 430's and early 420's. 9° Thrasycles Rigy be the general 
of 412/1. 97 Leon may be the general of 412/1. 7 Arigtocrates is 
probably the general of 413/2, 410/9, 407/6 and 406/5. 9 	Timocrates 
may be the father of Aristoteles the general, 100  or the politician 
' who moved the imprisonment of the generals after Arginusae. 1°1 Lampon 
is probably the well-known soothsayer 102 and founder of the colony 
of Thurii. 1°3 Apart from the four certain identifications, six 
others, Pythodorus, Euthydemus, Hagnon, Thrasycles, Leon and Aristo- 
• crates can in all probability be identified withgenerals of the 
Peloponnesian War. I suggest that we may have a list of most of the 
generals for 422/1 - apart from Cleon, who was killed at Amphipolis, 
and one or mgre generals who were involved in suppressing the revolt 
of Scione. 1°4 It was common for Athenian generals to take the oath 
in treaties.-° 5 The three strategoi Nicias, Nicostratus and Autocles 
signed the truce of 423. 1" and Athenian generals signed the treaty 
with Samos in 439/8.107 Unfortunately there is no evidence for the 
names of strategoi of 422/1 except for Cleon. 	Nicias was general 
in all the years from 427/6 to 423/2 and again in 421/0. According 
to Thucydides 5.16.1 ...nfrE OiiKal4Pq 777 '76 'kEL'I-Ea°zir'r21 
;p1tXterra r jv `isi Elloriav liAcurrocirot. 7E 6 flavo-uviov i3acri-
k€Us. AnKebaLflovCcov 	Nocias. 6 NLK77,,wirov, rXdo-ra r63r 
(hspdpc -i.03 	p:LillytatS • • • 	This is not evidence for a generalship 
of Nicias, but it is hard to believe that he was elected for the last 
five or six years of the 420's except 422/1, the year in which he 
was finally able to take the initiative as the chief proponent of 
peace. If Nicias was a general it would be strange if others among 
those who took the oath were not. It is worthy of notice that in 
418/7, the next year after 422 for which we have a list of more than 
one general, four of the strategoi were signatories to the Peace of 
Nicias - Nicias, Laches, Demosthenes and Euthydemus. However,it is 
difficult to isolate those men among the delegation who were generals 
from those who were not. Presumably some delegates were chosen for 
their negotiating ability and experience - Rerhaps, for example, Hagnon. 
Lampon's function was probably religious. 1°0 According to Andrewes 
and Lewis, Isthmonicus was a colleague of Lampon, 109 Some of the 
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delegation will have been commissioners chosen especially for the 
task. 110 The list may nevertheless be evidence for generalships 
of Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Lamachus and Demosthenes, and perhaps 
others as well. Demosthenes, Lamachus and Nicias were probably 
generals in most of the years of the late 420's and early 410's. 
If Nicostratus had been a member of the peace delegation such a 
conclusion would carry more authority, for he is the one general, 
except for Nicias, whose tenure of office in the late 420's is most 
fully attested. Perhaps his absence can be explained — he may have 
been sent to quell the rebellion at Scione. 
42 1/0 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 	Plut. Nicias 10.9 
That Nicias was a strategos has been accepted by Fornara 
and Seeley. 111 
4 20/9 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 	Plut. Alc. 15.1; 
Nicias 10.8 (600) 
There is no reason to dispute Alcibiades' strategia in 
this year. 112 
419/8 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 	Thuc. 5.55.4 
418/7 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Nicostratus Dieitrephous Scambonides IV 
Callistratos Empedou Oethen VI 
Laches Melanopou Aixoneus VII 
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX 
Autocles Tolmaiou Anaphlystios X 
Euthydemus Eudemou 
IG i2 302.20 
IG i2 302.17 
Thuc. 5.61.1 
IG i2 302.21 (8142) 
Thuc. 5.61.1 
IG i2 302.6, 15 
2 IG i 302.17 
IG i2 302.9 (5521) 
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Alcibiades' srategia depends on the restoration of his 
name in line 17 of IG i 302. 113 
417/6 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 
Rhinon Charicleous Paianieus III 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Teisias Teisimachou Cephalethen V 
Cleomedes Lycomedous Phlyeus VII 
Thuc. 5.83.4 
IG i2 302.26-7 (15207) 
Thuc. 5.84.1 
IG i2 302 .29 (13479) 
IG i2 302.30 (8598) 
Rhinon is not certain but a strong probability. 114 
416/5 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Teisias Teisimachou Cephalethen V 
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI 
Cleomedes Lycomedous Phlyeus VII 
Philocrates Demeou 
Thuc. 6.8.2 
Thuc. 6.8.2 
IG i2 302.29 
Thuc. 6.8.2 
IG i2 302.30 
Thuc. 5.116.3 (14585) 
415/4 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 	Thuc. 6.47.1 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides.IV Thuc. 6.48.1 
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI 	Thuc. 6.49.1 
Telephonos 	 IC i2 302.63 
I follow Fornara in dating the generalships of Demaratus, 
Laispodias and Pythodorus to 414/3 rather than 415/4. 115 
414/3 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 	Thuc. 7.16.1 
Pythodorus (Epizelou Ralaieus II) Thuc. 6.105.2 
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III) 	Thuc. 7.16.2 
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Dieitrephes Scambonides IV Thuc. 7.29.1 (3755) 
Lamachus Xenophanous Oethen VI Thuc. 6.101.6 
Charicles Apollodorou Oineidos VI Thuc. 7.20.1 (15407) 
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX Thuc. 7.16.2 
Conon Timotheou Anaphlystios X Thuc. 7.31.4 (8707) 
Euthydemus Eudemou Thuc. 7.16.1 
Laispodias Andronymios Thuc. 6.105.2 (8963) 
Menander Thuc. 7.16.1 (9857) 
Demaratus Thuc. 6.105.2 (3283) 
Euetion Thuc. 7.9 	(5460) 
Pythodorus is probably the son of Epizeles although he 
may be the general exiled in 424 and therefore of tribe 
Less likely, he may be Pythodorus Polyzelou Anaphlystios X. 	118 Beloch tentatively assigns Androcles and Peisander to this year. 
' 413/2 
Strombichides Diotimou Euonymeus I 
Nicias Niceratou Cydantides II 
Eurymedon Thucleous (Myrrhinusios III) 
Aristocrates Sceliou Kekropidos VII 
Demosthenes Alcisthenous Aphidnaios IX 
Euthydemus Eudemou 
Menander 
Hippocles Menippou 
Diphilus 
Thuc. 8.15.1 (13016) 
Thuc. 7.32.1 
Thuc. 7.31.4 
Thuc. 8.9.2 (1904) 
Thuc. 7.31.4 
Thuc. 7.69.4 
Thuc. 7.69.4 
Thuc. 8.13 (7620) 
Thuc. 7.34.3 (4464) 
There is no good reason for leaving Euthydemus and 
Menander off the list for 413/2. According to Thucydides they 
were generals at the last battle in the harbour at Syracuse - 
b..A/ 	. 	 '"Nr• 	. 	.1 
0 OE aillAC rt/2VelS 1.--0.1 rr i i 1/(AV.S DOS 06"Nros, 	( cZ.-.rct Yap ETI 
k 	 ( 	\ , , Tq5 Vas -n'.., AokivAttLov Crperl voi crrri30.v ) _ 119 	Spley does 
not include Strombichides on the board for this year. 12u 
412/1 
Strombichides Diotimou Euonymeus I 	Thuc. 8.15.1 
Eucrates Niceratou Cydantides II Schol. Aristoph. Lys 103 
(5757) 
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Phrynichos Stratonidou Deiradiotes IV Thuc. 8.25.1 (15011) 
Onomacles Kekropidos VII Thuc. 8.25.1 (11576) 
Thrasycles Thuc. 8.15.1 (7317) 
Diomedon Thuc. 8.19.2 (4065) 
Leon Thuc. 8.23.1 (9100) 
Scironides Thuc. 8.25.1 (12730) 
Euctemon Thuc. 8.30.1 (5782) 
Charminos Thuc. 8.30.1 (15517) 
See also the lists of Fornara and Beloch. 121 
411/0 
Strombichides Diotimou Euonymeus I . 
Eumachos Euonymeus I 
Theramenes Hagnonos Steirieus III 
Thrasyboulus Lycou Steirieus III 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Dieitrephes Scambonides IV 
Aristarchus Deceleeus VIII 
Aristoteles Timocratous Thoraieus X 
Conon Timotheou Anaphlystios X 
Chaireas Arches tratou 
Thrasyllus 
Alexicles 
Thymochares 
Melanthius 
Simichos 
Thuc. 8.62; 8.79 
Xen. 1.1.2 
Thuc. 8.92.9 (7234) 
Thuc. 8.76.2 (7310) 
Thuc. 8.82.1 
Thuc. 8.64.2 
Thuc. 8.98.1 (1663) 
Xen. 2.3.46 
Diod. 13.48.6 
Diod. 13.50.7 (15093) 
Thuc. 8.76.2 (7333) 
Thuc. 8.92.4 (535) 
Thuc. 8.95.2 (7406) 
Xen. 2.3.46 (9768) 
Schol. Aesch. 2.31 (13030) 
It is difficult to know to what extent established 
procedures were ignored 22d abrogated in this period of revolution 
and counter-revolution. 1 	After the revolution of the Four Hundred 
at Athens the soldiers at Samos deposed some of their generals and 
elected others. Whether they elected a complete board or merely 
replaced (in number) the men they removed is not clear. 123 
124 Perhaps they deposed Charminos, but not Leon and Diomedon. 
Diomedon was again strategos in 406/5. Presumably the oligarchs 
elected some generals after the revolution of the Four Hundred, 125 
and maintained in office such men as Dieitrephes,who, to use Fornara's 
words, anticipated the normal course of events by joining the oligarchs 
and by going to Thrace to hold it in their interests. 126 Should 
231. 
the strategoi of the fleet and the generals of the oligarchy be 
considered separately? Both Fornara and Beloch believe so, 
at least for the first few months of 411. 127 However, after 
the fleet and the city were reconciled in the autumn of 411 4 and 
the city recognized the authority of the generals at Samos, 128 
the board of generals was probably larger than ten, even though 
oligarch generals such as Alexicles and Aristarchos fled to Agis at 
Decelea and to Oenoe on the border with Boeotia. 129 Certainly, 
in the last months of 411 and early 410, before the battle of 
Cyzicus, the generals of the fleet and of the Five Thousand 
co-operated, working and fighting together. 13° 	Nevertheless, 
some scholars have maintained that the generals elected by the 
fleet in 411 continued for some years as a separate board distinct 
from the boards appointed annually by the city. 131  This view is  
usually based on the indication in Xenophon that Alcibiades was 
first elected by the city in 407. According to Xenophon 1.4.10 ... 
o 'Aoriio I 	 tkov ro )/b■ki 5: cz v Ake V 41: ec.N.•rct, icQk / k 	 1." 	 n 
6ettSUAOVX0 WOV ra, Wv'tk:v Lt, 6Z Tr 	etc- 11-v omovcv. 	Xenophon 
makes it clear that Alcibiades was nervous about returning to Athens, 
and only sailed into the Peiraeus when he heard that he had been 
elected general)-32 	The fact that he found reassurance in his 
election is an indication that he was not chosen by the city before 
407. 	However, he was chosen by the fleet in 411 and fought as a 
general at Cyzicus in spring 410, 134 presumably having been confirmed 
in his position as strategos by the city)- 35 Furthermore, Alcibiades 
was active as a commander of Athenian troops in the years before 
407136 and the inference from Xenophon 1.3.8 is that he was a general 
in 409/8. 
In his recent interesting study of Alcibiades, E. Bloedow 
has argued that Alcibiades' cautio14.5 attitude on his return to Athens 
in 407 was a piece of adaptation. 1" 	Bloedaw questions the tradition 
preserved in Xenophon that Alcibiades was afraid to return to Athens. 
He suggests that Alcibiades' address to the council and assembly 138 
in the form of ancirri:Xcih was superfluous, because his election as 
strategos before he arrived nullified the previous sentences against 
him, or rather, proves that they had already been nullified. Furthv-
more, the decree of banishment had been officially revoked in 411, 19 
and without opposition once Peisander had asked each person who spoke 
against his proposals whether Athens could survive without an indivi-
dual who could persuade Tissaphernes to support Athens rather than 
Sparta. If Bloedow is right the statements in Xpophon that Alcibiades 
was still an exile are not precisely accurate. 14u It would seem 
to follow from all this that Xenophon 1.4.10 may not be an indication 
of Alcibiades' first election by the city. His command of Athenian 
troops in the Hellespont in 499 and 408 suggests in fact that he 
was elected earlier than 407. 141 However, the use of the title A CTXCV TO VAL1r1K0 in reference to a cert9ln Pasiphon (who was 
certainly one of the generals at Samos) '4  on a casualty list of 
about 409 tilts the scales in the opposite direction, implying that 
some sort of distinction existed between the generals at Samos and 
those elected by the city. But I am not convinced that Athens 
regarded the generals at Samos as strictly "unofficial" .141b  I would 
suggest in fact that the evidence of Nthe casualty list and IG i 2 304, 
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when taken together, enable us to define more precisely the 
relationship whip existed between the city and the generals 
at Samos. 	IG i 304 indicates that they were accorded full 
authority and status as strategoi by the city. To all intents 
and purposes they enjoyed the same prerogatives as generals. 
elected at home. The casualty list merely indicates that they 
were not elected by the city, nothing more. The Athenians made 
the distinction and it is understandable that they should do so,- 
but the heading of cipcv 	Vturi-4<e is at the top of the list, 
an acknowledgment o the rank of the two casualties named immediately 
below, a confirmation of their authority. 
Thus, even if we assume some sort of maration between 
the city and the fleet in the years 410 to 407 44 there is no 
difficulty in thinking that there was no legal distinction between 
the strategoi of the city and the fleet. To put it differently, if 
Alcibiades, for example, was not elected by the city, he was probably 
nevertheless recognized as a strategos because he was maintained 
in that position by the fleet. A brief examination of the career 
of Thrasyllus in these years may, it is suggested, cast some light 
on the situation. He was a general of the fleet in 411 and went to 
Athens late in that year with news of the victory of Abydos and a 
request for troops and ships. While Thrasyllus was in Athens he 10 
Athenian troops against a Spartan invasion of Attica (now in 410) 
and then received the troops and ships he had requested.' 44 By this 
time the full democracy had been restored at Athens and it is possible 
that he was elected as one of their generals. However, his repulse 
of Agis may easily have occurred before the restoration and this 
command may therefore be an indication of the attitude of the city 
to the generals of the fleet. Even if the restored democracy over- 
looked such men as Theramenes, Alcibiades and Thrasyboulus, I find it 
difficult to accept that their positions should be retarded as 	. 
unofficial or irregular. 14.5 For all we know Thrasyllus was not 
elected by the city for 409/8 but was voted troops and ships by Athens 
in recognition of his official position as general with the fleet. 
It seems obvious enough that the democracy was unwilling 
to replace Alcibiades and Thrasyboulus in their commands at the 
Hellespont if only because they were wary of alienating a fleet in 
control of their lifeline. However, it was probably not as simple . 
as that. The generals at the Hellespont were actively promoting 
the war against Sparta and Athens probably realized that they were 
the best commanders available. It is possible that Athens deliberate-
ly sent Thrasyllus to Ionia in the summer of 409 in an.atteTpt to 
demonstrate their power to the generals at the Hellespont. 14' If 
this is correct and the forces at the Hellespont were in urgent need 
of reinforcements, the Ionian expedition was not only foolish, but. dangerousboth for Athens and the fleet. 'However, was the fleet 
in desperate need of reinforcements? After the battle of Cyzicus 
the Spartan fleet was broken. 147  Furthermore, the inactivity of 
the generals and their failure to attack and capture Spartan bases 
on land (during 410/9) until the arrival of Thrasyllus in 408 may, 
be satisfactorily explained by the fact that they had been engaged 
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in continuous fighting since the summer of 411. The battle at 
Cynossema took place in about September 411. This was inconclusive 
and not surprisingly another major action resulted, this time at 
Abydos, in about November. The battle at Cyzicus occurred in March 
or April of 410. None of these engagements was a skirmish. They 
were serious encounters. By mid 410, not only was the Spartan fleet 
no longer the threat it had been, but the Athenians needed a rest. 
The inactivity of the generals is therefore explained. After the 
decisive action at Cyzicus there was no immediate need to reinforce 
the Hellespont. It is true enough that when Thrasyllus finally 
did reach the Hellespont and joined forces with Alcibiades, some 
friction was apparent between the two forces. According to Andrewes, 
troops were needed at the Hellespont and the ill-feeling of Alcibiades' 
soldiers towards the hoplites of Thrasyllus was due to the delay 
(the expedition to Ionia) in their arrival. 145 Xenophon is more 
explicit. He states that the veterans of Alcibiades refused to 
associate with troops who had just been defeated. 149 I suggest that 
Athens realized that further progress in the Hellespont could only 
be achieved by sending reinforcements to Alcibiades. Accordingly, 
Thrasyllus was dispatched in 409 but was instructed to make use of 
his forces in Ionia on the way because the situation at the Hellespont 
was favourable. It follows that Athens recognized Alcibiades' 
authority as a general. After Thrasyllus linked with Alcibiades 
their joint forces marched against Abydos. 	Alcibiades made use of 
Thrasyllus' troops. 150 
Neither Fornara nor Beloch include Strombichides on their 
_lists for 411/0. However, the implication of Thucydides 8.79.3 is 
that Strombichides had been elected by the fleet. Due to the events 
•of 411 nothing much can be made of the large size of the board in 
411/0. 151  
!410/9 
Eumachos Euonymeus I 
Theramenes Hagnonos Steirieus III 
Thrasyboulus Lycou Steirieus III 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Pasiphon Phrearrios IV 
Theoros Leontidos IV 
Aristocrates Sceliou Kekropidos VII 
Oinobios Deceleeus VIII 
Dexicrates Aigilieus X 
Eucleides 
Thrasyllus 
IC i2  304A. 35-36. 
Diod. 13.64.3 
Diod. 13.64.2 
IG i2 304A. 35 
IG i2 304A. 35 (11668) 
Hesp.,v.33, p.49 
IG i 2 304A. 35. 
2 IC i" 108.47 (11357) 
IG i2 304A.35 (3226) 
2 IG i 304A. 17 (5672) 
Xen. 1.1.34 
It seems highly likely that Eumachos, a general in 
411/0, should also be considered as 2a general for this year. His name iseasily restored to IG i 304A, lines 35-36.15 2 
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409 /8 
Theramenes Hagnonos Steirieus III 
Thrasyboulus Lycou Steirieus III 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Pericles Pericleous Cholargeus V 
Leotrophides 
Timarchos 
Anytos Anthemionos 
Thrasyllus 
Diod. 13.66.1 
Diod. 13.64.1 
Xen. 1.3.3 
IG 12 301.22 (11812) 
Diod. 13.65.1 (9159) 	. 
Diod. 13.65.1 (13623) 
Diod. 13.64.6 (1324) 
Xen. 1.3.6 
408/7 
Theramenes Hagnonns Steirieus III 
Thrasyboulus Lycou Steirieus III 
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Thrasyllus 
Diod. 13.68.1 
Xen. 1.4.9 
Xen. 1.4.8 
Xen. 1.4.10 
-407/6 
-:,Thrasyboulus Lycou Steirieus III 
-Adeimantus Leucolophidou Scambonides IV 
.Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides IV 
Pericles Pericleous Cholargeus V 
-Aristocrates Sceliou Kekropidos VII 
Conon Timotheou Anaphlystips X 
Phanosthenes 
Xen. 1.4.10 
Xen. 1.4.21 (202) 
Xen. 1.4.10 
IG i 2 105,5-6 
IG i2 1.4 . 21 
Xen. 1.4.10 
Xen. 1.5.18 (14083) 
Xenophon 1.4.20 states that Alcibiades was proclaimed 4. , 	c 	N. 	› 	/ curcio/Twv siv'Etv ac.' -r-P it:pirr- r. 	 Whatever else this may mean it 
is not connected with 'Alcibiades' election as a strategos. He 
had been elected as a general before his return to Athens, but was , 	) not proclaimed allAiirwv' 79-i-L vl CZO rOKE)61,1 until after his arrival 
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and his speech in the ecclesia. 153 It is not therefore evidence > c for the so-called single or-Tar/roc 	Qz-a.vi-wv 	and does not explain 
the double representation of Leontis by Alcibiades and Adeimantus. 154 
Presumably Xenophon's expression means that Alcibiades was author-
ized to conduct the war in whatever way he saw fit. He was 
entrusted with powers which extended beyond those which he already 
possessed as a general, but his powers do not seem to have been 
specifically defined as were those of the (71ATIArot ctu -roocpa.rop ES 
sent to Sicily in 415. This grant was an unprecedented measure 
which gave Alcibiades supreme command and authority over other 
strategoi. This much is clear from the fact that when he left the 
fleet anchored at Notium to visit the general Thrasyboulus, who was 
investing Phocaea, he appointed the pilot of his own ship to command 
the fleet in his absence. 155 There were two other generals present 
with the fleet, Adeimantus and Aristocrates. 156 	Quite obviously 
Alcibiades was their superior for the command would have automatic-
ally become their responsibility if they had been equal colleagues 
with Alcibiades. 156a Furthermore, the blame for the defeat at 
Notium was placed solely on Alcibiades' shoulders. Although 
Adeimantus was not one of the ten generals elected after the battle, 
Aristocrates was. Adeimantus was restored to office after Arginusae. 
No blame was attached to these two generals - they were subordinate 
to Alcibiades.. 
The Special grant to Alcibiades of powers which in effect 
reduced the other strategoi to subordinate officers was an aberration, 
quickly dispensed with. The immediate election of a new board of 
generals is indicative of the change. The appointment of Alcibiades c as cirretvrtw iirEAY:tirrokfxtrtur in 407 is the only deviation from the 
principle of equality in the strategia. Strict collegiality, in 
-principle and in fact, eliCept in this instance, was unbroken through-
out the fifth century. 15/ It has been thought by some scholars that 
Alcibiades was granted special powers by the fleet at Samos when they 
elected him strategos in 411, for in additicn to mentioning the 	. 
election Thucydides also states wairoL7rp4y/l ek-rzt ntivrft 01.) vErte1.1k. .1.58 • 
However, Alcibiades did not participate as a strategos in the battle 
at 'Cynossema, 159 and unless the generals were equal in authority and 
able to decide strategy and tactics and give battle on their own 
initiative, the absence of Alcibiades provokes difficulties. Further 
the late arrival of Alcibiades on the scene at the battle of Abydos 
is not Commensurate with an alleged position of superiority. Once 
again, other strategoi had acted as if they need only consult 
themselves. It would seem an over-interpretation of Thucydides' 
words to consider that Alcibiades was made commander-in-chief. A 
more likely interpretation is that the Athenian's at. Samos relied on 
his judgements on political policy rather than military strategy. 
He, at any rate, persuaded them not to sail to the Peiraeus but to 
allow him to negotiate with Tissaphernes - in this sense the fleet 
r. arTutp.curec rr:tvro_ clvcri Ofes-rtil . 161 As .far as the battle of Cyzicus 
is concerned, it is true that Xenophon reports as if Alcibiades 162 made all the decisions and that credit for the victory was his alone. 
However, when we turn to Diodorus' account, significantly much more 
detailed, Alcibiades' predominance disappears. Decisions appear to 
have been made by all the generals collectively, 163 and at the point 
of action they decided to divide their force into three squadrons, 164 Thrasyboulus leading one, Alcibiades another and Theramenes the third. 
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There cannot be any doubt that the Athenian command at 
Arginusae was collegiate. According to Xenophon each of the 
eight generals had direct command over a contingent of fifteen 
ships. ]-65 It was merely a matter of deciding where in the line 
each general and his contingent should be placed. After the battle 
and the victory the Athenian generals decided collectively upon the 
next course of action - 60e. kw ras 	AOlVeLLW 
l'rpo:Trlycis• • 166 All the generals were judged responsible for 
failing to respie their shipwrecked comrades after the battle and 
were deposed. ]- u Those who returned to Athens were imprisoned, 
tried and put to death. 168 Obviously, if any one or two of the 
generals had authority over their colleagues the whole eight strategoi 
would not have been condemned, only those, as in the instance of 
Alcibiades after Notium, who were entrusted with superior powers. 
406/5 
Archestratus Phrearrios IV 	Xen. 1.5.16; Diod.13.74.1 (2430) 
Adeimantus Leucolophidou Scambonides IV Xen. 1.7.1 
Pericles Pericleous Cholargeus V Xen. 	1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1 
Aristocrates Sceliou Kekropidos VII Xen. 	1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1 
Conon Timotheou Anaphlystios X Xen. 	1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1 
Aristogenes Xen. 	1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1 (1781) 
Diomedon Xen. 1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1 
Erasinides Xen. 	1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1 (5021) 
Thrasyllus Xen. 1.5.16 
Protomachus Xen. 	1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1 (12318) 
Lysias Diod. 13.74.1 (9351) 
Philocles Xen. 	1.7.1 )14517) 
The ten generals elected after Alcibiades' failure at 
Notium are listed by both Xenophon and Diodorus. Diodorus 13.74.1 
names Thrasyboulus instead of Thrasyllus. There are no difficulties 
here for it is clear from Diodorus' later narrative 169 that 
Thrasyboulus was not a general and should be considered a trierarch, 
as in Xenophon's account.-7° Leon appears in Xenophon's list but is 
Lysias in Diodorus. Again there is no difficulty. Leon does not 171 
reappear in Xeptiphon but becomes Lysias at the battle of Arginusae, 
and at 1.7.2. 1 " Diodorus 13.101.5 names a Calliades as one of 
the generals who returned to Athens after Arginusae. This is probably 
Diodorus' mistake but puzzling nonetheless. He can only be identified 
with Diomedon or Erasinides, both difficult.173 
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405/4 
Eucrates Niceratou Cydantides II 	Lysias 18.4 
Adeimantus Leucolophidou Scambonides IV 	Xen. 2.1.30 
Tydeus Lamachou Oethen VI Xen. 2.1.16 (13884) 
Conan Timotheou Anaphlystios X 	Xen. 2.1.28 
Cephisodotos 	 Xen. 2.1.16 (8312) 
Nenander Xen. 2.1.16 
Philocles Xen. 2.1.30 
cACFOrding to Xenophon 2.1.16, the Athenians sviirc)kis 
11-P 4'5 "rets 	°on 	XO‘q-0 tlevctvpov, 	Kl+tro oTdv . 
This suggests that three additional generals were elected after 
the regular xciporcvreL. 	There is another possibility. Lysias 
states that Theramenes was elected for 405/4 but rejected at 
his dokimasia. 174 These generals may be replacements for three 
men rejected, Theramenes and two others. It is possible that 
Archestratus was a general for 405/4. After the deposition of the 
eight generals in 406, Adeimantus and Philocles were elected. 
These two, plus Conon, were confirmed in office for 405/4. There 
is no evidence for Archestratus but he may have merited the same 
consideration. It is also possible that Cleophon was a general)-75 
APPENDIX 
The Strateala - Its Nature and Powers. 
According to Hignett, after the reform of Telesinus 
in 487/6, the presidency of the ecclesia may have been transferred 
from the eponymous archon to the generals. There is no evidence 
to indicate that this occurred. In Periclean Athens the Crit(roxls 
of the Council of Five Hundred also acted as the president of the 
ecclesia if it met during his day of office. 2 If the archon was 
Adeprived of the presidency of the ecclesia in 487/6 it may have been 
 transferred at this time to the mitc-ra.-11-S chosen from the Council. 
_Even this is not certain. The change may have been effected at a 
_later date. Hignett is probably right in believing that the inno-
vation of choosing the president of the ecclesia from the Council 
.scan hardly be dated. later than Fphialtes' reforms but need not be 
-earlier. 3 There seems no reason to think that the Athenians deemed 
it necessary to transfer the presidency to the strategoi in 487/6, 
umless it be assumed that there was a deliberate attempt (by 
Themistocles, perhaps) to substitute one executive in the state for 
another . (the generals for the archons). and that this was part of 
the process. However, such an assumption appears unwarranted. The 
reform of Telesinus was a democratic innovation and as such was 
designed to weaken executive power rather than strengthen it. The 
incongruity is obvious if the reformers, after objecting to a strong 
archonship and strong civil executive, vested the powers they removed 
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from it in their military executive. 4 Moreover, it is surely an 
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argument from hindsight to suggest that there was a direct 
connection between the demise of the archonship and the rise of 
the strategia. In the 480's the strategia was a military institution. 
It was only later and as a product of entirely different developments 
that the strategoi became political leaders no less than military. 5 
It is nothing short of anachronistic to consider that the Athenians 
associated civil powers with the strategia as early as the 480 / s. 
In brief, for these reasons it is very unlikely that there was an 
intermediate stage in the transference of thepresidenay of the ecclesia 
from the archon to an ERITTO115 chosen from the boule during which 
the generals were allocated the responsibility. Rather, the problem 
3 is one of dating the changeover to the tirlif-rcurtt, from the archon, 
and the obvious choice is between 487 and 462. 
In the period before the institution of the taxiarchs the 
strategoi were probably given certain administrative reponsibilities 
associated with their tribes. In addition to assuming direct command 
over their tribal contingents when they all participated in a battle, 
as at Marathon, they were also probably responsible for discipline 
of their regiments, 6 and presided over cases involving hoplites charged 
with desertion or failure to report for duty. 7 Other routine duties 
which later became the responsibilities of the taxiarchs may have 
fallen to the generals in the first twenty years of the fifth century. 
They may, for example, have appointed \oxa.Vol as their immediate 
tribal subordinates 8  and prepared and kept up to date the catalogues 
% 	/ of the 4L:AE-rat eligible for military service. 	When only one general 
commanded an Athenian expedition, as did Melanthius in 499/8 and 
Miltiades (against Paros) in 490/89, the other generals were possibly 
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therefore involved with such administrative details as those 
connected with the organisation of tribal contributions to the 
forces, but once the expedition left Athens the conduct of the 
whole army, rather than merely the conduct of a single tribal 
contingent, was the responsibility of the strategos appointed. D3  
The strategoi were never purely tribal commanders, but when in 
command of Athenian armies and fleets, whether only one was present 
or several, decisions for or against battle and tactical arrangements 
were solely their responsibility. It is quite clear from Herodotus .' 
account of the battle at Marathon, for example, that the generals had 
the authority either to risk an engagement or withdraw. 
It seems that even though the taxiarchs were empowered to 
preside over the trials of hoplites accused of desertion and failure 
to report for duty, this responsibility was always shared with the 
strategos. 11 Generals, to be sure, had to act as legal officers in 
cases which were outside the jurisdiction of taxiarchs. Charges of 
desertion and cowardice brought against soldiers and sailors who were 
not under the direct command of taxiarchs were probably dealt with 
by generals, and during the fifth century they had the power to inflict 
the death penalty. 12 Strategoi were empowered to punish lesser 
breaches of discipline with imprisonment, exile or (less commonly 
in practice) the imposition of a fine. 13 The generals were the 
highest authority to which the troops could appeal in disputes when 
on campaign and there is evidence which indicates that generals 
arbitrated even in disputes between trierarchs. 14 It goes without 
saying thct the strategoi were in immediate charge of taxiarchs, 
15 trierarchs and hipparchs, although' on occasions generals deliberated 
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with them about strategy and tactics. 16 
In one sense it is an overstatement to assert that when 
Athens, on the eve of Xerxes' invasion, became a great naval power, 
the strategoi acquired the command of the fleet as well as the army, 
and on the foundation of the Delian League they became the leaders 
of the naval and military forces of the new confederacy. 17 From 
their inauguration in 501/0 the strategoi were naval commanders, 
small though the Athenian navy may have been in the early years of 
the fifth century. Melanthius had command of twenty ships in his 
expedition in support of the Ionians in 499/8, and Miltiades was 
granted a fleet of seventy ships in 490 to conduct his campaign 
against Paros. 18 However, the competence of the strategoi was certainly 
enlarged by the creation of a large fleet in the 480's and their 
powers were made more important when Athens acquired the hegemony of 
the Greek League forces from Sparta in 478. From the time of the 
early years of the Delian League the generals probably supervised 
the collection of financial contributions from the allies - it is clear 
that under the Empire, generals commanded the squadrons which collected 
19 the tribute from the subject states. 	They probably also supervised 
the imposition of terms and penalties on recalcitrant member-state's 
of the empire which revolted. 20 
The prestige of the strategia was no doubt enhanced during 
the Persian War of 480/79; the actions and decisions of Athenian 
strategoi, particularly Themistocles, played no small part in contri-
buting to the Greek victory. The increased scope of the magistracy 
after the Persian invasion, together with the fact that there was 
21 no legal limit to the number of times a man could hold office, 	meant 
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that the strategia did not long remain the preserve of men elected 
for military leadership alone. Indeed, whatever effect the reform 
of Telesinus had on the quality of candidates for the archonship, 
if any, after 487/6 the strategia was the only important office to 
be filled by direct election and its attraction to members of the 
leading families seeking political leadership of the state was a 
development which, although evident before Xerxes' invasion, 22 became 
more obvious afterwards. Although the authority enjoyed by Themistocies 
perhaps depended less on his possession of the strategia than on 
his retention of the confidence of the ecclesia, 23 Cimon's success 
as a strategos in the early years of the 470's (beginning in 478/7), 
while ensuring that his tenure of office continued virtually unbroken. 
until 461, 24 played a large part in his rise to political predominance. 
A statesman like Cimon, whose popularity was reflected in his annual 
^ 	/ re-election and whose position of Trrro. Cohip in the state was 
achieved and maintained by a combination of military and political 
ability, was able to exert a positive influence on the shaping of 
policy, and as a general, play a major role in the execution of policy. 
Thus, under the influence of Cimon, Athens continued a pro-Spartan 
policy throughout the early years of the Pentacontaetia and at his 
instigation sent a force of hoplites under his command to assist Sparta 
in her struggle against the Helots in the late 460's. Cimon was the 
first of a series of prominent Athenians whose rise to power was 
facilitated by tenure of the strategia. From the early 470's (if not 
before) until the 420's the only path to a distinguished political 
career was through constant military achievement. There is no reason 
to doubt that the prominence of Ephialtes in the late 460's was aided 
243. 
25 by his military success as a general, 	or that Pericles' career 
was launched in the 460's by his election to the strategia. Proven 
military ability and achievements contributed to the prestige and 
power which Pericles enjoyed at Athens from the late 440's until 
429 and that which Nicias enjoyed during the Archidamian War and 
later. 26 
Although the strategia had political importance throughout 
the fifth century, the demands of purely military matters on the 
generals during the Peloponnesian War, the fact that they were engaged 
in operations away from Athens for much of the year, was partially 
responsible for the emergence of a growing distinction between the 
military and political professions, a process which was by no means 
completed until some time during the fourth century. 27 It does seem 
clear that certain distinguished generals of the Peloponnesian War, 
for example Demosthenes and perhaps Phormio to a lesser extent, 28 
concerned themselves almost totally with military affairs l and when 
compared with their predecessors played a relatively minor role in 
the political arena and the shaping of policy. A growth in special-
ization in political affairs was a contiguous development. It needs 
to be noted that the more important of the demagogues of the fifth 
century, the men who became prominent politically through their 
oratorical ability, may have all been generals. Cleon certainly was, 
and there is a chance that both Hyperbolus and Cleophon were also. 29 
It was only during the fourth century that the strategia ceased to 
be the politico-military executive institution Of the state, for by 
the middle of the fourth century no preminent politicians were also 
C generals. Even though it would seem that the strategia held some 
importance to the demagogues as a vehicle to promote their political 
power, their careers form a sharp contrast with those of their 
political predecessors. aa  Cleon and perhaps Hyperbolus came to the 
strategia after and because they were already prominent politicians. 31 
The period of the Peloponnesian War was in effect a time 
of transition for the strategia, a period which saw the beginning of 
its decline in political power. An avenue to political prominence, 
other than by military accomplishment, was opened up to prospective 
politicans, an avenue which was at first exceptional but which later 
became the rule - the _phenomenon of eloquent orators whose rise to 
power was not facilitated by election to the strategia. Aristotle 
summed up the change in his observation that capable speakers of his 
own day no longer concerned themselves with military affairs because 
they lacked the experience. 32 Cleon's military career foreshadowed 
this development - Amphipolis suggests that he, a general who came to 
office relatively late, an amateur, was no match for a professional 
--soldier, a -Brasidas. Conversely, (that is, in the sense of a growing 
distinction between the military and political spheres) Demosthenes' 
career foreshadows the development - a successful and distinguished 
commander, a specialist concerned with military matters. A new 
pattern was set, the old rules were broken, but the change was gradual. 
For the time being at least, as the careers of other prominent Athen-
ians indicate (Nicias and Alcibiades, for example) political power 
and prestige was more usually achieved by success on the battlefield, 
by proven military leadership. 
Although the military success of a general was useful in 
promoting his prestige and political authority, although the strategia 
245. 
provided a congenial field of action for the members of the tradit-
ionally important political families,. 33 this path to power and the 
consolidation and strenthening of political influence was not without 
its hazards. The Demos dealt harshly with generals who failed to 
achieve objectives laid down or failed in the execution of a policy 
they had advocated. The failure of Cimon to win the trust of the 
Spartans in 461 contributed to his humiliation and ostracism, 34 and 
the failure of Miltiades' Parian expedition resulted in his trial and 
the imposition of a heavy fine. 35 There are numerous other examples. 
36 Pericles was deposed from office in 429 and fined, and Phormio, also 
)( dismissed from office not long afterwards, may have become aT; )405 
and barred from re-election when unable to pay the fine. 37 In 424 
'Tythodorus and Sophocles were banished and Eurymedon fined, 38 and in 
407/6 Alcibiades was deposed. 39 Demosthenes was probably removed from 
office in 427/6. He was too afraid to return to Athens after his 
failure in Aetolia, 40 and only came home when his military fortunes 
ihad improved 41  The eight generals at the battle of Arginusae were 
deposed and the six who returned to Athens executed. 42  Thucydides 
himself was exiled for 1ife, 43  and probably as a result of his failure, 
44 when general, to check Brasidas in the Thraceward region in 424/3. 
In most of these instances (but possibly not all) the generals were 
-deposed at one of the regular meetings of the ecclesia when a confirm- 
atory vote was taken on the satisfactoriness of the conduct of magi- 
) 	r strates in office. A vote was taken (ernpro-rovox.) in every prytany 
. which meant that a general's behaviour was assessed ten times during , 
his year of office. 45 If the vote went against on official 
3 (arroxelrorovict) he automatically lost office and was tried by a jury 
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court. 46  If he was convicted by the court the penalty was assessed 
by the assembly, 47 and if he was acquitted he resumed office. 48 The 
ecclesia had the power to inflict the death penalty but, if we are 
to judge from the evidence, usually imposed a fine or exiled the 
offender. 49 
The confirmatory vote every prytany reflects the degree 
of control the ecclesia had over the elected magistrates. 50  The 
,e:)ktriatria. , an examination which magistrates-elect had to undergo 
 before their entry on office, 51  and the wawa., an examination of 
the accounts of a magistrate at the end of his term of office, 52 were 
no doubt designed to ensure that undesirables and incompetents were 
unable to attain public office, and to minimise corruption and encour-
age diligence, but they further emphasize the extent to which the 
Demos maintained a close watch over the activities of its chief 
officials. The military officials, including generals, not only had 
to face the wrath of the people if unsuccessful on the battlefield 
or if they were judged to have made a decision not in the best interegts 
of the state when on campaign, but were also exposed to the dangers of 
combat. The casualty rate of generals killed in action was not low. 
At least one of the ten generals at Marathon was killed, as was the 
polemarch. 53 Thucydides records the .death of some generals during 
the Peloponnesian War. Three generals were killed in the Chalcidice 
in 429. 54 An Athenian general was killed in Sicily in 426, 55 and 
57 	58 Lamachus, 56 Eurymedon, Nicias and Demosthenei, the commanders 
of the second disastrous expedition to Sicily, were all killed there. 59 
Procles was killed in Aetolia6° and Hippocrates at the battle of 
Delium, 61 and two Athenian generals were killed at the battle of 
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Mantinea. 62 Casualty lists record the death of other generals. 63 
In spite of the fact that the Athenians exerted a stern 
control over the strategoi using the procedures outlined above and 
even if Fornara's statement is correct that they exercised a sovereign 
authority not merely in the general formulation of policy but in the 
detailed supervision of that policy's execution, 64 nevertheless the 
strategia did not lose its attraction to men of ambition, ancestry 
and wealth, and year after year the ecclesia returned to office men 
whose opinions were respected. It has sometimes been thought that there 
was a property qualification for the office, but this is by no means 
proved. 	As Jones has noted," respect was based on the grounds of 
ancestry and wealth, and although a property qualification was required 
for the office of treasurer of Athena, 67 the strategia was probably 
reserved, generally speaking, to men of noble birth and landed wealth 
and to men with a family tradition of military and political leader- 
ship, not by the need to conform with a restricted qualification require-
ment,but for reasons of expediency: 68 de facto therefore, rather than 
de jure. There are several passages in our literary sources which 
testify to the unwillingness of the ecclesia to promote men from its 
ranks to military office. Aristotle notes that during the Pentacon-
taetia, Athenian forces were commanded by men with no experience of 
war but elected on account of their family reputations ,69  and in the 
time of Xenophon this was still not uncommon. 70. There is of course 
some irony in the fact that the radical democracy looked to the 
aristocratic families to fill executive positions. However, the strategoi 
were accountable for their actions and the Demos, not unconscious of 
its power, was not slow to punish generals who abused their authority. 
65 6 
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Accordingly, as Hignett has stated, 71 it may be more true to say 
that the ecclesia was not afraid to take its leaders from the higher 
ranks of society because it was secure in its knowledge of its 
control over them. Moreover, it had always been customary to choose 
generals from the nobility and custom does not change overnight. 
On the other hand the strategia retained its prestige and 
remained the most attractive office throughout the fifth century, 
and therefore it would be strange if its members did not possess 
certain well-defined constitutional prerogatives. However, the evid-
ence is weak and due to the fact that the people elected men whose 
opinions they respected and to whom they therefore already looked for 
advice, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the control 
of defence and foreign policy by strategoi was the result of certain 
constitutional prerogatives. The generals may have beenex-officio 
members of the boule72 but this would not seem an extraordinary privilege 
for ordinary citizens could make applications and gain access to the 
Council. 73 Nevertheless, if the strategoi could propose motions 
in the boule 74 they did possess some advantage, for magistrates and 
citizens who were not members of the Council could not propose motions 
when admitted but had to rely on a bouleutes to act on the statements 
they made. An ordinary citizen may have encountered some difficulties 
in gaining access to the Council as a permit was required from the 
prytaneis for admission. However,we can safely assume that magistrates 
would have no difficulty in obtaining permission from the prytaneis 
for an audience and that their statements would be taken up and intro-
duced as proposals by members of the Council. Thus it would make 
little difference whether the strategoi were members of the boule or 
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not. There is in fact some evidence which suggests that generals 
were not members of the boule, or that if they were they preferred to 
follow the ordinary procedure and allow councillors the responsibility 
of introducing their proposals. 75 When it is also considered that 
the ecclesia was empowered to instruct the prytaneis to admit a 
citizen before the boule, 76 it follows that citizens who were in the 
confidence of the Demos could in reality effectively enjoy exactly 
the same privileges, in relation to the boule, as the magistrates, 
including strategoi. Popular politicians were of course usually 
/ generals, but a Trpoern-ro -Moor) who was not a general was not thereby 
significantly disadvantaged with regard to the influence he could 
exert in shaping policy by causing to have placed on the agenda for 
decision by the ecclesia measures he thought desirable. 
We can therefore expect that there was a close co-operation 
between the boule and the leaders of Athens whether they were generals 
or not. Nevertheless the boule probably relied on the opinions of 
experienced generals when dealing with military measures and preparing 
agenda for the assembly, 77 and the prytaneis convened the assembly 
on the request of the generals, 78 giving priority on its agenda to 
any business they brought forward. 79 It was within the powers of the 
strategoi to have the prytaneis convene a special meeting of the 
^ 	J ecclesia, 80  but Thucydides' phrase at 2.22.1 - irrErtiOls ciatisprctil 
TC. OVK tlrotE aaruJV Ou6E. SOAXOgo1/ 04)6fikz - does not necessarily mean 
that strategoi had the authority to postpone or disallow regular 
meetings. 81 It is just as likely that Pericles, in his capacity as 
a strategos, prevailed upon his colleagues not to have a special 
meeting convened, 82 or that the ecclesia itself suspended meetings 
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during the actual invasion period, leaving it to the discretion 
of the strategoi to summon a meeting if they required it. 83 The 
fact that the strategoi were able to have summoned special assemblies 
presupposes their power to initiate business in the ecclesia which 
would be given precedence over other matters at regular meetings, 84 
but the special privileges of the generals in regard to the ecclesia 
do not appear to have extended further. These prerogatives hardly 
amounted to much when, theoretically, at least, policy could be 
decided by a vote on the proposals of any person eligible to sit in 
the assembly, 85 even if, as Hignett observes, 86 the initiative was 
generally left to the elected executive and the politicians. 
Although the strategoi did possess a positive political 
advantage to the extent that matters which they brought forward had 
preference over all other business, their control of defence and 
foreign policy in the fifth century was not so much by virtue of 
constitutional prerogatives they enjoyed, but rather by virtue of the 
tendency of the ecclesia to follow the advice and recommendations of 
its generals cum political leaders. Generals, to be sure, used what 
special privileges they were granted to introduce business on their 
own initiative, either individually or collectively. Pericles prop- 
osed the Megarian Decree 87 and because he was a general it was probably 
given top priority on the agenda for decision by the ecclesia. 88 
However, probably more usually, generals introduced business directly 
connected with military policy or with a view to obtaining military 
commands. Thus,Demosthenes in 425 applied and obtained permission 
to use thc fleet embarked for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophocles, 
89 if he wished, on the coast of the Peloponnese, 	and Cleon in 422 
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prevailed on the Athenians to send an expedition under his command 
to Thrace. 90 This procedure, whereby a military expedition was 
sent from Athens upon the instigation of a general (or generals) and 
commanded by him (or them), may have been quite common throughout 
the fifth century, 91 and may account for a sizeable proportion of the 
operations of the Peloponnesian War. This procedure may in fact be 
an explanation for some of the instances in our sources, 
and epigraphic, of phraseologies such as g io 
I 	/ cwros or ; 10■10. K41 01 UVQINK0VT85. Thus, Thucydides' 
both literary 
trettar05 
phraseology 
may have sometimes been determined by the fact that a particular 
general proposed a particular mission. To take an example, Thucydides' 
choice of eponym in the phrase Kant/(13/1-‘0V kcaktA00 r14.Tr-rov otirrOV 
errarprov , at 1.61.1, may be an indication that Callias was responsible 
for initiating the proposal to send a force to Potidaea, or that he 
acted as the spokesman in the ecclesia, and perhaps before the boule, 
for a group of five generals. 
However, even though generals often obtained commands through 
their own initiative, the fact remains that they had to persuade the 
ecclesia to adopt a particular course of action. In the final analysis 
the ecclesia made the decision to launch a particular expedition, 
determined which strategoi would command it, issued instructions as 
to the size and composition of the force and laid dawn the objectives 
and strategy of the campaign. The advice and recommendations of 
strategoi in all these matters might often, as Fornara has noted, 92 
be decisive, 93 but it is clear from the grant of special powers to 
Nicias, Lamachus. and Alcibiades in 415 that strategoi were not usually 
able to decide how a particular campaign would be conducted or to 
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decide the size of the forces to be sent. 94  Thucydides also notes 
that Nicias was appointed as one of the commanders against his will, 95 
which was probably unusual, but nevertheless demonstrates the extent 
to which the ecclesia was the master of its chief executive officials. 
It would appear that individual generals had no control over their 
assignments unless they themselves proposed a course of action, and 
even then it was not a certainty. The instructions issued to the 
generals sent to Corcyra in 433, that they were to avoid a collision 
with the Corinthian fleet unless the Corinthians threatened a landing 
on Corcyra or her possessions, 96 were probably more precisely defined 
than was usual. 97 It must have been generally expected that strategoi 
would use their initiative within the framework of the instructions 
they received and th3refore perhaps, common practice to allow strategoi 
some discretionary powers of action . 98 Generals, for example, had 
the authority to make agreements and draw up treaties when on campaign, 
but they were accountable for the actions and initiatives they saw 
fit to put into effect. Thus Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon acted 
on their awn initiative in concluding a peace with the Sicilians in 
424. They were brought to account not because they overstepped their 
authority but because their action proved unacceptable to an ecclesia 
which thought in the circumstances that the generals should have used 
their discretion to press for a military victory. 99 
According to Fornara, by the last decade of the fifth century 
the Athenians had begun assigning special competencies to strategoi 
on a regular basis. 100  The most important command which could be 
allocated was I; 	lAs -76.20(0 1/0401 va3g. Thus, Phrynichos, in 
tx 	/ 	';` 101 reference to whom Thucydides says, ST-real-1M 02 kVIA KUrfos 1V 
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held a special position in 411, and when 'iaovixov TOO Trelonavy0o- 
,, 	c 	) 	 r 	/ 
Tfeic...Aucrtv 0 OlpoS Is rov cuvapxoVra. 	, and 
N the Athenians subsequently wiTemtiputiav 	(1-1/A7n/rous 	V'S 
o,ovrc k KQA Eva-% 102 this is an indication that Phrynichos and 
Scironides and their replacements were allocated a particular command 
which was .; rr As Tnv>/1o 1 voAdvvqt'75. However, in Sicily in the 
winter of 426/5, we have an identical situation - the replacement of 
one general by another. Pythodorus replaced Laches in command of the 
fleet there. Thucydides 3.115.2 describes the transfer of the command 
using these words: 	avaropwayTes (the Athenians in Sicily) nes 
'-'1371ytov Ilveawpoi; Tim 'Io-o..6xov,l__'AOnvatow al-pal-1776v, rca.TaXal.,,,ec'wovacv _  
Fe;f:r-ar': 
	
'vain alaoxov 	 ypxev. . Are we to suppose that Laches 
k 	•"‘ and Pythodorus had special competencies as angTvp( eirt ros vao's. 
in 426/5? If so the apportionment of particular ccmmands to generals 
began much earlier than Fornara would have us believe. On the other 
. hand need we consider that Thucydides' language is technical rather than 
precise? I would suggest that there is no good reason to do so. 
Pythodorus was sent to Sicily to replace Laches in command of the fleet 
and this is exactly what he did - 	TruelNw(os Y 1 t?‹,Lov4.173 
M
A a 	1- pir05/ VECOVCirXrri errXE041...PI'd/tOITIIV frojr0V . 103 
Thucydides merely informs us that the command of the fleet changed 
hands. 	Similarly, Leon and Diomedon were sent to replace Phrynichos - 
and'Scironides in command of the fleet. This they did -0 
:Ajcov 	AtopAcov eVTp ab76) xecptc7mit. d(he-il.avot. ;Fin eri Tar Trov -'.A.e)vaiwv 
To be sure, they were sreallYbl qiabst-ELTh-1 , TX0up 	Tri '.1)6acp eiroci;a-ap-ro. . 104 
\ ern Tac vauS but so were all the other generals who commanded fleets 
during the Peloponnesian War and earlier. Nor does Thucydidesi 
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description of Phrynichos imply that he held a special position. 
The words the historian used are part of a sentence and that sentence 
must be considered within the context of the preceding passage. 
Phrynichos had just been urging the army to fortify Samos and look to 
/ kk / the defences. Thucydides then states, ErrycktlYs-t be kru icuplos iv 
) 
AxTells Trreccat.a/Taarct.. 	Phrynichos, as a general, had the power to 
order the fortification. This does not mean that no other general 
was empowered to issue the same instructions. Phrynichos used the 
authority vested in his office, not any powers which were entrusted 
especially to him and to him alone. 
However, although I do not agree with Fornara that the 
examples discussed above are evidence for specialized duties, there are 
other instances in our sources which do not so readily admit to an 
alternative explanation. Thus, at Henenica 1.4.21, Xenophon states 
that when the Athenians dispatched Alcibiades in 407,p-c-0 at3) -1-00 
1)161-0Kpari1c .Kill -A Scift.n.V ros AW (AO (0)00 6u4/241beettrcot Lcipre/ i 
k ^ Ktra by crrecniroi . The inference is that Aristocrates and Adeimantus 
only had authority to command troops on land and had no powers in 
relation to the fleet. Was this a specialized duty for which Aristo- 
> crates and Adeimantus had been especially elected at the ctrx0,1rEd-lat 
or were their powers defined only for this particular mission? If 
at the elections consideration was given to prospective duties, we 
can expect that two or more generals were elected every year to command 
KAT& 	. But this was not the case. Eight generals participated 
at the battle of Arginusae in command of the Athenian fleet. 105 On 
k 	- Fornara's reasoning they are (11TaTtrfot Eni 1 -05 VS . Conon did not 
take part in this battle. He was however, a strategos and he was 
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commanding a separate Athenian naval squadron at the time of 
> ■ Arginusae. 106 Ostensibly, he was also a crrpcapros P21:I ItK Vaias . 
Of the ten generals listed by Xenophon as elected for 406/5 only one 
\ is left (Archestratus) to command MR\ XIV. 
How is Xenophon's description of Aristocrates and Adeimantus 
to be explained? I would suggest that it is simply another example 
demonstrating the power of the Demos to control its executive officials. 
The ecclesia, in its instructions, defined the powers of two of the 
generals for a particular mission. They were to command on land. To 
c / be sure, Alcibiades' duties were not defined, but he was corov-r uiv 
4 \ 
rr‘ E/..“1.41 e-OTO KrnOp and superior to Aristocrates and Adeimantus.. On 
this interpretation there is no reason to suppose, as does Fornara, 
> that Conon could not take Alcibiades' place as .61 parl YoS ea" - ■ 'MS 
■,4135 until a vote of the Athenians assigned him this particular 
command. 107 The Athenians, certainly, sent Conon to take over 
Alcibiades' command after Alcibiades was deposed - I2ET1,; Ta EiTa 
, --(after -Alcibiades left Samos) ICOPWU 6C 	FIT 'AvaPov 	"X€ 
. Va 7411'.7 	EtKOC 
-  lnichicraplvwv . .-kOnva(wv 	 ov r7.-Xeva-ev lrri, TO 	vav7t,:ov .
108 
- . 
•But this does not mean that Conon was not already, if we are to use the 
■ s term, a 41-91alw05 errt TCRS Vat:5. He had command of twenty ships at 
Andros. 'What the Athenians decided was not to appoint Conon to a 
special position but to give him a new command. The situation is no 
different to that of Pythodorus in 426/5 or that of Diomedon and 
Leon in 411. A general replaced another. 	Thus Phanosthenes was 
sent with four ships to replace Conon at Andros when Conon was sent 
to Samos. 109 Phanosthenes duties, like Conon's, were defined. He 
had no duties other than those defined in his instructions, and his 
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instructions were to replace Conon. Conon, when he was sent to 
Samos, no longer had responsibility for Andros. 
In opposition to Fornara I do not think we an satisfactorily 
conclude that special competencies of strategoi were regularly apport-
ioned in the latter years of the fifth century. Although the evidence 
indicates that the Athenians often assigned generals to the strategic 
localities of Naupactus and Thrace, Thucydides' phrase npiittEvoV OE Cs 
\ .3 \ rs / 	3/ Ta  on pc aispv , 110 in reference to Dieitrephes, is not necess- 
) 	/ arily an indication that Thrace became a regular appl, a special 
command. - True enough, Dieitrephes had been elected to govern Thrace, 
but the Athenians probably often elected particular generals with a 
view to their prospective assignments, and much earlier than the' time 
of Dieitrephes' command. Asopius, in all likelihood, was only elected 
in 428 to aid the Acarnanianc, and perhaps the founder of Amphipolis, 
Hagnon, was elected in 429 to serve with Sitalces of Thrace. But 
there is a difference between electing generals for particular 
purposes, for planned or anticipated operations, and regularly apport-
ioning special competencies, as was the practice by the mid-fourth 
century. Neither the instances above mentioned nor the statement, for 
example, that Conon virxE NtetoTruKrW, 111 conclusively demonstrate special 
competencies. Although many military operations conducted during the 
Peloponnesian War were routine - amphibious forces were regularly sent • 
around the Peloponnese and until 424 the Athenians invaded the negarid 
112 annually 	- the fact remains that strategoi were used wherever 
	
- they were needed. 	And priorities changed. In 406/5 no generals were 
assigned to Thrace or to Naupactus but nine of them were used to 
command the navy. To the extent that different campaigns and assign- 
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ments required variations in the degree of control exerted (and 
restrictions imposed) by the Athenians over their strategoi, to this 
extent can it be asserted that special competencies were apportioned. 
Thus in some (if not many) instances, for example when secrecy was 
essential, 113 generals will not have been issued with the detailed, 
binding instructionsswe know was often the case. 
By way of conclusion, in theory the privileges of the strategoi 
were not much more than those of the ordinary citizen. In practice 
the ecclesia generally left it to her leading politicians to initiate 
policy and the leading politicians were usually generals. The 
strategoi, in particular individuals such as Cimon and Pericles, were 
in a position not only to shape policy, partly through their continuous 
contact with the boule but largely because of their political predom-
inance, but as leaders of the armed forces were able to play a major 
role in the execution of policy. Sometimes generals were made 
aPtekpayores , granted specially defined privileges which increased 
their freedom of action in conducting military operations, although 
this seems to have been unusual, but the leading statesmen of Athens 
owed their power to their political authority and popularity, the 
confidence and trust placed in them by the Demos, rather than to any 
rights inherent in the strategia automatically conferred on its 
members. 	After the reform of Telesinus the strategia replaced the 
archonship as the most important executive institution in the state 
and it remained the most prestigious office as long as it retained 
its attraction as a necessary adjunct for fillanDkcolors to obtain and 
maintain political prominence and influence. 
. APPENDIX 
Term of Office of Strate oi. 
• I - have assumed that the strategoi entered on office at the 
same time as the archons and most other Athenian magistrates, that 
is, on the first day of HekatoMbaion, in Midsummer. There is almost 
. unanimous agreement about this, 1  although some scholars have argued 
that the generals entered on office shortly after they were elected, 
at the beginning of the campaigning season. 2 According to Aristotle, 
the election of generals and other military officials took place 
\ 	• 
prra T1V S i . 11-iwravEuDvits 4) & 	Ylvilial. 3 It is quite 
.possible that the gpxatrifict.t were frequently held in the seventh 
. prytany,•but this would not necessarily have always been the case. 
They would only take place in the seventh prytany if the omens were 
favourable. Conceivably, sometimes elections may not have been held 
—Iintil - the last ptytany -before the new archon year. It is certainly 
.a misinterpretation to consider, as does Mayor, 4 that Ath Pol 44.4 
fixes the date of the election in the seventh prytany. 5 As Meritt 
has noted, s Qv refers to or psfa fry z arrays() ovrss , and therefore 
Aristotie's phrase might be translated as "in whatever prytany after 
the sixth there are favourable omens". 6 
Mayor stressed that it would be much more sensible for a 
number of reasons for the strategoi to enter on office at the beginning 
of the campaigning season rather than in midsummer. 7 However, as 
Pritchett has observed, 8  Mayor did not.produce any solid evidence 
to support his theory, and his arguments are not convincing when 
f. 
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considered beside some of the evidence produced by Pritchett to 
refute his viewpoint. The abundant inscriptional evidence which 
suggests that the term of office of military officials and archons 
was identical, is objection enough to Mayor's theory. The fact is 
that the language employed in inscriptions in reference to the term 
of office of military officials makes it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to conclude that strategoi entered on office before the 
beginning of the archon year. To give but one of the examples listed 
by Pritchett, in several fourth-century inscriptions generals are 
honoured as Cfra.rprrtects STri roo 	oilLyKoVros. 9 5 	WA/ m 	However, although 
I agree with Pritchett's conclusions on the basis of this evidence, 
his elaborate refutation of Mayor, if justified, nevertheless resorts • 
to the use of questionable evidence in one aspect, his conclusion 
that twelve generals in office in 425 under Mayor's theory offers a 
real difficulty. 10 As .I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere we 
are simply not in a position to assume that the strength of the fifth-
century strategia was limited to ten members every year. Moreover, 
unless I am mistaken, Ath PoZ 44.4 is evidence enough against dating 
the generals' entry on office to the beginning of the campaigning 
season. How could the strategoi enter on office in time for a spring 
campaign if the omens were unfavourable to holding an election not 
only in the seventh prytany but in the eighth as well? I would 
suggest that the Athenians allowed themselves as many as four prytanies 
in which to hold the elections because (in )1eritt's words) the 
3 	/ eUripiCt was an extraordinary dispensation valid particularly for 
3 the apxarnctt , not realized until after the seventh, eighth and 
perhaps even the ninth prytany had come and gone. 11 Religious 
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considerations were of no little importance. For this reason it 
would matter nothing to the Athenians that in some years their 
elected military officials would have to wait some months before 
assuming office. It seems rather odd, at least to me, that Aristotle's 
terse phrase has not been considered decisive evidence, by scholars 
such as Pritchett, for dating the term of office of strategoi from 
midsummer to midsummer. 	The phraseology of the fourth-century 
epigraphical evidence, implying simultaneity of office for archons and 
military officials, not only supports the evidence of Ath Pol 44.4 
but puts to rest the theory (if it has not already been done) that 
the strategoi assumed office at the beginning of the conciliar year 
rather than at the beginning of the archon year. 12 
If it be accepted that the E061)..ita. in Ath Pol 44.4 were not 
13 based on weather signs, which could effectively prevent not only 
the convening of the electoral assembly on a given day within a 
prytany but which 
be postponed, can 
9>xcurC6-icti may 
could cause regular assemblies within prytanies to 
• we admit the possibility • that the Euaripio, for the 
not occur in the last four prytanies of the year? 
In practice, were the elections sometimesdeferred until after the 
beginning of a new archon year, or were they held annually, without. 
exception, in one of the four prytanies after the sixth? The answer' 
to this question not only depends on the nature of theetitrty..te, but 
whether a prognosis taken, say, at the beginning of a prytany decided 
if the elections should be held then or postponed until the next 
prytany, for if that was the case there were only four chances for 
deciding before the new year. The only evidence we have is for an 
election held in the second century B.C., in the year 188/7.1 4 In 
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that year the election was held late in the tenth prytany, but as 
there were twelve tribes at that time compared with the ten of the 
fifth and fourth centuries, the date, translated back three centuries, 
would fall in the ninth prytany. 15 The election was held only after 
the Delphic oracle had been consulted, and approval was given in the 
tenth prytany. 16 As Meritt states, this is more an indication of the 
3 unique nature of the tocivca. rather than evidence that sanction from 
Delphi was always sought. 17 
However, may it be that the Delphic oracle was only consulted 
when two or three prytanies had gone by without the evnuiltt being 
realized? 	If we can assume for a moment that this is correct, it 
would seem to follow that the apxarricti could only be held before 
the beginning of the new year. 	In the first place, the fact that the 
clearance was sought when there were still at least two prytanies of 
the year left suggests some urgency was felt about the matter. Second-
ly, unless the Delphic oracle was approached only in extraordinary 
circumstances and extremely rarely, we can expect that Aristotle 
would have mentioned the procedure at 44.4. Thirdly, a postponement 
3 of the apxctiff.cricu to thenext year implies that the generals already 
in office were prorogued or that there was a period of time when the 
state had no military officials, matters about which Aristotle, signi-
ficantly, is silent. I would hazard the guess that the nature of 
the sucituct was such that it was very unusual if they were not apparent 
in the two or three prytanies after the sixth. Whatever may have 
caused delays in holding the elections there is no reason to suppose 
that they were ever delayed for the duration of the last four prytanies. 
Implicit in Ath Pol 44.4 is the fact that the elections could be 
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delayed, but the author has been incredibly remiss if he has failed 
to note that the elections were sometimes prevented. We can only 
assume that Aristotle knew they were not - there were never any 
difficulties in holding the ciiv_irecilcu before the end of the old 
archon year and the term of office of strategoi always expired at the 
end of the tenth prytany because a new set of generals was ready to 
assume office. 
Unless it can be shown that elections were sometimes post-
poned until the new archon year it seems reasonable to assume that 
there was never any need for the Athenians to make use of the principle 
of prorogation. According to Aristotle, Kpxsiv 	-As Av ectrolt 
ITIAE110V E'4i5x\a5 griri-Xs0v4nS , 18 and we know that the tenure of 
office of some generals, for example Cimon, Pericles and Nicias, 
continued for years without a break, a practice which probably applies 
to others as well, men for whom the evidence is less fully attested, 
strategoi such as Phormio, Demosthenes and Alcibiades. In brief, it 
would make little sense to prorogue generals when they could simply 
be re-elected. 19 Fornara has suggested that some leeway must have been 
given to generals still at their appointed tasks after the legal 
expiration of their command. 20 I am not convinced. In the first 
place, strategoi conducting operations away from Athens sent back 
reports. 21 The city was probably kept fairly well informed about the 
progress of campaigns and the time needed to achieve objectives. 
There will possibly have been exceptions, but we can expect that 
generals whose term of office expired while they were on campaigns 
were replaced. 22 Decisions would be made, presumably, according to 
. the military circumstances in which Athens found herself. Conceivably, 
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if all newly elected generals were needed elsewhere or if a mission, 
from information received, was nearing completion, it may not have 
been feasible or practical to replace strategoi whose term of office 
had legally expired. Nevertheless, I do not think we can safely 
conclude that generals who are described by Thucydides as still engag-
ing in military activity after the beginning of the new archon year 
were not elected for that year. Secondly, it is quite possible that 
the Athenians may have deliberately delayed the afxctireelle_i at times, 
particularly in wartime, in order to avoid proroguing strategoi. In 
terms of military considerations such a practice would certainly have 
its advantages, for not only would the Athenians be better able to 
decide whether to re-elect or replace generals who were commanding 
lengthy operations, on the basis of their progress, but they would be 
in a better position to judge the capabilities of strategoi who had 
completed missions before the end of spring or early summer. We can 
at least be sure that generals sent out in spring or early summer on 
missions which were expected to last the whole campaign season or 
longer would have been elected for the next year as well, although the 
Demos reserved the right to recall them. It will not do to assert, 
as does Mayor, that Laches,who was replaced in Sicily by Pythodorus in 
the winter of 426/5, was therefore commanding as "pro-strategos" in 
Sicily from July 426 until February 425. 23 Laches was simply elected 
in early 426 for the year 426/5, 24 and replaced half-way through his 
term of office and before he completed his mission, at the discretion 
of the ecclesia. Similarly, the activities of.Demodocus, Aristeides 
and Lamachus in the summer of 424 25 are. more likely an indication 
that they were re-elected for 424/3 than that they had failed to return 
of office expired, 
EiffutooXZqh&J,/ 
The inference is 
as Fornara argues. 26 
vEa,/ -1A09 vaLy 
that they were still 
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to Athens before their term 
Thucydides uses the words 01 
SiTaTVol to describe them. 
generals in 424/3. 27 
It has been argued by some scholars that the Athenians 
employed the practice of giving commands to "strategoi-elect" or to 
Men who were not generals. Thus Cleon was not a general when he was 
assigned the command at Pylos and nor was Demosthenes, 28 and Thucydides 
had a special command in 424. 29 However, just as the annual election 
of generals and the possible re-election of the same men indefinitely 
for year after year render the idea of prorogation unnecessary and 
therefore unattractive, so Would it make little sense if the Athenians 
gave commands to men who were not legally strategoi. I have argued' 
elsewhere that Cleon was elected to office to command at Pylos and 
that Demosthenes was reinstated before he took up his appointment. 30 
There should never have been any doubt about Thucydides' strategia. 31 
According to Fornara the assumption of by-elections, like prorogation, 
would be happy only if we believed that a strategos, and a strategos 
alone, could lead Athenian soldiers. 32 However, without the examples 
of Cleon and Demosthenes at Pylos, Fornara's idea that any citizen 
could be empowered with a command becomes questionable. The only . 
other case he cites is the command of Hagnon in Thrace in 429, but 
c. 	/ 	33 , Thucydides' description of Hagnon as vapova is not .evidence that 
34 Hagnon was granted a special command in 429/8. 
It may be objected that the granting of special commands was 
for a particular purpose, the grant expiring when that purpose was 
achieved, and that such a practice would not impinge on the prestige 
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of the strategia or threaten its viability, and nor would it interfere 
with the practice of electing ten generals. However, unless I am 
mistaken, the only time it may have seemed practicable to the Athenians 
to grant special commands was in a situation where the generals 
available were not suited to the task, when unforeseen circumstances 
arose which demanded the specialized abilities of a particular indivi-
dual who had been overlooked at the amairecrial . Unless that was the 
case the granting of special commands would undermine the basic 
reason for the existence of the strategia. In this context it is 
worthy of note that if Cleon and Demosthenes were granted special 
commands at Pylos it was not because they were thought to have special-
ized abilities over and above those of the strategoi available but 
because they persuaded the ecclesia. 	There is no evidence to suggest 
that individuals were allocated commands in preference to strategoi 
because they were considered more suitable to the circumstances of the 
command. But the unique qualifications of individual strategoi were 
certainly given consideration. Thucydides, familiar with the Thraceward 
area, had his only recorded command as a strategos in that region. 
Asopius, the son of Phormio, was dispatched around the Peloponnese 
in 428, the Athenians deliberately acknowledging the respect the 
Acarnanians felt towards Phormio. 35 Furthermore, in some years of 
the fifth century where the evidence for more than ten generals cannot 
be overlooked, the increased number cannot be explained by the granting 
of special commands to "strategoi-elect" or to ordinary citizens, 
because men whom Thucydides describes as strategoi cannot be considered 
as anything less. In short, the belief of Fornara and others that 
strategoi were not the only persons who could command Athenian troops 
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is far from proved. Aristotle's statement that ouros (the taxiarch: ) 
13 ,/ 40,crai Ka) 6)q.01(04 kaGiS1614 36 not only indicates 
that taxiarchs were tribal leaders, but also shows that the Athenians 
had a developed military organization. The strategoi were a functional 
part of this organization. The overwhelming evidence is that the 
leaders of Athenian military expeditions, the commanders of Athenian 
troops during the fifth century, were invariably strategoi. I would 
suggest that it is misleading to isolate one or two cases, like the 
command of Cleon and Demosthenes at Pylos, as examples on which to 
construct the hypothesis that not only strategoi could command military 
Operations. 
There is no problem if it be accepted that the Athenians 
could and did have by-elections. Fornara has noted that by-elections 
and suffect-generals have commonly enough been inferred since, like 
prorogation, they help to explain away troublesome instances of double 
representation. True enough, but he nevertheless finds no difficulty 
in restricting the board to ten members every year by postulating 
special commands or, as in the case of Aristeides and Demodocus in 
424, by suggesting that they failed to return home before their term 
expired - in effect, if we are to believe Fornara, Demodocus and 
Aristeides prorogued themselves. 	Without wishing to be pedantic, 
a further note on Cleon and Demosthenes may be in order. Their cases 
are different. Demosthenes had been deposed after his failure in 
3 	/ Aetolia and hence was Omu-ris •on his return. But he returned after 
some military successes and was reinstated in the spring of 425 and 
elected general for 425/4 at the regular c > vniredicti. He asked for 
permission to use the fleet at Pylos as a strategos for 426/5. 
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Cleon was elected at a by-election to join Demosthenes. The fact 
that Thucydides does not name him as a strategos is unimportant in 
this instance because Thucydides never calls him a general, not even 
on his ill-fated campaign against Brasidas in 422. Cleon was therefore 
a general for 425/4 and his term of office would expire at the end 
of the tenth prytany in 424. Although it was the rule that generals 
retired from office at the end of the tenth prytany to make way for 
the new board, and in that sense their term of office was fixed, the 
ecclesia had the power in exceptional circumstances to depose her 
strategoi or make additions. There was not necessarily a connection 
between depositions •and by-elections. The strength of the board 
fluctuated during the archon year. Strategoi elected at by-elections 
will not have always served a full term unless they were re-elected 
and held office for the next full year. 37 
APPENDIX 4 
Possible Double Representations.  
• Apart from the examples discussed, there are other less 
certain, but nevertheless possible, cases of double representation 
as well as several instances in the last decade of the fifth 
century which T have not listed) - 
The first grouping is as follows : 
Year 	Generals Tribe 
426/5 Demokleides, Nicias Aigeis 
Lathes, Pythodorus Kekropis 
425/4 Cleon, Eurymedon Pandionis 
-424/3 Cleon, Eurymedon Pandionis 
412/1 - Phrynichos, Scironides- Leontis 
426/5 Demokleides and Nicias 
A strategia for Demokleides depends on2whether Mattinglx's 
proposed date of 426/5 for the Brea Decree (IC 1 45) is correct.' 
:The decree Is usually dated some fifteen or twenty years earlier. 3 
If Mattingly is right double representation further depends ca the 
. •identification of the ..Demokleides who established the colony of Brea, 4 
with the Ay4ogAdcs Aiyeidos ...,.strategos in 439/8. 5 	The 
identification is of course much more likely if the Brea Decree can 
'be dated, as Woodhead argues, to 439/8, because the restoration of 
•Demokleides' name . is based to a large extent on the'assumption of an 
,eminent Demokleides in Athens during the late 440's. Double represent-
ation of Aigeis in 426/5 6 is perhaps the least likely possibility among 
all examples discussed, including the other four possibilities listed 
above. 
426/5 Laches and Pythodorus  
• Laches, son of Melanopus, came from the deme Aixone, 7 
and belonged to Kekropis. Fornara thinks the identification of 
IT0G43 ,-uroST[A]lj[c-36 [5; 8. with 9 PythodoruS 2 the son of Isolochus, strategos in 426/5, is safe. A further indication that Isolochus 
belonged to Kekropis would put it beyond doubt. 	As it is, the 
• Identification is not certain, although a strong chance)-0 
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425/4, 424/3 	Cleon and Eurymedon  
Double representation of Pandionis occurs in these years 
if the deme of Eurymedon, the son of Thoupc ,s, is pyrrhinous. 
Wade-Gery has rystored to line 38 of IC i 324 Ceueuki4bovr1 
floreDvoirro; , 1' which means, if he is correct, that the unknowi2 
fellow-tribesman and general with Cleon in 423/2 was Eurymedon. 
Wade-Gery based his restoration on the fact that a Eurymedon 
Myrrhinusios, brother-in-law of Plato and father of Speusippos, 
is known in 011e immediately succeeding generation after that of 
the general. 1' Eurymedon is a very rare name, and if the Eurymedon 
Myrrhinusios was the father of the general, the latter belonged 
to the phyle, Pandionis. Wade-Gery has suggested, albeit tentatively, 
that all the known Eurymedons may have been descendants of the general. 
His stemma is as follows: 
floruit. 	460 
427 
394 
Thoukles 
1 Eurymedon I (general) 
Eurymedon II of Myrrhinous, Plato's 
brother-in-law 
361 Euryedon III 	Speusippos 
co-executor, with 
Speusippos, of 
Plato'i s will. 
Eurymedon IV 
Aristotle's accuser 
Diog. Laert. 5.5 
daughter? 
marries (?) Charid-
emus of Acharnae 
Eurymedon V pays 
a trierarchic 
debt 330/29 
Wade-Gery's restoration in IG i 2 324 has been accepted 
by Tod, Sealey and MacDowell, but doubted by Gomme, Fornara, Lewis 
and Davies. -4 	The major weakness is that of the several known 
Eurymedons, one, the son of the famous fourth-century general 
Charidemus, belonged to the deme Acharnae of the tribe Oineis. 15 
Wade-Gary admits as questionable the assumption that Charidemus 
may have named his son after his father-in-law, (which would if 
plausible, explain the change of deme) but then suggests as an 
explanation that Charidemus had a romantic taste in names, as he 
called another of his sons Troilos. 16 	It is of course possible 
that Charidemus was in no way related to the earlier Eurymedons, and 
it is certainly true that Athenians were often named after their 
fathers but seldom after their maternal uncles. 17 Therefore, Gomme's 
objection to Wade-Gery's construction that Eurymedon Myrrhinusios 
may have been related to the general through his mother suffers 
from the same weakness as Wade-Gery's explanation for the demotic 
(Acharnae) of Eurymedon son of Charidemus. I agree with Fornara 
that Wade-Gery's method of assigning tribal affiliations to 
individual strategoi (by a process of eliminating from consideration 
those tribes which have already definitely produced a general in 
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the same year) cannot be accepted. 18 MacDowell also uses the 
same method as Wade-Gery to identify tribes of certain strategoi, 
and application of this method is utilized by both scholars to 
determine Eurymedon's (the strategos) tribe, 19 However, no 
longer can it be assumed that only one double representation 
could occur in a particular year, and that no-one else could there-
fore have the same tribal affiliation as a known strategos when 
there is already well attested evidence for the existence of one 
case of double representation. 
Even allowing for all the objections to Wade-Gery's 
-hypothesis, 2° he still may be right in considering Eurymedon 
Myrrhinusios, the brother-in-law of Plato, as the father of 
Eurymedon Thoukleous, strategos during the Peloponnesian War. 
The suggestion, at least, is supported by the fact that Speusippos, 
the son of Eurymedon Myrrhinusios, was born about 410. 21 Eurymedon 
Thoukleous was obviously born after Cimon's victory in 467, in . the 
last years of the 460's at the latest, and if Eurymedon Myrrhinusios 
was the son of Eurymedon Thoukleous, a birth date for Speusippos 
of 410 fits without any difficultes. It would not be unreasonable 
to conjecture, on this construction, that Eurymedon Myrrhinusios 
was born about the mid 430's, perhaps a few years earlier or later, 
and was therefore some six or seven years older than his brother-
in-law Plato (born between 430-27) and about twenty five when 
Speusippos was born. Plato's brother Glaucon was born about 428/7, 
and Potone, Plato's sister and wife of Eurxmedon Myrrhinusios,was 
probably born in the early 420's as wel1. 2z Such conjecture by 
no means adds up to a demonstration, but nevetheless the possibility 
that Eurymedon Thoukleous belonged to Myrrhinous, and therefore to 
the phyle Pandionis, should not be casually dismissed. 
421/1 	Phrynichos and Skironides  
Phrynichos, son of Stratonides, 23 came from the demg 
Deirade, of the tribe Leonti s, 24 and was strategos in 412/1. 2 26 Scironides, named by Thucydides in the same command as Phrynichos, 
shares his name with only one other Athenian, a Skironides of the 
tribe Leontis who proposed a decreq in the fourth century (during the 
340's) at a meeting of his tribe. 2 ' 	According to Lewis there is a 
high probability of a relationship between the fourth-century 
Skironides and the fifth-century general if the readings in both 
Thucydides and Demosthenes are secure. However, they are not 
completely secure, as there is some evidence that the name Kironides 
should replace Skironides in Thucydides 8.25.1, and that Kritonides 
should replace Skironides in Demosthenes 58.17. 28 The nature of 
the case prevents firm conclusions either way. Double represent-
ation of Leontis in 412/1 remains an open question. 
Of the four cases of double representation here examined, 
the two most likely cases, involving Laches and Pythodorus of 
Kekropis and Cleon and Eurymedon of Pandionis; produce further . 
examples of two doubles during some years of the Peloponnesian War, 
and in the years 426/5 and 424/3, three doubles. They are as 
follows : 
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Year 	Generals  
426/5 
425/4 
424/3 
Laches, Pythodorus 
Lamachus, Sophocles 
Hipponicus, Aristoteles 
Lamachus, Sophocies 
Cleon, Eurymedon 
Nicostratus, Thucydides 
Lamachus, Sophocles 
Cleon, Eurymedon 
Tribe  
Kekropis 
Oineis 
Antiochis 
Oineis 
Pandionis 
Leontis 
Oineis 
Pandionis 
If a Demokleides Aigeidos was a general in 426/5, 
there is a chance of a third double representation in this year, 
and of course, the double representation of Pandionis in 423/2 
involves Eurymedon if the restoration of his name in IG i 2 324 
is correct. 
• • The second grouping s for the period after the revolution 
of 411, is as follows : 
Year  
410/9. 
409/8 
408/7 
407/6 
465/4 
Generals 
Theramenes, Thrasyboulus 
Alcibiades, Pasiphon, 
Theramenes, Thrasyboulus 
Theramenes, Thrasyboulus 
Alcibiades, Adeimantus • 
Cleophon, Tydeus 
Tribe 
Pandionis 
Leontis 
Pandionis 
Pandionis 
Leontis 
Oineis 
410/9 Theramenes and Thrasbo _adesan n 
As a general of the Five Thousand, Theramenes fought at 
Cyzicus in the spring of 410. 29 Thrasyboulus, elected as a general 
by the fleet at Samos in 411, 30 was also a general at Cyzicus. 31 
After the full democracy was restored it is possible that only one 
set of generals was elected. 32 If tlIgt is correct, Theramenes and 
Thrasyboulus were generals in 410/9," there being dole represent-
ation of Pandionis. However, if as Fornara believes, 	the restored 
democracy did not hold new elections in 410 but merely continued 
in office the generals already on active duty, nothing much can be 
made of the double rcpresantation of Pandionis in 410/9. 
') 72e. • 
There is no evidence which indicates that Alcibiades 
was deposed after the demise of the Five Thousand. 35 As Fornara 
has noted, 36 the presence of Pasiphon, a tribal colleague of 
Alcibiades, in the strategia of 410/9 does not mean that Alcibiades' 
generalship was cancelld. 	There is in fact, evidence to the 
contrary, that Alcibiades was a general in 410/9. 
409/8, 408/7. 	Theramenes and Thrasyboulus 
I am not at all convinced that the position of Alcibiades, 
Theramenes and Thrasyboulus was unofficial in these years. No 
attempt was made to deprive them of their commands and they were 
conspicuous as commanders of large forces in the Hellespont. 33 
The only thing against this conclusion is, of course, Xenophon, 
Hellenica 1.4.10-12. 	I think the passage can be explained. 
Xenophon has a vivid recollection of Alcibiades' return to Athens. 
The reason is not hard to find. It was an event out of the ordinary, 
a memorable occasion. Alcibiades was famous and he had not set 
foot in Athens for nearly a decade. 	Xenophon's statement at 
1.4.10 that 01 AOTL6704 477 -PaTla alO*170 5,4k(giAlV dgkV $6 "'' '11-t ecl Op cs 	LAc 40:nZ%emt., 	a Tv:Dv c_< 
should be considered in this context rather than as an indication 
that Alcibiades was still leplly an exile. His banishment had been 
revoked some years earlier, 39 but he had made no attempt to return 
until now. He remained in effect in exile. 	The words )AXMAIC:it)..NV 
I / vFYcV-i-c, are used by Way of emphasis to suit the scene'which 
follows, and as such should not be interpreted as being strictly 
.accurate. 	Even if Alcibiades and Thrasyboulus were not elected 
strategoi by Athens inthe years after 411 .down to 407, their authority 
as generals elected by the fleet was recognized by the city. 
A07/6 	Alcibiades and Adeimantus 
	
C 	c 	• / In 407 Alcibiades was avc.temeets ottraVmAi inwt.:1; cita-c;((payils . 
Alcibiades received this extraordiriary grant of power some time 
after he was elected general, and as I have argued elsewhere l,a 
there is no reason to think that the grant was implicit in the 
• election, that it indicates that Alcibiades was elected as a single 
crircentb'e.:N. 	alret.vIewv , thus explaining how Adeimantus, his 
fellow-tribesman, came also to be a general. Xenophon 1.4.10 . 
mentioned the election of Alcibiades, Thrasyboulus and Conon and 
presumably failed to name the rest. If only thiTe generals were 
elected the reference may not be to the regular tafx(ure6 -icte for 
there were other generals - Adeimantus and AristocrateS, for 
.example, who were soon to sail with Alcibiades. 42 I would merely 
. surmise that the three men were uppermost in Xenophon's mind at 
.the time of writing - his immediate subject is Alcibiades and he 
has just mentioned Thrasyboulue activities in Thrace. 43 Conon 
was soon to play a prominent part in his narrative.44 
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405/4 	Cleophon and Tydeus  
There is a possibility, admittedly not strong, that 
Cleophon was a general in this year. The statement that he 
himself was general in Aristophanes, Frogs 679 with the scholia, 
is the main evidence. It is not proof. 45 However, since it has 
been shown that Cleophon belonged to a family which had held 
the strategia," the idea gains in plausibility. 47 There are 
numerous examples of two or more generations within families 
holding office during the fifth century. 48  The double represent-
ation of Oineis in 405/4 must still be considered a remote 
possibility nevertheless, for as Lewis has noted, 49 Lysias 13.12 
is more probably an indication that Cleophon was not a general 
than that he was. 
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• 12. N.B. If it is still thought reasonable to conclude that 
Hermocreon was archon in 501/0 on the basis that 504/3 
is already occupied, on good authority, by Acestorides, 
then an alternative interpretation is that the institution 
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p.113, n.9 is not completely convinced. 
24. So Buselt, vol.2, p308; Schwahn, p.1072; de Sanctis, Atthis, 
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with the strategoi in the years before the reform of Ath Poi 
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0-4. 	roPkavo, T.4, k.t2 	. 
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Hammond,Kar (6:Xcis has the same meaning at 22.2 as at 
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used. The precise meaning is in fact determined by the 
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51. Ath Pol. 22. 
52. Badian, p.29. 
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rejected. According to Lysias 13.10 Theramenes failed to 
pass the dokimasia in 405/4. 
c 	\ c 60. According to Ath Pa 55.2 Tic,VTE5 Yuf KC' 01 NX9p44.:7-of Kat ot 
■ 	/ KE-froprg-,,vefroc aciTas-14, ,i-c,s p6o,ki, 	k Demos thene 40.34 
)(ci cTovmvn.ov 4.1ol. 	(.,Jr cv qt,c 7-aej tqfwv, 
, . / owl-0s cm 7.0 0 1K. Cln- ptcv hoicliuckSW11-01-1C.Vcs ...; Also Aeschines 
3.15. 	Plato Laws 755D. See Hignett, p. 205; Staveley, GR., 
pp. 57ff. 
61. Thuc. 2.65.4; 4.65.3. 
62. Bicknell, DR., p. 106, n.39. Bicknell states that a replacement 
was also chosen for Procles, killed in action in 426/5, but 
does not inform us who he was. 
63. For Laches see PA 9019; for Pythodorus see IG i 2 335, 1.51. 
64. Thuc. 3.115.2. 
66. 	For example, Fornara, p. 58; Lewis, p.120. 
65a. Gomme, HCT.,vol.2, pp. 430-1, 
66. Aristophanes Wasps 836-997. 
67. Nay Xen. Hell. 1.7ff. be an indication of this? 
68. Thuc. 3.115.5. 
69. But see Gone, HCT, vol.2, p. 431. 
70. Thuc. 8.76.2. 
71. Respectively Thuc. 2.65.4, 4.65.3, 3.93.5, 4.101.2, 
6.101.6, 7.86.2. 
72. Gomme, HCT.,vol.2, p.183. Also Wilamowitz, vol.2, p. 248. 
Cf. Fornara, p. 55. 
73. pp. 151ff. 
74. Thuc. 8.76.2. 
75. Xen. Hell. 1.7.1. 
76. Note, for example, the extraordinAry election of Cleon in 425/4 
and the reinstatement of Pericles in 430/29. 
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77. Ath Pol 44.4. 
• 77a. According to D.J. Mosley, "Voting Procedure and the Election 
of Athenian Envoys', Weiner Studien, vol. 85, pp. 140-144, 
there were variations in the procedure used to elect Athenian 
envoys, depending on circumstances. Whether this may only 
apply to extraordinary officials is not known, but there is a 
chance, of. course, that this is what Aristotle meant at Ath Pol 
44.4 where he stated that military officials were chosen in 
whatever manner seemed best to the Demos. 
78. Thuc. 6.6.1. 
79. Thuc. 2.65.4. 
80. Laws 766C. 
81. Ath Pa 61.1. 
82. Ath Pa 22.5. 
83. So Badian, pp. 27f. Cf. Hignett, pp. 183ff; Fornara, pp. llf; 
Burn, p. 284. 
84. As Fornara, p. 12. 
85. Badian, pp. 14-16. 
86. Hdt. 6.132, 5.97.3 respectively. 
87. Because Aristeides was the most prominent Athenian general 
at Plataea, and because Themistocles was the most prominent 
at Salamis and Artemisium, does not mean that other generals 
were not present. See next Chapter. 
87a. I see no reason why we should not consider that the Athenian, 
army (or sections thereof) was organized and fought in tribal 
divisions throughout the fifth century. Thucydides 6.98.4 
.decribes a section of the Athenian force which became involved 
in a skirmish outside Syracuse in 414, with these words: kai Twv 
WINiv4;;v 41.1k:ti /wit -r(us ■/ cTONfrii“./ kcit ci irr*Cis p.e.T'aikr-nv •t-c(o.q-cs 
Presumably the hoplites in Sicily (numbering 1,500) were 
organized by tribes into fighting units - there were therefore 
probably about 150 hoplites to each unit. See also Dover, RCT., 
v.4, p. 372. This conclusion is reinforced by the indication in 
IG i2 1085 line 10 that the contingents of three tribes, Pandionis, 
Kekropis and Autiochis, supplied the force (2,000 troops) which 
invaded the Megarid in 446 under the general Andocides. 
See M-L, p. 137. 
88. So Hignett, p. 348; Bicknell, p. 441. 
89. Jordan, Diss., pp. 118f; A Krebs, "Taxiarchon", Daremberg-Saglio, 
vol.5, p. 53; BS., vol.1, pp. 579-80. Hammond, JHS, p.49, 
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thinks they commanded the tribal divisions in 490, at Marathon. 
90. 	A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Pragmenta, 2 , 1899, fr. 182; 
preserved by Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, 1.11 d-e. 
91.. See pp. 122-123. 
92. See pp. 52ff. 
93. Fornara, p. 20, n.32. 
94. In 441/0,440/9, 439/8, 433/2, 431/0, 426/5, 425/4, 424/3, 
423/2, 418/7. 
95. So for example Schwahn, p. 1073; Beloch, p. 275; Bicknell, 
DR., p. 112. 
96. Ath Poi 22.2. 
97. See at 45.1, 45.3, 53.1, 54.3, 55.2, 55.4, 56.3, 56.4, 
60.2, 62.1. 
98. See Hignett, p. 206. 
I do not understand how Bicknell . can reconcile his belief that 
Aristotle's words imply the election of generals  
to the fourth century only, with his acceptance of Jones' view 
of nominationby tribes of candidates for the generalship in the 
fifth century, using as support the procedure for appointing 
.choregoi. (DR., p. 105) Aristotle states (56.3) that the archon 
used to appoint choregoi for the comedies (nTorefov 	),,but in 
his ,own tim, the tribes put forward candidates ( ,1,-, v 	Tt ,fercos c 	 A 'CU tr"Ca 	./10U3-1 V ) 	The formular Tri,6r - Frcv 	vcv is used in 
exactly the same way at 56.3 as at 61.1. If Aristotle's words 
-imply a late fourth century reform at 61.1 why not also at 56.3? 
,/ 100. Herodotus often uses the word my4Txos to describe subordinate 
officers in Xerxes' forces (7.99.1, 8.67.2, 9.42.1), and also 
.designates Spartan officers by it (9.53.2). .Jordan, Diss., 
pp. 118-119, asserts that his use of the term is indefinite and / 
imprecise because he uses TaVct..pKGs as an equivalent to Trpoo.Tocb'or. 
and T - po.pxos. However, in each case cited by Jordan it is 
clear from the context that Herodotus consistently used the word 
to designate subordinate officers Artemisia is described as 
TWV TcVVrXLCV (7.99.1) because she ranked below the men described 
immediately above by Herodotus as 7,-;:; 4Yrrol'eos (7.98.1). 
Similarly, at 8.67.2 the commanders described as .r -os 
at 7.98.1 become ol r6ravvoi 1401pgoi because they rank 
below Xerxes, who had summoned them to a meeting. 
/et 	/ 
At 9.42.1 Mardonius summons TCOS TV,stapt0S 1--LrEAst4.sv 16/i 
_3c el  1140 $1 igt£ EwurcV c-oV1-1.4.1 v CEVilvtiA;V 	crpr1st,o5. It is interest- 
ing that the historian refers to the barbarian contingent 
commanders as Tcl.tgpficL and their Greek counterparts as 
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(irpceritTc05. He is merely emphasizing the fact that the Greeks 
were not integral parts of Mardonius' force but independent allies 
under his overall command for the moment. To be sure, Herodotus 
uses terms designating command interchangeably, but surely not 
imprecisely within the context of each individual case. The fact 
is that to a large extent the terms are used relatively. Quite 
simply, Men described as the commanders of a state's forces 
are always errt-riroi but these same men become 1--(7;tctiKei relative 
to Xerxes' or Mardonius' position, or as in the case of Artemisia, 
relative to the importance of other leaders Within Xerxes' army. 
Since Herodotus was well acquainted with military terminology, 
and particularly with that of Athens, he probably trans-
ferred the official term for Athenian tribal leaders to subord-
inate officers of other states (at 9.53.2 the immediate subord- 
inates of Pausanias within the Spartan army) and contingent 
commanders within the Persian army. 
101. As Fornara, p. 26.. 
102. As Staveley, GR., p. 42. 
103. See Fornara, p. 27. 
103a. In this context Themistocles may have had something to do with 
it. Other preparations to meet Xerxes were not completely 
improvised and Themistocles was largely responsible for those 
(Hdt. 7.142 ff). 
104. Cf. Bicknell, DR.,p. 112. 
105. Diod. 11.27.3. 
106. Hdt. 8.131,3. See also Hignett, XIG, p. 277; Fornara, p.42. 
107. Ath Pa 22.8. 
108. Hdt. 8.95. 
109. The conclusion of Hignett, p. 277. 
110. Hdt. 8.79 ff. 
111. Fornara, p.42. 
112. e.g. Beloch argues that Themistocles was unwilling to be Sub- 
ordinated to Pausanias. 	However, he served in such a capacity 
to other Spartans at Artemisium and at Tempe; Hignett, p.278, 
argues that Themistocles disapproved of the strategy .now in 
favour at Athens of making the main effort by land rather than 
on the sea and hence was not prepared to undertake: a position 
of responsibility. There is no evidence for this or for the 
opposing view, advocated by Macan (vol.2, p. 332ff.) that 
Themistocles approved of the policy adopted in,479. See also 
Fornara., p. 42. 
291. 
113. D.W. Knight, Historia, Einzel, 'deft 13, 1971, p.32. Knight 
argues that Themistocles had a hand in the ostracism of 
Xanthippus in 485/4 (pp. 29-30) and was responsible for that 
of Aristeides in 482. (p.31) The la-lter--fwoi -44,11jr-- 2.1-,=- Th 
proven political enemy, Tiltmtstocie-c. 
114. Hdt. 9.114.2. 
115. Hdt. 9.120.4. 
CHAPTER - 4 
1. Hammond, pp. 135-142. 
2. Hdt. 7.17.32, 7.205.2, 7.222 respectively. 
3. Hdt. 8.42 and 8.75.2. 
4. Hdt. 8.5.1. and 8.59. 
5. Hdt. 9.28.6, 8.131.3, 9.114.2 respectively. See Hammond, 
pp. 134-5. 
6. Hammond, p. 135. 
7. Hammond, p. 136. 
8. Plut. Cimon, 8.8. 
9. Bicknell, DR., p. 110. 
10. Thuc. 1.105.4 and 1.105.2 respectively. Both Myronides and 
Leocrates had been strategoi at least once prior to 460/59, 
(in 479/8; Plut. Arist. 20 -.1) and Myronides at least once 
during the 450's. 
	
.11. 	Hammond, p. 135. 
12. Hdt. 7.173.2. 
13. lidt. 8.131.3. 
14. Hdt. 9.117. 
15. Thuc. 4.2.2. 
16. Thu. 3.115. 
17. Hdt. 7.173.2. 
18. Hdt. 8.131.3. 
19. The view of Bury, CR., vol.10, 1896, p. 414; Busolt, vol.2, 
p.664: - Schwahn, p. 1079. 	Hignett, p. 248, also seems to 
hold this view. 
20. See pp. 80ff. 
21. Fornara, p. 13. 
292. 
293. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
See Plut. Pomp. 8. 
See also Fornara, p. 14. 
Thuc. 6.8.2. 	See also Hignett, pp. 247-48. 
Plut. Them. 	6.1. 
Plut. Arist. 	15.2 
Plut. Arist. 	15.5. 
Plut. Arist. 	16.1. 
Plut. Arist. 	16-2-3. 	According to Hammond, pp. 135-6, 
Plutarch's account expresses very well the relationship
of the GThrriist s 	curav-rwV to the normal TIT 	arve 
40.15 . He states that Aristeides opposed the wishes of 
the other Athenian generals and implies that he overruled 
them. Aristeides does indeed declare that the others are 
.wrong) (o eAftrrils 	pctrrctvelv af)rouS Etpark. Toi) 
molyos ) but he then sets about persuading them, rather than 
forcing them, to follow Paus,a;lias' orders. And he succeeds,
Of00 rilk‘Vo 	 oi 	
/ 
vro roi 
Jittprietrat5 Tip/ roLV ). Similarly, at Arist. 20.1, Aristeides 
does not use force when his colleagues are opposed, once again, 
to a Spartan proposal, as Hammond implies, but he converts 
them through 1p ersuasion. (...iro 	ramrø 	kod 
TaS 61/Trparly'oul: ApiCre ISIS /IC\ a-Mk kpetTet i(c1J 
NorwVili, ...). See also Bicknell, Di?., p. 111, and'n.5. 
• 30. 	Plut. Arist. 
Edt. 
32. Hdt. 
33. - Hdt. 9.46.3. 
34. . See also Macan, Op.cit., vol.2, 11: 86; Hignett, 	. 
35. As Hammond, p. 136, n.l. 
36. Hammond. p. 134. 
37. Hdt. 9.44ff. 
38. • Hdt. 9.114.1-2. 
39. Hdt.•9.114.2. 
40. Hdt. 9.120.4. 
41. Hdt. 9.117. 
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42. See also Bicknell, DR., p.111; Fornara, p.16. 
43. Hdt. 6.114. 
44. Hdt. 6.103.1. 
45. Hdt. 6.104.1. 
46. See pp. 29ff. Note also that 01 crra -rriy-ct are responsible 
for despatching Philippides to Sparta (Hdt. 6.105.1, 106.1). 
47. Hdt. 7.17.32. 
48. Hdt. 8.42. 
49. Hdt. 8.110.3. 
50. Hdt. 8.131.3. 
51. Hdt. 8.4. 
52. For a convincing refutation see How and Wells, Historical 
Commentary on Herodotus, vol.2, pp. 236-7. 
53. See Hdt. 8.1. 
54. Hdt. 8.131.1. 
55. Hdt. 9.118 - The fleet was the same one which besieged Sestos 
later in 479. According to Diodorus 11.34.2 the fleet was 
250 strong. If he is to be preferred to Herodotus it was 
appro::imately the same size as the Greek fleet which fought at 
Artemisium. 
56. Thucydides indicates that at the battles of Leukimme in 435 
(1.29.2) and Sybota in 433 (1.46.2) the Corinthians employed 
a collegiate command. 
57. Hammond. p. 134. 
58. Hammond. p. 134, n.l. 
59. Assuming, of course, that their supreme military officers were 
not institutionally categorized into generals and admirals, 
but were interchangeable between land and sea commands in. 
much the same way that Spartan and Athenian general officers 
were. 
60. Hdt. 9.28.3. 
61. Hdt. 9.28.4. 
	
•62. 	Hdt. 9.28.5. 
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63. Hdt. 9.50. 
64. See Burn, pp. 523-524. He details the composition of the 
four divisions. 
65. See also Fornara, pp. 12-19, especially pp. 14-17. 
66. See Hdt. 7.144.1. 
67. See Thuc. 1.14.3. 
68. Hdt. 7.143.2-3. 
69. As Hignett, XIG., p. 198. 
70. Hdt. 8.41.1. 
71. Presumably with the exception of the generals of Aegina and 
Megara, in view of Hdt. 8.74.2. 
72. According to Hdt, 8.57-58, Theml)stocles only approached 
Eurybiades and persuaded him to convene the third 
council after Themistocles himself had been approached by 
Mhesiphilos. The story of Mnesiphilos'role in the affair 
does not seem. trustworthy. See Hignett, XIC., p. 204. 
However, at the council meeting Themistocles used none of 
the arguments provided by Mhesiphilos, as Hdt. notes in 8.60. 
73. Fornara, p.16. 
74. See pp.-85ff. 
_Th. _Mit-8.109.4. 
76. Edt. 8.131. 
77. Hdt. 8.1.1, 44.1 respectively. 
78. I have attempted, as faithfully as possible, to note the 
instances where my arguments follow the same lines as 
Forliara's. In particular, I find myself in substantial 
agreement with his belief that the phraseology used by 
Herodotus in describing Athenian strategoi in no way indicates 
-different levels of authority among the generals and certainly 
does not prove that the three generals named in his account, 
Themistocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides, occupied same kind of 
special position within the strategia by virtue of being granted 
extra legal powers or hegemony over the other elected Members of 
the board; and essentially for the same reasons, specifically, 
that Herodotus' interest is focused on the main actors in the 
events, the men who were recognized as largely responsible for 
the Greek victory,, and secondly the fact that in two- instances 
Herodotus demonstrates the existence of a collegiate command 
of Athenian forces. 
However, Fornara's argument does not include - a detailed 
296. 
analysis of Heroaotus' account of the actions at Artemisium, 
Salamis and Plataea, as far as Athenian strategoi are concerned; 
nor does he consider in detail the problem of how the Athenian 
system,if collegiality was operative, worked in conjunction 
with a Spartan commander-in-chief in practice. It is all very 
well to merely state that Themistocles, Xanthippus and Aristeides 
were the most important members of the strategia, as Fornara 
does, but the controversy which surrounds the whole question 
of the nature of the Athenian command system, the widespread 
acceptance in fact, of the view that these generals were superior 
in powers to the others, necessitates, if anything, an attempt 
at resolving the question of why and how Themistocles, Xanthippus 
and Aristeides were the most important strategoi if not within 
terms of the usual explanation. The nature of the case, I would 
suggest, demands precision. To put it differently, Fornara's 
statement, for example, that Themistocles, Aristeides and 
Xanthippus were the most important members of the strategia and 
dominated it just as Miltiades did in 490, (p.15) is not precisely 
accurate. In the case of Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus, 
I have argued that Herodotus' attention to them is explained by 
their political predominance, the very significant part 
they played in determining military strategy the Athenians 
adopted against Xerxes' forces. This also applies to Themistocles' 
role at Salamis, but if there is any basis for comparison,it 
rests with the consideration that Miltiades' persuasion of 
Callimachus is to a certain extent similar with Themistocles' 
influence on Eurybiades at Salamis, but only because no action 
could be taken without the decision of Callimachus and Eurybiades 
respectively. Miltiades dominated the strategia only in the 
sense that the other generals deferred to his experience by giving 
him the rotating rrpurcvisC) every day up to the time it was 
rightfully his, andafter the polemarch had reached a decision. 
The deadlock among the generals indicated the extent of 
Miltiades' influence over his colleagues. What was important 
was Miltiades' initiative (and perhaps his imagination as far 
as battle tactics were concerned) not his dominance of the 
strategia. At Salamis there is no question of Themistocles being 
opposed by other Athenian strategoi. Athens could protect her 
people at Salamis, Aegina and Troezen only if the Greek fleet 
controlled the Saronic Gulf. Themistocles was the natural 
spokesman for Athens because it was at his instigation that Athens 
made their defense by sea. If he was the dominant Athenian 
strategos at Salamis it was because his colleagues deferred to 
him for this reason. Miltiades' importance at Marathon rests 
simply with his initiative as a strategos, but an appreciation 
of the importance of Themistocles, Aristeides and Xanthippus 
as strategoi should be considered within the pntext of their 
political importance in the state as rrpret 4.VN,CS at Athens. 
79. See Hammond, p. 134. 
80. Thuc. 1.94.1. 
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81. Hdt. 7.204. 
82. As Hammond,p.135. 
83. See, for example, his phraseology at 8.49.1 and 7.204. 
84. As Hammond, pp. 136-7. 
85. Thuc. 1.76.1, Hdt. 8.3.2. 
86. Which is not inconceivable. See Diod. 11.44.2. 
87. Thuc. 1.94-2. 
88. See also Bicknell, DR., pp. 111-112. 
CHAPTER 5 
1. Fornala, especially, pp. 19-27. 
2. I cite below a bibliography of those who believe in the 
existence of a "strategos ex hapanton". 
Beloch, pp. 280ff. - 
Meyer, E., Geschiehte des Altertums, vol.3, Stuttgart, 1901. 
p. 347. 
Wade-Gery, H.T., CQ.,-vol.24, 1930, p. 38. Also Essays,p.115. 
Accame, S., "Le archeresia degli strateghi ateniesi nel V 
secolo", RFIC., vol.63, 1935, pp. 341ff. 
Pritchett, W.K., "The Term-of Office of Attic Strategoi", 
AJP.,. vol. lxi, 1940, pp.472-4. 
Lenz, F.W., "The Athenian Strategoi of the Years 441/40 and 
433/32", IAEA., vol. lxxii, 1941, p. 232. 
Ehrenberg, 	pp. 114ff. 
Gomme, vol.1, p. 386. 
Hignett, C., pp. 349ff. 
Jacoby, vol. 111b, suppl. ii, p.127, p. 135. 
Jameson, pp. 63ff. 
Westlake, H.D., "Sophocles and Nicias as Colleagues", 
Hermes, vol. 84, 1956, p. 112. 
Sealey, R., "Athens and the Archidamian War", FACA., 
vol.1, 1958, pp. 65ff. 
-Dover, pp. 61ff. 
Lewis, pp. 118ff. 
Mattingly, E.B., "The Growth of Athenian Imperialism", 
Historia, vol.13, 1963, pp. 258761. 
MacDowell, C.M., "Nikostratus'1, CQ., vol.55, 1965, pp. 42-44. 
_Hammond, -p.-132,-n..1, 
Jones, p. 127. 
Staveley, pp. 277ff. Also GR.,. pp. 43-47. 	- 
Woodbury, L., "Sophocles Among the Generals" Phoenix, 
.vol. 24, 1960, pp. 212ff. 
3. Fornara appears unaware that Leocrates, general in 479/8, 
may have had the same tribal affiliation as Xanthippus. 
4. See pp. 80ff. 
	
• 5. 	BS., p. 891, n.3; Meyer, ibid., 347f; Schwethn, p. 1080, 
and Kahrstedt, U., Untersuchunyen zur Magistratur in Athen, 
Stuttgart, 1936, pp. 27f. explained double representation as 
the result of exceptional circumstances, such as the inability 
of one tribe to provide a candidate, or the deposition or death 
of generals. 
6. 	Lenz, op.cit., pp. 226-32, presented a case for the existence 
of more than ten generals in 44110 and 433/2. Hammond, p.132, 
298. 
299. 
thinks there were 11 generals in 441/0 and Hignett, p. 355, 
admits the possibility. 
	
. 7. 	See p. 88. 
8. Beloch, p. 280. 
9. Fornara, pp. 19ff; Bicknell, DR., pp. 103ff; Staveley, 
pp. 275ff; Ehrenberg, p. 132, thinks that the ecclesia 
elected Phormio FOIrciorwv in 440 and 430 rather than Pericles. 
10. Wade-Gery, CQ., vol.24, 1930, p.38. 
11. Jacoby, p. 135; Gomme, p. 386; Sealey, p. 66; Hignett, p.352. 
For the weaknesses of Wade-Gary's hypothesis, particularly 
his analogy see pp. 48-49. 	Staveley, GR., pp. 43-47 distin- 
guishes the crparyos eg cm ir;wv from other strategoi but 
allows several a-rpirrip 	Qctvrov in a particular year. 
Compare with Fornara, p. 22, n.36. See further at chapter one, 
pp. 48ff. 
12. See also Dover, p. 66; Ehrenberg, p. 132; Hignett, pp. 352-3; 
Seeley, op.cit., pp. 66-7; Westlake, p. 112. 
13. Accame, op.cit.„ p. 346; Ehrenberg, pp. 122-132. 
14. Dover, pp. 61ff. For the use of the CtUr-cf:s formula to indicate 
•superior powers see Schwahn, p. 1079; Ehrenberg, p. 116; 
Hignett, p. 352.' 
15. Jameson, pp. 63ff; cf. Sealey, op.cit., pp. 65-66. According 
to.Jameson the best parallel for the existence of an annual 
--chairman comes from thenext most "important elected board in 
Athens the hellenotamiae. Such a conclusion is questionable 
even if the hellenotamiae did have a chairman. As has been 
-pointed out by .W.E. Thompson, ("Notes on the Treasurers of 
Athena", Hesperia, vol.39,19.004f0.58f0there is a major difference 
between the two offices. The treasurers had a collective 
responsibility throughout the year but the strategoi did not. 
Generals were responsible individually, not as a group, for the 
m6neys they received. Thus, there may. have been a good reason 
for the hellenotamiae to have a chairman. That reason does not 
exist for the strategoi. 
16. Lewis, p. 118. 
17. Hammond, p. 130, and p. 132, n.l. 
18. Jameson, p. 63. See also, for example, Sundwall, KU°, 
Beiheft iv, 1906, P.  20; 	BS., p. 1124; Hignett, p. 348; 
Seeley, op.cit., p.65. 
19. p. 49. 
300. 
19a. 	It is interesting to note that in 445 the Athenianschose c hi;cotres ?_g),401 v0(wv 	-17‘d-pc.is (Andoc. 3.6) to 
•arrange the Thirty Years Truce with Sparta. It cannot be 
denied that election of officials 4- conty-:-:-Jv was a 
fifth-century practice. 	It is also worthy of note that the 
choice of the number of ambassadors (ten) was not decided by 
the need for tribal representation. 	For a full discussion 
of the election of Athenian ambassadors see D.J. Mosley, 
"Voting Procedure and the Election of Athenian Envoys", 
Wiener Studien, vol.85,1MAR,140-144. 
20. Fornara, p. 22. 	Staveley, pp. 278ff., has also argued that 
Aristotle's reform took place before 441, but see my discussion, 
pp. 50 ff. 
21. I have criticized Fornara's interpretation of Ath Pa 22.2 
at pp. 13ff. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. See my discussion at pp. 80- .82 and p. 66. 
26. The reform of 501/0, for all we know, may have been an extra-
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1. See, for example, W.K. Pritchett, "The Term of Office of 
Attic Strategoi", AJP., vol. lxi, 1940, pp. 469-470; 
Hignett, p. 245, pp. 347-348; Fornara, p. 40, 
2. See, in particular, H.B. Mayor, "The Strategi at Athens in 
the Fifth Century. When did they Enter on Office?", JHS.,vol.59, 
1939, pp. 45-64. 
3. Ath Pol 44.4 
4. op.cit., p. 45. 
5. See also Meritt, Klio, vol. 52, 1970, pp. 277-278. Staveley, CR., 
p. 87, Kenyon, Aristotle on the Athenian Constit., pp. 141-142. 
6. As Meritt, ibid., p. 278. 
7. Mayor, op.cit., pp. 46-47. 
8. Pritchett, op.cit., p. 469. 
9. IG ii2 2854, 2856, 2857. See Pritchett, op.cit., pp. 470-471. 
10. Pritchett, op.cit., pp. 471-473. 
11. Meritt, op.cit., p.278. 
12. Wade-Gery, CQ., vol. 27, 1933, p. 28, believed that the 
strategoi assumed office at the beginning of the conciliar 
year. This idea was rendered untenable by Meritt, Hesperia, 
vol.5, 1936, p. 376, who proved that the conciliar year was 
not introduced at the same time as Cleisthenes' reforms but 
only later during the fifth century. See also Hignett, p. 348. 
13. As Meritt, Klio, op.cit., pp. 277-278. But compare with J. Sandys, 
Aristotle's Consitution of Athens, London, 1912, at 44.4. 
2 . 	.2 14. IC ii 892, IG ii 954, IC ii 2 955. 
15. Meritt, ibid., p. 278. 
16. Meritt, ibid., pp. 278ff. 
17. Meritt, ibid., p. 278. 
	
' 18. 	Ath PoZ 62.3. 
19. 	See also Fornara, pp. 74-75. 
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20. Fornara, p. 74. 
21. Thuc.•7.11ff, 	Xen. 1.7.4, 1.7.17. See also Jordan, Diss., 
p. 105. 
22. See also Fornara, p. 40. As a general consideration it does 
not seem unreasonable to suppose that in practice generals 
may sometimes have been delayed and failed to return before the 
expiry of the old year. See also p. 158. The point is that 
our sources, including Thucydides, are silent about the matter. 
23. Mayor, op.cit., p. 47. 
24. See also Fornara, p. 58; Pritchett, op.cit., pp. 473-74. 
25. Thuc. 4.75.1-2. 
26. Fornara, p. 69. 
27. See also Sealey, p. 105; D.M. MacDowell, CQ., vol. 15,n.s., 1965, 
p. 42. 
28. So Fornara, p. 75, for Cleon and Demosthenes; Sealey, pp. 108-109, 
for Cleon; Lewis, p. 120, for Demosthenes. 
29. For example, Seeley, p. 109. 
30. See pp. 151-155 for Cleon, pp. 145-151 for Demosthenes. 
31. See, for example, Comma, INT., vol.3, p. 577. 
32. Fornara, p. 75. 
33. Thuc. 2.95.3. 
34. See p. 223. 
35. Thuc. 3.7.1. 
36. Ath Poi 61.3. 
. 37. i.e. their term of office would expire at the same time as 
generals who were elected at the regular 	
l 
ctccitrz..5- icu . 
:APPENDIX - 4 
1. See Chapter 5. 
2. H.B. Mattingly, "The Growth of Athenian Imperialism", Historia, 
vol. 13, 1963, pp. 257-261. 
3. • See, for example, A.G.:Woodhead, "The Site of Brea ; Thucydides 
1.61.4", CQ., vol.2, n.s., 1952, pp. 57-62; M-L., pp. 129-32. 
tk 4. IC i2,.45, lines 8-9 read as follows:- AefujorAstSti,v dS ice rcce - v / 
450 [Qv (16T-clq eiT o pa) iecuri .)(1.v ouvrc i k fp frta • 
Mattingly assumes that Demokleides, not being ' a member of the 
Council, proposed the decree as a strategos. 
5. IG i 2 50, line 28. 
6. That is ., involving Demokleides. 
7. Aristoph. Wasps 895; Plat. Lach. 197c. 
8. IG i2 355, line 51. 
9. Fornara, p. 58. 
10. See Lewis, p. 121. 
11. Wade-Gery, CQ., Vol. 24, 1930, pp: 34-35. 
12. I have included Eurymedon on the list for 423/2. See p. 225. 
13. For the deme of Eurymedon, brother-in-law of Plato, see Diog. 
Laert 3.42.43. 
 
• 14. 	Tod, Greek Historical Inscription, Oxford, 1946, p. 138; 
Seeley, p. 89; MacDowell, "Nicostratus", CQ., vo1.15, 
1965, pp. 44-45 and n.4; Gomme, HCT., vol.3, pp. 627-625; 
Fornara, p. 58, p. 78; Lewis, p.119 and M-L., p. 207, p.:13; 
J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, Oxford, 1971, p.334. 
15. See also Game, INT., vol.3, pp. 627-28. 
16. Wade-Gery, op.cit., p,39. 
17. See also MacDowell, op.cit., p. 44, n.4. 
18. Fornara, p. 78. 
19. MacDcwc11, op.cit., pp. 44f. 
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20. See also Lewis, p. 119, for the suggestion that ...11,rfaivei 
may be a hellenotamias, rejected in turn by MacDowel1, op.cit, 
p. 44, n.4. 
)/ 21. Speusippos died in 339/38 'sripcucs coV. (D.L. 4.3, 4.14. 
See Davies, op. cit. , p. 334). 
22. See Davies, op.cit., p. 332, p.. 334. 
23. Schol. Aristoph. Lys. 313. 
24. Plut. Alc. 25.2 
25. Thuc. 8.25.1. 
26. Thuc. 8.25.1. 
27. Dem. 58.17-18. 
28. Lewis, p. 122. 
29. Xen. 1.1.12. 
30. Thuc. 8.76.2. 
31. Xen. 1.1.12. 
32. See pp. 230-233. 
33. Diod. 13.64.2-4. 
34. Fornara, p. 69. 
35. As Andrewes, p. 3. 
36, Fornara, p. 69. 
37. Cf. Fornara, p. 69; Andrewes, pp. 2ff. 
38. Diod. 13.64-13.68; Xen. 1.4.9. 
39. Thuc. 8.97.3. 
40. Xen. 1.4.20. 
41. See pp. 234-236. 
42. Xen. 1.4.21. 
43. Xen. 1.4.9. 
44. Xen. 1.5.18ff. 	G.E. Underhill, A commentary on the EeZlenica, 
Oxford, 1906, at 1.4.10, suggested that of the ten geaeraLs 
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elected Xenophon only mentions the commanders of the fleet. 
See also Jameson, pp. 85-86. 
45. Fornara, p. 70, completely dismisses this as evidence. 
Cleophon's father was Cleippides, most probably the same man 
who was general in 429/28. See Vanderpool, Ilesp:. v61.21, 1952, 
pp. 114ff. 
47. See Jameson, pp. 86-87; Lewis, p. 123. 
48. For example, Xanthippus - Pericles - Pericles; Miltiades - 
Cimon-Lacedaimonius; Phormio - Asopius; Ragnon Theramenes; 
Lamachus - Tydeus. 
49. Lewis, p. 123. 
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